

8 Aug.
#16

Governmental Affairs

NEW YORK TIMES
3 August 1975

Modern Intelligence: Myth and Reality

By William E. Colby

WASHINGTON—The Aztecs thought the Sun God had to be strengthened each day by the sacrifice of a young man or woman. Without the sacrifice the sun could not rise.

The myth of the Sun God's need drove the nation through the daily travail of the sacrifice.

The reality of astronomy to explain the sunrise was unknown.

Today we have myths about our intelligence. They are expressed in sensational catchwords: "dirty tricks," "invisible government," "terminate with extreme prejudice," "lie to anyone but the President," "infiltration of the White House," "destabilization," "secret war," "massive illegal."

They come from old, outmoded ideas about intelligence: espionage, intrigue, derring-do.

These myths achieve lives of their own. Formal denials, evidence to the contrary, and independent, serious, follow-up assessments of the true proportions of a catch phrase never overtake the original allegation. The myth becomes accepted as reality.

In normal times, these myths are but part of the life of an intelligence professional, like the anonymity and the lonely challenges, intellectual as well as physical, of a demanding craft.

Today, however, these individual myths are gaining momentum and mass. They tend to portray intelligence as unconstitutional, improper, unwanted by our citizens. They threaten American intelligence's ability to contribute to the political, economic and military safety and welfare of our nation. These myths threaten intelligence's ability to help our country to negotiate with—not confront—opponents in an unsettled world.

If we believe these myths, we can make our own mistaken Aztec sacrifice—American intelligence—in the belief that only thus can the democratic sun of our free society rise.

We must not sacrifice a virile, a necessary, contributor to the safety of our nation, the welfare of our citizens, and peacekeeping in the world of the future to a handful of myths. The reality of intelligence today is as different from the myths about it as the reality of astronomy from the Aztec myth of the sunrise.

Let's note some of the realities:

Our careful centralization of foreign information from open, public sources provides us with a compendium and continuity of facts.

America's technical genius has revolutionized intelligence. It has given us new views of distant objects, new abilities to analyze and absorb masses of data and detail, new ways to keep up with the fast-moving and

complex world of today.

To these must still be added that information that we can only get from the resourceful, dedicated clandestine operator. He is the only one who can overcome the barriers of the closed and hostile societies that share our planet. He can tell us of secret plans for tomorrow or the research ideas of today. He tells us of the human interaction—something no technology can show—among groups and leaders of closed societies.

Experts of independence, talent and intellectual integrity study this wealth of reporting. They write objective assessments of world affairs free from domestic political bias or Government departments' budget desires.

Intelligence collection and analysis cover not only military threats but political problems and economic dangers as well. Intelligence forecasts of future trends abroad permit us to make national decisions about future foreign threats in time to react.

Intelligence permits us to negotiate international differences before they become disputes. And today the excellence of our information now contributes to a new role for intelligence: peacemaking and peacekeeping.

With sure information about the plans, capabilities and dispositions of the political and military forces on both sides of foreign crises, we can clarify their misunderstandings of each other that might lead them to go to war; we can reassure both sides of getting from us early warning of hostile moves by the other side.

Perhaps the strongest myths relate to the Central Intelligence Agency's mission of covert political and paramilitary action. Today's reality is that little of this nature is done. What is done is fully controlled by the policy levels of our Government and is reported to committees of the Congress.

This, then, is the reality of modern intelligence. We understand why the myths arose, as we understand why the Aztec myth was born, but serious and scientific investigations by the Congressional committees examining intelligence will clarify the need of our free society for intelligence and show the excellence of the intelligence

LONDON TIMES
22 July 1975

Union federation wins damages from Penguin

Penguin Books yesterday apologized publicly in the High Court to the general secretary of an international labour federation for the suggestion in one of its books that his organization was under the control of the Central Intelligence Agency.

The company also agreed to pay unspecified damages to Mr Tom Sansby Bavin, general secretary of the International Federation of Plantation, Agricultural and Allied Workers in Geneva, who brought a libel action over the book, *Inside the Company: CIA Diary*, by Philip Agee.

Mr Marshall Andrews, for Penguin, told Mr Justice Eveleigh that the libel would be withdrawn from all future editions of the book.

structure that serves it. They should also show the true proportions of the missteps of the past, and the national atmosphere in which they occurred.

With this new perception of reality should also come clear direction and effective supervision. This will insure that the new reality remains fully compatible with our free society. For this, too, is a reality of American intelligence, that it must conform to the will of the American public as well as our constitutional procedures.

This need not include some new myth that "the public has a right to know" everything. The citizen does have a right to expect that this new reality of intelligence will protect his country's essential secrets.

We protect other American secrets: proceedings of grand juries, diplomacy, trade, income tax and census data, although intelligence secrets are being exposed in unprecedented, and dangerous, volume.

Secrecy is not new in America. Intelligence professionals accept, indeed seek, a better discipline to enforce adherence to the fundamental obligation of intelligence, that it protect its sources.

With public understanding of the realities of American intelligence, we can avoid a useless Aztec sacrifice. Nor need we believe that ultimate myth: that America does not have the responsibility and restraint necessary to have the best intelligence service in the world.

William E. Colby is the Director of Central Intelligence.

PUBLISHER'S WEEKLY
21 JULY 1975

Norton nosed out the competition in an auction for Sam Adams's "Fourteen Three" by slightly topping the next highest offer of \$50,000 and bettering the customary royalty rate and reprint split. Adams, a descendant of John Adams and John Quincy Adams, entered the CIA at a time when it seemed respectable. His book, still to be written, grows out of a time when the service has become. Scott Meredith was the auctioneer.

TIME

4 AUGUST 1975

Efficiency: Low Momentum: Low Morale: Low

"The CIA is broken," says a leading Administration official. That statement is undoubtedly an exaggeration, but throughout the top echelons of the U.S. Government there is a growing sense of alarm that the congressional investigations of the CIA, combined with repeated press charges and disclosures about its activities, have seriously damaged the agency's effectiveness. Morale has dropped among senior staffers, who bitterly claim they are the victims of a post-Watergate witch hunt. Old allies abroad are wary about cooperating with the CIA, fearing that their secrets will leak, or sources be compromised. U.S. intelligence operations against the Soviet Union have been harmed. Says one White House aide: "We're all paying a price."

Since its formation in 1947, the CIA has had two basic assignments: 1) to provide the Executive branch of the Government with reliable information about what is happening abroad, and 2) to influence events overseas without publicly or militarily involving the U.S.—giving the U.S. some alternative "between diplomatic protest and sending in the Marines," in the words of CIA Director William Colby.

The CIA leadership stoutly maintains that the agency is operating at 90% of its old effectiveness even after a year of investigation and publicity. Few agree with that figure. Says one senior expert on the U.S. intelligence efforts: "Their analysis is not outstanding, and their covert operations are marginal. I'd say that their B-plus grade has slipped to B-minus."

All Goosy. The President's daily intelligence summary, for example, used to come almost entirely from the CIA. Now the report draws much more heavily on material from the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, and offers fewer insights. Says one White House aide about the CIA: "They're all goosy over there, and it shows. The sense of intellectual momentum from the agency is just not there."

A similar wariness has afflicted the agency's covert and paramilitary operations. The CIA used to propose about 50% of these missions (the rest coming usually from the State Department or the National Security Council). At least twice during the past two years, Government sources claim, the CIA has played a key (but unpublicized) role in defusing potential outbreaks of war in the Middle East and the eastern Mediterranean. Now the agency's recommendations have dried up. Intelligence sources variously describe the Directorate of Operations as "dead in the water" and "paralyzed." While CIA leaders call such characterizations overblown, other Government officials note that the agency has shown no sign of taking action, which might have been expected in the past, to restrain Portugal's lurch toward

a left-wing dictatorship.

One major factor inhibiting the CIA is the assignment of responsibility for "black" operations. According to long-established practice, a CIA operation has to be planned in consultation with the Assistant Secretary of State who deals with the part of the world where the plan would go into effect. Understandably, the assistant secretaries are now wary of supporting such operations; they are afraid that some day they may have to testify about them before a congressional committee. As one high-level source puts it: "There is inevitably a good deal of bureaucratic ass-covering going on."

More important, however, is a new set of ground rules that assigns responsibility to the White House. In the past, the formal responsibility was assumed by a small group of top intelligence, defense and foreign affairs officials known as the "40 Committee" and headed by Henry Kissinger. Presidents have almost always given their direct authorization for covert operations abroad (although their roles in the agency's various alleged schemes for assassinations are still far from clear), but they could always avoid personal blame if a secret operation was "blown" by disclosure. This insulating of the President is of course one of the factors that is now frustrating the Church committee's efforts to find out exactly who authorized what. The main purpose was to avoid international confrontations. When the U.S. efforts to raise a Soviet submarine from the Pacific were revealed by the press last March (TIME, March 31), for example, President Gerald Ford made no comment upon the affair and thus made it unnecessary for the Soviet Union to act indignant.

This delicate system, to preserve the President's "deniability," was upset by Congress last December when it approved a measure ordering the President himself to certify that any proposed operation "is important to the national security of the U.S.," and to report on the mission "to the appropriate committee of Congress." With the responsibility now clearly his and his alone, any President is going to think twice before approving a risky covert operation, however necessary he may deem it to be.

Holding Back. This increasingly public aspect of traditionally secret operations has changed U.S. relations with both friends and adversaries. There is evidence of increasing reluctance on the part of allies to share secrets with the CIA. Says Ray Cline, the agency's former deputy director for intelligence and now a director of Georgetown University's Center for Strategic and International Studies: "In the old days, people in allied outfits competed with each other to have a close relationship with the CIA because it cast credit on them with their bosses. But now a close relationship can be more of a liability. Our friends are definitely worried and scared. If they have something sensitive, they're concerned that it might come out when they share it with us. As a result, they're holding back, and frankly, I don't blame them."

For the Soviets, of course, the trend

toward exposing the CIA is priceless. According to Dr. Albert Hall, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, it has become easier for the Kremlin to take countermeasures "to deny us information we need and have come to count on." Dr. Hall refuses to name a specific example, but other top-level sources cite one. On May 25, the New York Times revealed that U.S. submarines, specially equipped with electronic spying gear and operating under the code name Holystone, had been monitoring Soviet missile activities for 15 years, sometimes within Russian territorial waters. As a result of that story, U.S. officials say, the Kremlin stopped Holystone by planting some underwater mines and erecting jamming and shielding devices around the targets. The Times report infuriated U.S. intelligence officials—"mischievous" was about the kindest description of it. One baffled Soviet diplomat shook his head over a Bloody Mary in Washington and commented that the relationship between the American press and the American Government was "anarchy." Jokes Cline: "The only unrestricted intelligence organization in this country is the American press."

Looking ahead, U.S. intelligence officials are worried that the curtailing of the CIA will jeopardize the Government's ability to monitor Soviet compliance—or noncompliance—with arms-control agreements. (Observation satellites, although extremely helpful, do not reveal all.) Says Dr. Fred Ikle, director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency: "More and more, imaginative and occasionally daring operations are necessary—unless, of course, the Soviet Union becomes a more open society."

Sharp Split. Within the organization itself, the charges that the CIA has illegally conducted surveillance of Americans at home and been involved in assassination and undercover plots abroad have created a sharp split among agency personnel. Attending staff meetings, Director Colby has found himself subjected to anguished questions by two groups of subordinates. Some CIA men and women—mostly young intelligence analysts—are as outraged as the editorial writers and congressional critics about the agency's transgressions. In contrast, the people in operations—mostly veterans of the early days of the cold war—feel that the agency is being unfairly attacked for carrying out orders emanating from the White House. Asks one oldtimer: "Do you mean to tell us you're going to send us to jail for doing our patriotic duty?"

The differences between the two groups were sharply revealed when staffers gathered in a CIA auditorium last spring to watch a videotape of an interview in Canada with former Agent Philip Agee, who quit the agency to write an exposé of the CIA (see BOOKS). After the screening, a lively debate broke out between those who felt that some of Agee's charges were well founded and those who denounced him as a contemptible traitor.

As the furor continues, the White House is trying to decide how to reform the CIA without ruining it. Essentially, the President and his close

advisers believe that the agency should be maintained in its present general form and have the capability to mount covert operations. The Administration is not likely to accept the advice of former Defense Secretary Clark Clifford and others who argue that the CIA should be split into two separate units: one for intelligence gathering and one for covert operations. White House officials believe that this could be inefficient, since the two functions often involve the same agents. In addition, there is the fear that putting operations under a separate and smaller agency might bring them too close to Pentagon influence.

Public Budget. The goals of the White House are to restore public confidence in the functions of the intelligence agency and establish an effective congressional watchdog organization. President Ford, say his top aides, now favors the creation of a special joint committee, drawing members from both the House and Senate, that would have the power—still not spelled out—to oversee the operations of the CIA. Such a step was recommended by both the Rockefeller Commission, which looked into the domestic transgressions of the CIA, and a blue-ribbon commission on foreign policy that was created by President Richard Nixon and headed by Robert D. Murphy, a former Under Secretary of State.

Also under consideration by the White House is a Rockefeller suggestion that at least part of the CIA budget should be made public; it is now entirely hidden in the nooks and cran-

nies of other agencies' appropriations. Furthermore, the President is mulling over a recommendation made by both the Rockefeller and Murphy commissions that, as a general rule, the director of the CIA should be chosen from outside the agency—a point that is agreed upon in principle by none other than Director Colby, 55, the archetypal insider at the agency.

Colby's experience has been almost entirely in the covert field from the time he parachuted into France in 1943 to lead an underground operation until he served as head of the CIA's plans, a job he left to become director in June 1973, just a year before the roof fell in. Since the beginning of 1975, Colby has had to spend most of his working hours coping with the criticisms of the organization. He has testified 36 times this year before a variety of congressional committees,* maintaining his poise admirably and replying frankly to hostile questions. Indeed, Colby is being criticized privately at the highest levels of the Government for being needlessly apologetic. One senior official characterizes him as "the kind of guy who, when he is given a parking ticket, admits to seven felonies."

Sooner or later, quite possibly by the end of this year, Colby seems certain to be asked to leave—a fate that he accepts philosophically. Says one White House aide: "He inherited all the skeletons in the closet and issued all the corrective memoranda, but that's not going to make him any less expendable. He should be allowed to see the investigation through, then retire with honor."

Tough Questions. The search for

Colby's successor as director is already quietly under way. One prime possibility is Elliot Richardson, now the U.S. Ambassador to Great Britain, formerly Under Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense and Attorney General. Richardson earned a national reputation for probity when he quit as Attorney General during Richard Nixon's Saturday Night Massacre rather than accede to demands to take the pressure off the Watergate investigation. Other names being mentioned: former Treasury Secretary George Shultz, former Assistant Attorney General William Ruckelshaus and former Deputy Defense Secretary Cyrus Vance. Whoever is chosen is likely to face tough questioning during his confirmation hearings. "There will be one hell of a fight and an attempt to tie him down," predicts a senior policymaker.

But finding the right man for the top job will be only part of the answer to the fundamental question of what kind of a clandestine operation the U.S. is prepared to conduct: How dirty should the dirty tricks be? The Hill and the White House will have to come to a basic accord on the matter, then work out a reasonable way for Congress to monitor the work of the agency. Until this happens, the CIA will continue to be a badly shaken organization working below its potential to serve the nation.

*The agency is also defending itself against 13 lawsuits aimed at prying out information. In addition, because of the new Freedom of Information Act, it has had to answer nearly 4,500 requests from individuals and organizations demanding copies of any information about themselves in CIA files (in 90% of the cases, there is none).

CHICAGO TRIBUNE

30 JULY 1975

Frank Starr

What guidelines for intelligence?



WASHINGTON—There is considerable talk here these days about changing the law governing intelligence operations.

Even if the Rockefeller Commission, the Murphy Commission, the Church committee, and others produce little actual result, they've declared open season on the 1947 law—reason enough perhaps to consider some alternatives.

Two of the men most qualified to discuss such a change—from opposite viewpoints—are least likely to engage in actual rewriting of the law: either may have some influence on it.

One is Clark Clifford, who as a young lawyer was asked in 1945 by President Truman to study unification of the armed services and establishment of a central repository of intelligence information. That was the beginning of an intimate acquaintance with intelligence that included later posts as chairman of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board and secretary of defense.

The other is Lt. Gen. Vernon Walters, now deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency, who was beginning his own active career in the field three years before Clifford's work started.

Now their views overlap only at the far edge. Walters briefly concedes that the probes may be beneficial, but then emphasizes that the U.S. is in a seriously threatened situation and may be

irretrievably damaged if its ability to gather intelligence is permanently impaired. Clifford, on the other hand, briefly concedes that we should have a CIA but insists that the old days of spying are gone, replaced by technological means.

So what about a new law and guidelines for the conduct of intelligence operations? The key clause most contested is the catch-all one, which says the CIA shall perform such other functions as shall be assigned to it by the National Security Council. That was included 30 years ago, says Clifford, because without experience in the field it was impossible to foresee all contingencies; it now should be dropped. Walters believes it's still impossible to foresee, and thereby foreclose action to meet, all contingencies; the clause should stay.

The new law Clifford envisages should provide for a full-time White House official—not the CIA director as proposed by the Murphy group or the national security adviser as now provided—to act as liaison between the President and the intelligence community. He would be a buffer between President and CIA, assuring that each understood the other completely.

Covert operations, the meddling in

done, should in Clifford's view be removed from CIA to a separate agency reporting to the White House and overseen by a joint congressional committee.

That committee, Clifford believes, must be small and well chosen to prevent leaks, but it should control the entire CIA budget and give advance approval to foreign covert operations. It is the President, Clifford believes, who needs oversight. He can't be expected to appoint his own overseers in the advisory board and the CIA director.

Walters, with a trace of stoicism in his otherwise jolly manner, says the CIA can operate under any guidelines the Congress can write and adds that it has never in the past had trouble with leaks from the oversight committee. This, of course, begs the question. The committee, in the past, took the view that it didn't want to know all those things that were going on.

There is only one huge caveat in Walters' acceptance of guidelines. If you write them, he says, you must also write in a mechanism for adapting them to changing public attitudes about intelligence.

Operations that seemed appropriate in the 1950s are not acceptable in the 1970s, he says, and he doesn't want to be judged by 1990 standards for things done—or not done—in 1976.

The Unmaking of a Spy

By RICHARD R. LINGEMAN

INSIDE THE COMPANY. CIA Diary. By Philip Agee. 340 pages. Stonehill Publishing Company. \$9.95.

Philip Agee's "Inside the Company" is not a diary of nearly 10 years with the Central Intelligence Agency, as the subtitle might suggest. As he explains in the foreword, the diary form is a device to organize his material. What Mr. Agee has done is to reconstruct the events he experienced from memory and supplemental research. Thus the book is more history than diary, with large chunks of material on the political, social and economic backgrounds for events he observed as an operations officer in Ecuador, Uruguay and Mexico from 1960 through 1968.

The book was first published in Britain to avoid the kind of C.I.A. censorship that shredded parts of Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks's "The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence." Its most valuable purpose is that of exposure, with Mr. Agee playing the "whistle-blower" who brings heretofore secret information into the light of public revelation. Although previous "outside" reporting on the C.I.A. has given us a pretty good idea of how the agency plies its sub rosa trade, we have never before had such a detailed account of its operations written by an insider, albeit a relatively low-level one whose service was limited to Latin America.

Open Window on a Secret World

Circumscribed as Mr. Agee's vantage point is, it nonetheless throws open a window on much of the C.I.A.'s secret world, and it is doubtful that the agency's methods elsewhere differ much from the ones Mr. Agee describes. In his eagerness to tell all, however, he almost swamps the reader at the outset while describing his preliminary training at the C.I.A. school at Camp Peary, Va. Here the "diary" reads like a digest of C.I.A. training manuals or even a Soviet secret agency confession.

It is when Mr. Agee moves on to his first assignment in Ecuador that the story loses its textbook quality and gains in authority. Here again, he leads off with what seems to be the entire file drawer as he describes the mission of the Quito "station," the political situation in Ecuador, all the various pending cases and even the cryptonyms of various informers—as well as their real names when he can remember them. This background is useful, though, because it sets the stage for Mr. Agee's description of what he and his colleagues did: In Ecuador—and the countries where Mr. Agee subsequently served—the C.I.A. mounted an aggressive, sometimes highly effective campaign of countersubversion against leftist groups. If it did not control the country's destiny, it certainly amended the political scenario in significant ways.

The book reports wide penetration of Ecuadorian life—the Government, the police, labor, left wing, right wing—even the World Assembly of Youth, an "umbrella" organization embracing, among other groups, the Boy Scouts and the Junior

Red Cross. (One is touched to read that when the station chief was transferred, a local civic group gave him a medal "in recognition of his work with youth and sports groups in Quito.") The book goes on:

Not content merely to inform the police of the whereabouts of a guerrilla band, the Quito station also persuaded them to exaggerate the number of guerrillas still operating when the arrests were announced to the press. Forged documents were planted on leftists by compliant police, who then leaked their "discovery" to the newspapers. Numerous propaganda campaigns were concocted and financed; militant-action groups were formed to provoke anti-Communist crackdowns; an unremitting campaign to force the Government to break off diplomatic relations with Cuba was carried out—all these in addition to "normal" intelligence gathering. There were no coups or bought elections but nonetheless Ecuador was Chile written small—or rather Chile on an annual budget of \$500,000, which was all the Quito station had to play with.

We tend to think overmuch of C.I.A. bungles; what Mr. Agee's book shows is that, left to itself, the organization is frequently all too effective. The trouble is that the means determine the ends, and the ends, in the sense of larger moral and policy consequences, are lost sight of. Mr. Agee's own disillusionment came when he began to assess these larger implications. He concluded that the agency was playing a powerful yet largely negative role as defender of a corrupt, exploitative status quo. Not only the C.I.A.'s activities in South America, but also other military and internal-security aid programs, merely shored up the ruling minority—the 5 per cent controlling over one-third of the wealth—by guaranteeing law and order. Once protest (read, the left) was silenced, with C.I.A. help, there was no incentive for reform.

An Arguable Conclusion

It is here that the diary becomes a political document. Mr. Agee's analysis of South American conditions is informative; his conclusion that only revolution (presumably of the Cuban type) can end gross economic inequities is certainly arguable.

Yet as an account of Mr. Agee's conversion "Inside the Company" falls rather flat; deep introspection is lacking, and the convert seems to have made a rather abrupt flip-flop from amoral C.I.A. technician to knee-jerk Marxist-Leninist. So when he tries to assess the meaning of the C.I.A. in terms of his newfound faith, Mr. Agee falls into a ritualistic denunciation of it as the inevitable "secret police of capitalism." The C.I.A. is a tool—and one that occasionally slips out of control—of American foreign policy and especially the President and that is something else—something more complicated and ambiguous yet also, at least potentially, more controllable by public opinion in convincing and disturbing detail.

4 AUGUST 1975

Company Man

INSIDE THE COMPANY:

CIA DIARY

by PHILIP AGEE

640 pages. Stonehill. \$9.95.

The Rockefeller Commission report detailed its transgressions. Two congressional investigations are probing its involvement in assassination plots and domestic spying. The press keeps producing fresh disclosures. With all this going on, the CIA looks less like a clandestine fraternity and more like an open society. New sensations would seem impossible to find, and few, if any, are contained in the latest CIA exposé by former Agent Philip Agee. His book, *Inside the Company*, is a sheaf of accusations and recollections that can no longer astonish a world grown familiar with the vagaries of secret services. Nevertheless, Agee's tales are worth attention, less for their shock value than for the descriptions of a subterranean arena.

If ever the CIA recruited a candidate of uncompromising devotion, Agee seemed to be the man. When he joined "the Company" fresh out of Notre Dame in 1956, the graduate experienced an epiphany atop the Washington Monument. In a soliloquy straight out of a Loyalty Day pageant, Agee claims to have sworn, "I'll be a warrior against Communist subversive erosion of freedom and personal liberties around the world—a patriot dedicated to the preservation of my country and our way of life."

Under the curious cover name of Jeremy S. Hodapp, Agee was assigned to the U.S. embassy in Quito, Ecuador, and then in Montevideo, Uruguay. Hodapp's good works later made him aide to the U.S. ambassador in Mexico. As described by Agee, the CIA's penetration of these South American nations was so thorough that it became a silent partner in the governments. Mexican authorities cooperated with the CIA to such an extent that the Company could tap 40 key telephone lines.

Using agents to tap phones and penetrate the Ecuadorian Communist party, Agee & Co. worked out an elaborate ruse to discredit a leftist named Antonio Flores Benitez. They concocted a report in the name of Flores, depicting him as a violent revolutionary. The paper was secreted in a tube of toothpaste. One of the agents at the airport then concealed the tube up his sleeve and let it fall out while examining Flores' luggage. When the document was "discovered," the ensuing uproar in the press helped discredit the government.

Comely Agent. A military junta took over, much to Agee's satisfaction. Still he kept close tabs on the generals. The mistress of one of his agents was the official stenographer for Cabinet meetings; Agee was privy to transcripts before the new governors. The CIA concentrated heavily on discovering the secrets of Cubans, Soviets and satellites. Agents installed eavesdropping bugs in apartments. Lip readers studied films taken of Soviet officials strolling in their embassy gardens. If the subtle approach failed, the Company happily played the role of pimp for overamorous Soviet of-

The New York Times Book Review/August 3, 1975

*Is there a secret police of American capitalism?***Inside the Company**

CIA Diary.

By Philip Agee.

629 pp. New York:

Stonehill. \$9.95.

By WALTER PINCUS

It almost takes the stamina and interest of a Soviet spy to get through Philip Agee's attempt to relate everything he knew and did during his 12 years as a Central Intelligence Agency operations officer—his selection, training and assignments in Ecuador, Uruguay and Mexico in the 1960's, and his final disillusionment and resignation at the end of 1969. Too bad "Inside the Company" is such a task to read, because there is important information buried in its 600 or so pages that the general American public should understand, particularly with today's debate over the past and future roles of the C.I.A.

Agee, however, wants his book to be more than just an exposé for his readers. He wants to convince them that "the C.I.A., after all, is nothing more than the secret police of American capitalism, plugging up leaks in the political dam, night and day, so that shareholders of United States companies operating in poor countries can continue enjoying the rip-off." To support this thesis, the book is weighed down with polemics which Agee thinks of as "the more difficult political and economic realities that give the [covert C.I.A.] operations meaning."

To my way of thinking they don't. Instead they offer a distorted picture of many ugly and often unnecessary attempts by United States agents to manipulate politically unstable Latin American countries. According to Agee, the Americans are always one-dimensional operatives, their indigenous agents pliant and money-seeking; no one on that side acts for noble or even patriotic reasons. The political and economic "realities" in Agee's world also never seem to include disruptive acts by Cuban or Soviet agents, though bombings, strikes and guerrilla warfare were being promoted by their Communist agents. I don't believe such actions justified the total C.I.A. interventionist response, but by leaving them out Agee defeats his overall purposes.

Agee also sees his book as a means to "neutralize the C.I.A.'s support to repression" in third world countries—an objective he hopes to accomplish by exposing names of Agency "officers so that their presence . . . becomes untenable." The close attachments developed between C.I.A. and host country police and intelligence organizations has always been a scandal; it is a United States national policy followed just as conscientiously by United States military organizations.

Walter Pincus is a Washington journalist and consultant for NBC News.

ficials. One was lured into bed by a comely agent, where his performance—said to be remarkable—was photographed and recorded for possible future use.

In a scene reminiscent of the Watergate bungle, Agee kept watch one night, walkie-talkie in hand, while two technicians and an engineer tried to bug the Czech legation in Ecuador. The agents were caught in the act by four guards. The fast-talking engineer saved the day by taking the guards aside to allay their curiosity while the technicians furiously ripped out installations.

The encounter is one of the few memorable passages in a book stuffed with detail. Indeed, Agee includes so many facts and names that the book has two glossaries, one for the cast of characters, another for organizations—as if the reader were wading through *War and Peace*. Perhaps, in a sense, he is. The events in *Inside the Company* are a matter of life and death; below their flat prose there moves a complex universe of national intrigue and human paradox.

The greatest paradox is Agee himself; his conversion is never fully explained. The superpatriot simply decides one day that he has been on the wrong side all along: the good guys were the revolutionaries. "The CIA," he writes with pious hindsight, "is nothing more than the secret police of American capitalism, plugging up leaks in the political dam night and day so that shareholders of U.S. companies operating in poor countries can continue enjoying their rip-off."

With his new vision as a Marxist socialist, Agee quit the CIA in 1969 and wrote his book abroad while bugged and hounded, he claims, by Company agents. Agee profited from the experience of Victor Marchetti, another disillusioned CIA agent and co-author of *The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence*. When Marchetti set out to publish his exposé in the U.S., the CIA took him to court and scissored out 168 passages. To avoid this fate, Agee first published his book in Britain. Once it was out, and a bestseller, the CIA decided to make no attempt at censorship in the U.S.

Although the CIA also refuses comment on the book's accuracy, independent intelligence experts, unable to vouch for details, think most of it rings true—a fact that should shock only the naive. In a world full of other intelligence agencies and dirty tricks, a good deal of the CIA's work may be defended as useful and even necessary.

The most volatile aspect of this angry volume remains the author's indiscretion: he has blown the cover of hundreds of CIA men and Latin American agents. Agee took the step to discredit and cripple the CIA, surely knowing he was threatening the lives of these men and women. The ex-agent, who now lives on the Cornish coast in England, blandly claims that "as far as I know, no one has been endangered as a result." The CIA will not reveal what has happened to the people named by its former employee, but it is known that the Company has changed its operations in Latin America. Agee hit home—and hard. With some justification, the officials of the Company now bitterly call him "our first defector."

James A. Walter

abroad. If Agee limited his naming names to those in the police end of things it would be understandable. He does not. Page after page of C.I.A. covert operations—intelligence gathering as well as political action—are listed along with the names of Americans directing them and the hundreds of Ecuadorian, Uruguayan, Mexican and other nationals who have served as paid or unpaid C.I.A. agents. There are so many individuals named along with their cryptonyms and pseudonyms that two full appendices are devoted to explaining them. When Agee was in agent-training he found the use of acronyms "rather complicated" and "confusing." His own use of names and cryptonyms is no less confusing to readers who don't plan to become agents.

This torrent of names, however, raises a question about some of Agee's sources and the purpose of his book. In a recent *Playboy* interview, Agee said that "I had no notes from my C.I.A. days; I had to find contemporary sources to refresh my memory, so I could reconstruct events." In a 15-page section early in the book, Agee lists some 24 covert C.I.A. operations which he said were under way in Ecuador in December, 1960, when he was first assigned there. He not only lists the operations but also the real names and cryptonyms of 34 Ecuadorians whom he identifies as C.I.A. agents working on these operations.

It is hard to believe a man without notes could sit down 12 years later and recall from memory that many agents' names or reconstruct intelligence operations without any assistance from individuals who themselves had been collecting that very same information. Thus it seems likely that during Agee's 1971 trip to Havana for research, the "considerable material" he found there was of this intelligence variety. Both Agee and Cuban intelligence have, in a sense, an identical goal—to disrupt C.I.A. activities in Latin America. Agee's book certainly has done that, though any major public response apparently will come only with a Spanish edition of the book.

Once the American reader gets over the twin hurdles of Marxian polemics and exposure for destruction's sake, the book has real rewards. It describes how the C.I.A. functioned in Ecuador and Uruguay between 1961 and 1966 far beyond any point of public or even Congressional understanding of the intelligence agency's mission. True, Presidents Kennedy and Johnson had declared that Cuba's Castro was exporting revolution to countries of Latin America. What each President did not say was that he

had directed the C.I.A. to fight back, using covert methods. In short, the United States was exporting counter-revolution.

As Agee puts it, when he arrived in Quito in December, 1960, the Ecuador C.I.A. station's basic campaign was "to promote a break in diplomatic relations between Ecuador and Cuba." To support that effort, according to Agee, the C.I.A. financed anti-Castro political candidates and even gave money to those running for office in labor union and university student government organizations if they were anti-Castro. Through Ecuadorian police the Agency arranged for the bugging of pro-Castro leaders and even directed C.I.A.-paid surveillance teams to follow specific individuals both inside and outside leftist organizations. False documents were placed in newspapers through a respected newsman who Agee says was a paid C.I.A. agent.

The agency also apparently controlled a hemisphere-wide news service and used it to circulate misinformation to aid in the anti-Cuban program. At one point, Agee describes how one pro-Castro individual was framed when a phony report was slipped into a toothpaste tube and planted on him so that it would be "discovered" when he returned to Quito from Cuba. Since there were no Soviets in Ecuador—there were no diplomatic relations between the two countries then—agency attention focused almost entirely on the Cubans and the inherent instability of the country's own politicians. Inevitably, American money and attention became a major factor in Ecuadorian politics.

In Uruguay, Agee describes only a slightly different atmosphere. There

the urge for total involvement in Uruguayan politics. Then and student affairs had taken second place to penetration efforts against the Soviet mission and the active, indigenous Communist party. Still, the C.I.A. with a larger complement of operations officers was able to help manipulate both governmental and non-governmental organizations, even to the extent of forcing out a North Korean trade mission in return for a favor done for a police official.

One can understand the C.I.A. recruiting agents to penetrate local Communist organizations and gain secrets from Soviet and Communist bloc embassy and intelligence personnel. That is part of a long-standing spy game that has always gone on between sovereign countries. What is less understandable and highly questionable is the drive for C.I.A. agents inside a non-Communist, essentially pro-United States government and within non-governmental, national organizations operating in third world countries. All this goes on while the United States has fully staffed embassies with an ambassador and trained State Department officers who supposedly are reporting on the very areas C.I.A. is manipulating.

The recent report of the Rockefeller Commission on C.I.A. activities within the United States, like "Inside the Company," concentrates on the agency's covert political action. Like Agee, the Commission describes surveillances, but they are of American newsmen in Washington; it talks of wiretaps, but they are of Americans phoning international narcotics dealers; it tells of infiltration of nongovernmental groups but they are Women's Strike for Peace, the

Congress of Racial Equality and others. Unintentionally perhaps, the Commission's report gives us an Orwellian clue on how C.I.A. got to this state of affairs. One footnote describes former C.I.A. director Richard Helms explaining that to "monitor" a group was to attend a public meeting, to hear and report on what others heard; to "infiltrate" a group was to join it, to appear to support its aims but only as cover to collect more information; to "penetrate" was to gain a position of leadership or direct a group's policies or actions. For Helms and his agency the progression from foreign targets to domestic targets, from gathering to directing, was simple. It should not have been.

Throughout Agee's book runs a current that pervades government today—the unflagging growth of bureaucratic organizations. The deputy director of C.I.A. covert activities places a friend in Uruguay and the station has to develop tasks for him to perform. The station chief is dissatisfied with the number of penetration agents and constantly demands more. Competition develops to achieve results at any cost, not because the goal is important but because of what it means in terms of promotion and the next assignment.

Agee's book, weakened by its questionable motives and slanted as it is, still remains powerful enough to demand further Presidential and Congressional review of currently basic C.I.A. operations overseas. There is a line that can be drawn between covert intelligence gathering and undeclared covert political warfare. The former is acceptable where needed; the latter is not. ■

NEWS, Greenville, S. C.

10 July 1975

Bella Gets A Dose

It was delightful to watch William Colby of the CIA stand up to Congressperson Bella Abzug and some of her left-wing associates at a hearing the other day.

Bellowing Bella was complaining as usual because the CIA had kept files on some members of Congress, including her, in cases involving overseas connections. Bella thinks that isn't crick-et.

But Colby put it in the right perspective. Why, he wanted to know, should Bella and other members of Congress be immune from scrutiny in security and foreign operations instances when all other Americans are not immune?

In other words, does Rep. Abzug consider herself above

other citizens and above the law which commands the CIA to check up on foreign connections?

The CIA has engaged in questionable activities, which have to be stopped. But it is essential for the security and welfare of all Americans that it continue to keep tab on all activities which have connections with foreign operations, and that includes activities of quite a few members of Congress.

Colby also was correct to refuse Bella's demand that he expose a CIA agent, now overseas, for activities in

connection with a congressional campaign. That would have endangered the life of the agent.

Colby seems to be doing a pretty good job of correcting the CIA's operations to prevent abuses which occurred in the past. And it's good to see him hold his ground against people, like Bella, who want to destroy the CIA.

Congresswoman Abzug is free with her mouth and quick to abuse anyone she pleases. It's high time somebody gave the old bat her comeuppance.

VILLAGE VOICE
16 JUNE 1975

Agee's Book (As Yet) Unbanned

BY ALEXANDER COCKBURN

Halfway through "The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence" (a book, by the way, which I always thought promised slightly more than it actually delivered) Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks report what they term "a master stroke" by Richard Helms. In 1967 they say that Helms authorized the "preparation of an official secret history of the CIA and its clandestine activities." The master stroke, in their estimation, was the fact that CIA veterans could contentedly spout their recollections straight into the confidential archives, and spend the end of their careers profitably in this activity instead of approaching publishers with potentially damaging exposes. Thus, as the CIA slips into its period of decline, this hidden spool of memory slowly continues to unwind in the darkness—a covert history presumably just as untrustworthy as all other claims ever publicly advanced by the agency.

The trouble with most books published about the CIA—as the "invisible government" or whatever—is that they tend to inflate the achievements and powers of the agency. People once had the same sort of mystique about the British Secret Service—a deeply inefficient outfit whose best-known achievement was to have nourished in its ranks a truly first-class spy for the other side—viz., Kim Philby. But no book on the CIA devoted to reporting how inefficient it has been could ever presume to sell many copies, any more than a volume on that other largely illusory Big Brother, the Mafia, would do well by belittling its allegedly awesome powers. One assumes the same rationale is guiding the composition of the Secret History compiled on Helms's orders. In the meantime the best partial secret history we have is that written by a former CIA officer, Philip Agee, published last winter in London by Penguin Books and available in Great Britain and Canada.

It is not yet available in the United States. No less than three publishing houses—Straight Arrow, Simon & Schuster, and Warner Paperback—have been dissuaded from publishing it by the prospect of interminable legal hassling and expense. Currently we are promised an edition shortly from Stonehill Books (to be distributed by Braziller), but it remains to be seen whether this project—in the face of Colby's stated determination to avert its publication—will ever see the light of day.

In Great Britain, Agee's book, "Inside the Company: CIA Diary," has enjoyed a large and rapid sale. It seems unlikely, in the wake of recent changes at Penguin, that the edition will ever be reprinted—but the surprising fact is that this matter-of-fact, often pedantic diary of 630 pages, has met with such an enthusiastic

CIA AS WHITE-COLLAR MAFIA

Colby should take heart at these accolades, and make plans swiftly to publish "Inside the Company" in this country, through one of the publishing houses with which the agency still maintains friendly relations.

The fact is that in its current baroque and decadent phase the CIA could use the publicity. The way things are going, it looks as though the agency, in order to survive public cynicism and disenchantment, will be the first secret service in history finding it tactically necessary to conduct all its operations in public. We may, in this context, look eagerly forward to Congressional hearings sometime later this year on CIA appropriations for the overthrow of the present regime in Portugal:

Congressman: "And how, Mr. Colby, do you propose to subvert the Armed Forces Movement?"

Colby: "Oh, by time-honored techniques. Infiltration of the labor movement, some well-placed bribes for high-ups in the Social Democratic party. I suppose. I ought not be saying this but Mario Soares has been on our payroll for some time."

Congressman: "Any plans for assassinations, that sort of thing?"

Colby: "Now let me make it quite clear that we—the agency, that is—have not initiated any discussion of assassination. I have here a National Security Council memorandum dated July 10, 1975, quite plainly showing that Secretary of State Kissinger recommended that we consider the idea. You have in front of you the budgetary estimate for the job. Around \$4 million, I think it says, and if you figure this sum in constant dollars, discounting inflationary factors, you will find that it only represents an investment of about \$1.9 million by 1960 indices."

Congressman: "We'll come back to that. Now, about your plan to compromise Berlinguer. . . ."

Of course, Kissinger has been going around lately saying that disclosures about the CIA in the process have prevented any efficient clandestine response to political developments in Portugal. This merely reflects the secretary's own manic obsession with secrecy. Since everyone expects the United States to try and overthrow the present regime; and since, should such an event occur, everyone will assume that the United States had a part in the operation, it is hard to see why the CIA does not just get on with the job. The argument used to be that the U.S.A. ought to display, at least a nominal addition to the democratic process, and thus, "overly covert" subversion would be bad publicity.

This, in 1975, is a feeble argument. Every child can now lisp the litany of "covert" victories—from Guatemala, through Indonesia, to the business in Chile. The age of illusion is over, and a tincture of realism now with us. In this era there is no place for the quasi-secret outfit thrown up on the beach of the Cold War.

And, of course, once the CIA becomes a body truly accountable to Congress and amenable to thoroughgoing inspection, investigators can probe for details truly exciting to the American people—which are not whether the agency tried to shoot Castro, which many people assumed anyway—but good old-fashioned corruption. Only this week, for example, it has been disclosed that Kermit Roosevelt on his retirement from the CIA was retained by Northrup to promote the sale of that company's planes in the Middle East. Roosevelt boasted that he had been able to use old agency contacts to discredit Lockheed's products. His somewhat meager payment from Northrup of \$15,000 was raised to \$75,000 as a result. Roosevelt had retired from the agency when he performed these services for Northrup. He was, of course, on active duty when he engineered the overthrow of Mossadegh, and thus rendered Iran's oil safe for other American corporations. One assumes that he received nothing so vulgar as a bonus on that occasion, but the operation tended basically toward the same result.

The Roosevelt story highlighted the status of the CIA as just another American multinational corporation, developing surveillance and monitoring systems and then leasing them to the Iranians, entering into partnership deals with Howard Hughes to develop deep-sea retrieval technology, assessing Russian grain production, and so on and so forth. The best outcome here might be for the CIA to become a corporation publicly traded on the New York Stock Exchange and subject to the inspection of the SEC. Then its research data would be available to all U.S. corporations—for a fee, naturally—and ugly stories that intelligence officers have been privately trading in the futures market on the basis of insider knowledge could be investigated in the appropriate manner. Then the CIA as a career prospect for the thinking man could become respectable once more. It is, after all, no accident that the reputations of multinational corporations and of the CIA are simultaneously undergoing some rough handling. Once senators, representatives, and

3 July 1975

the American people realize that bribery, subversion, and allied activities are simply the price one has to pay to stay ahead in the era of late capitalism, everyone—illusions dispelled—can press ahead with the promulgation of whatever political alternatives they have to propose.

But before this new era of realism finally dawns, it would evidently be appropriate for some adequate memorial of the CIA's activities in its High Covert phase to be published. Which brings us back to Agee. He was a CIA officer, stationed in Ecuador, Uruguay, and finally Mexico. He joined the CIA in 1957 and left it in 1968. He left it because he saw the agency as the promoter of reaction in Latin America, dedicated in essence to the preservation of oligarchies or dictatorships and to the suppression of popular forces. As has now been widely recounted, he made his way to Cuba, to Paris, and finally to London—where, with the aid of the newspaper collection in the British Museum, he reconstructed his career in Latin America.

It should be said at once that his book is probably one of the most interesting ever to have appeared on the operations of a "secret" service. Pedantic the diary is, but not boring. Far from it. It is in the very thoroughness of Agee's recollections that the book's importance lies. He describes in minute detail the CIA's penetration of labor unions, of student groups, of political parties; its recruitment of airport staff, post office functionaries; its relationship with local police forces and military officers; the requirements laid down by the CIA for the local station's activities; the bureaucratic apparatus established to answer and process these requirements. With a minimum of histrionics, but with persuasive conviction, Agee finally describes his disenchantment and his conversion to revolutionary attitudes.

It is an important book, but for Colby the importance should be perceived as a thorough testament to the CIA's untiring labors. Agee proves, once and for all, that the CIA was doing something beyond engineering a few glamorous coups and producing some fancy technology. That "something" did not necessarily change the course of history. Had Agee been stationed in the Far East we might have learned more on this score.

Nonetheless, Agee has written a demythicizing volume. Most famous books about spies have been conceived from the perspective of espionage as an activity undertaken as an act of ideological decision. This tradition stretches back to the great

Colby's future as CIA director in doubt

From our own Correspondent, Washington, July 2

Mr James Colby's future as director of the CIA is under challenge. There are insistent, well-founded, rumours that Dr Kissinger, backed by Vice-President Rockefeller, believes that Mr Colby has outlived his usefulness because he has said too much about the operations of the CIA. But Mr Colby has a strong backer in the Secretary for Defence, Mr Schlesinger.

Mr Ford is caught in the middle, and so far has made no decision. He has said he agrees with the view that future heads of the CIA should be recruited outside the agency, but that this does not apply to the present incumbent. Mr Colby is a professional who rose to his present position from within the ranks of the agency.

The general expectation is that Mr Colby's head will roll when the agency is reorganised, and perhaps given a new name. However, nobody knows how

long the President will wait before he acts on the various recommendations for changes in the CIA.

So far, he has the views of the Rockefeller Commission on the CIA, and the Murphy Commission on foreign policy reorganisation.

But, still outstanding, are the congressional recommendations that will only emerge early next year after the Senate Committee on intelligence activities completes its work.

Critics of the CIA do not believe its director has been too talkative, and Mr Colby himself argues that he has had no alternative. Given the public and congressional pressures on him, he had to answer honestly many of the questions put to him.

He has obviously given the Senate investigation into intelligence activities much highly confidential information which has generally not leaked into

the public domain. But Mr Colby has also said, publicly, that he destroyed as routine a number of classified files when he took over the agency. He also said that his predecessor, Mr Helms, had destroyed files when he left the agency. It is not clear what records have been destroyed.

Mr Helms' rôle during the Watergate cover-up has still not been cleared up. Nagging questions also remain over Dr Kissinger's precise rôle in ordering wiretaps on some of his close associates and some journalists.

Dr Kissinger has consistently, and with passion, claimed that he did not initiate the wiretaps. But although the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has accepted his explanations, various law suits against him still exist. Nobody knows whether the files that have been destroyed contained the answers either about Mr Helms or Dr Kissinger.

NEWS-SENTINEL, Knoxville

4 July 1975

Guest Editorial

Score One for CIA's Colby

From the Atlanta Constitution

THE DIRECTOR of the Central Intelligence Agency, William E. Colby, handled himself with dignity and courage before a congressional subcommittee determined to browbeat him.

Rep. Bella Abzug, chairman of a House subcommittee on Government Information and Individual Rights, denounced the CIA's political surveillance of Americans and blasted Colby for CIA sins past and present, including shouting at him. "I think there is no indication that you intend to change."

Colby of course has said publicly and repeatedly that the CIA did some things

in past years which the agency should not have done and which will not be done again. Of course such matters are serious. Yet it is equally serious and important the United States have an effective and functioning intelligence agency. Colby has defended his agency stoutly — and rightly — for most of its past and present operations.

In this particular rather unenlightened shouting match, it was Director Colby who came through as having an important sense of responsibility about both Government information and individual rights, the two supposed areas of concern for Rep. Abzug's subcommittee.

THE WASHINGTON STAR

6 August 1975

CIA Accused at Junta Trial

ATHENS — Andreas Papandreou, the Greek Socialist leader, has accused the 20 leaders of the fallen junta on trial here of having seized power in 1967 under orders from the Central Intelligence Agency and NATO.

The leader of the Panhellenic Socialist Movement Party asserted in testimony that the go-ahead for the coup had come from Washington in February 1967 — two months before it took place.

"I can assure you that the Greek Central Intelligence Service was controlled then, and probably still is, by the equivalent American service, which also financed it," he said.

spies active in the overt and covert struggles of the Reformation and Counter-Reformation. It emerged once more in the struggles of the international Communist movement of this century—where men like Richard Sorge and Kim Philby became spies for reasons of clear-cut ideology. The books of John Le Carré—with their meandering peripeteias—fed off this tradition. Agee's book is its epitaph. "Inside the Company" should be published in this country at once, as a suitable prologue to CIA Inc's accession to the Fortune 500.

Alexander Cockburn is a staff writer for The Voice.

NEWSWEEK

4 AUGUST 1975

True Tales of 'The Other Side'

True spy tales are few and far between, and Soviet espionage in particular is usually seen only in fragmentary glimpses when a big-time operative is exposed. But in recent weeks, the U.S. intelligence community has been repeatedly hit by exposés of its own illegal activities and troubled by its prospects in a time of détente. As one result, agents have been unusually willing to talk about their rivals' tactics—and NEWSWEEK's Anthony Marro and Evert Clark pieced together this picture of Soviet intelligence at work in the U.S.:

In the 1950s, the Russian spy could have come straight from the baggy-pants ranks of Ian Fleming's "SMERSH." But when Anatoli Chebotarev defected to the U.S. in 1971, the company secrets he spilled dispelled what remained of that image. Chebotarev, chief of the Soviet intercept mission in Brussels, told how he had monitored the telephone calls of senior Western diplomats and generals in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and SHAPE—Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers in Europe. Whenever a call came in or went out on a key NATO or SHAPE telephone line, Chebotarev said, a computer activated a recorder, which taped the entire conversation. To prove his boast and entertain his interrogators, Chebotarev mimicked perfectly the voice of a high-ranking U.S. official in Brussels who talked to Washington by phone half a dozen times a day.

Chebotarev's story, U.S. intelligence officials say, typifies modern espionage, Soviet-style. Chebotarev, they note, was an agent not of the infamous KGB but of the lesser-known GRU, a branch of the Soviet armed forces that gathers strategic military, scientific and technological intelligence. The Soviets' ways are infinitely more sophisticated than the cloak-and-dagger methods of the past, and U.S. experts frankly admit that "they're pretty damn good"—in a minority view, "maybe a little better than we are."

Sleepers: Détente, they report, has made it easier for Russia to slip undetected into the U.S. scores of "illegals" or "sleepers"—operatives deposited for several years with false identities, or sent in briefly on one-time missions. There are also 2,000 Soviet-bloc officials in the U.S., sources say, of whom perhaps 800 are full-time "legal" spies (under official cover) and another 800 take on occasional chores. Both legals and illegals have "assets" in cooperative U.S. citizens or resident aliens. In the recent arrest of two men of Armenian descent for espionage, one was an alleged illegal, the other his asset.

These days, the Russians "are sending over young men who are more American than the Americans," intelligence sources say. The young agents are for the first time "flooding the Hill," cultivating Congressional staffers. And they are bringing sophisticated apparatus to feed their hunger for scientific and economic data. NEWSWEEK has learned that the GRU operates at least 48 radio and telephone intercept stations around the world, including four in the U.S., that can monitor private as well as governmental conversations. The Soviet Embassy a few blocks from the White House, the

Soviet mission to the United Nations, and the Russians' country retreats sprout clumps of antennas—which, because they are technically on U.S.S.R. territory, are beyond U.S. law. Other Soviet innovations include the "roll-over camera"—a miniature that snaps photographs as it is rolled over a document—and eavesdropping with laser beams that can decipher conversations inside a room from the vibrations of window panes.

Couth: Has Soviet violence ebbed as technology has advanced? "They've gotten a little more couth," one expert suggests, and many U.S. intelligence sources say that the KGB's notorious Department V, which handled kidnappings and assassinations of foreign political enemies, defectors and obstreperous Soviet citizens, has not been linked to a murder since 1959. But others insist that the Russians have simply become more clever. As evidence of the Soviets' continuing hard line, they point to the KGB's top-secret "watch list"—a 460-page book containing the names, alleged crimes and sentences (death is common) of more than 1,000 enemies of the people.

Most of the best yarns about "the other side" date from the cloak-and-dagger era. One that U.S. agents tell concerns a gray-haired woman whose job was paymistress to Soviet operatives in New York. As was common during cold-war days, the FBI kidnapped the woman to a caretaker's cottage on the fringes of a Westchester estate. After three sleepless days and nights of interrogation—perhaps clinched by the reminder that she was near retirement, return to Mother Russia and a pension—she agreed to turn double agent. Agents took her home, bugged her apartment and listened in from across the street. Six hours later, they heard what sounded like a shot. When no one emerged, they placed an anonymous call to the police—and soon overheard a cop say, "Oh, my God. She's

dead. Suicide." More noises, including a dresser drawer being pulled out—and the cop telephoned his precinct that he had found a bundle of cash.

What happened next is disputed. One source says that the money—perhaps as much as \$300,000—was delivered to the U.S. Treasury. But others say that the cops were directed by their captain to

bundle up the bills and bring them to the station. "The result was that she had a very lonely funeral, and to this day the Russians don't know what happened to their money," says one counter-intelligence source. "A couple of cops walked into a major espionage case and looted it and got away."

To indicate the Soviets' almost super-human patience, agents tell about a KGB agent who was discovered not long ago by the CIA in an unnamed Latin American country. After a brutal interrogation by the country's intelligence agents—"They bloody near killed the guy," recalls a counter-intelligence expert—he told his story. It began fifteen years before when as a junior agent he was secreted in a series of Soviet "safe houses" to learn about the Americas and acquire a "legend," or cover story—that he was born in Latin America and reared in a Baltic nation where his family was destroyed—to explain his Slavic-accented Spanish. The agent married a KGB-recruited woman in England and the two were "staged," over the next two years, through three more West European countries.

He bided his time and perfected his legend in Latin America, with two children and a series of small but disastrous business ventures. "He went through \$250,000 of the KGB's money," says the expert. But cost was no object, and the agent's lack of business talent didn't count against him. When CIA agents broke into his apartment, they found a congratulatory message with his next destination: the Russian agent's big league, New York.

BALTIMORE SUN
28 July 1975

Charges of CIA's printing U.S. bills in Viet war checked by Senate unit

Washington (AP)—A Senate subcommittee is looking into allegations that the Central Intelligence Agency printed counterfeit American money during the Vietnam war to finance secret operations.

Howard J. Feldman, the majority counsel for the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, said the panel has been checking the allegation for several months but has not been able to substantiate it.

"We've just received allegations like that," he said. "We have no firm corroboration."

"We get many, many stories and many, many allegations. Some we check, some we don't," he said. "This one we will check just because of the nature of the allegations."

Mr. Feldman said the subcommittee is looking into the allegations of Henry M. Jackson (D., Wash.), has checked with the Central

Intelligence Agency on the allegation and said the agency replied it could find no evidence of counterfeiting in Vietnam but would check further.

Asked why the preliminary inquiry is being handled by Mr. Jackson's committee rather than the Senate Intelligence Committee headed by Senator Frank Church (D., Idaho), which is probing the intelligence agency's activities, Mr. Feldman said, "There's nothing stopping us from turning it over to the Church committee, but we don't have enough to turn over. It's an option."

Mr. Feldman declined to name the source of the allegations or outline the scope of the charges. He said public disclosure of the committee's inquiry would be to check it out now.

yesterday the probe also has touched on whether the alleged counterfeit currency fell into the hands of organized crime.

It quoted Mr. Jackson as saying the panel's staff "is conducting preliminary inquiries into unconfirmed allegations that the CIA was engaged in counterfeiting American currency in Southeast Asia."

He added that little if any hard evidence has been found.

The paper said it learned the original tip in the probe came from a former Vietnam serviceman now in prison in California on an unrelated charge.

The former marine told investigators that the Central Intelligence Agency obtained virtually authentic engraved plates and printed its own currency to avoid any accountability to congressional appropriations committees, the paper said.

LOS ANGELES TIMES
27 July 1975

CIA Family Game: I've Got a Secret

BY MARLENE CIMONS
Times Staff Writer

WASHINGTON—For 26 years, everyone who knew Wallace Mills, including his four children, thought he was a lower-level foreign service officer who just couldn't seem to advance, no matter how hard he tried.

Each time the State Department would reassign him to a new country, his wife's friends would ask her, gently of course, whether Wally was finally going to become an ambassador. Inevitably, Elinor Mills would say, with obvious discomfort, "No, not this time," and they would make all the appropriate sympathetic sounds.

Mills himself always seemed reluctant to talk about his work, an attitude his friends attributed to the trauma of unfulfilled ambitions. When asked, he would always shrug it off, as if failure didn't matter.

You learn to lie like that when you're a spy.

You learn to avoid Washington cocktail parties where there is always the chance that the man standing next to you works in the State Department office right next door to the one serving as your official cover. What do you say when he wonders aloud why you two have never met?

You adopt an air of modesty about your job and, around the dinner table, you make it sound hopelessly boring so your children won't ask too many questions. Your wife knows, but she doesn't know everything. So she, too, learns to pretend.

"You Learn to Listen"

"It changes your personality," Mills says. "You learn to listen and not volunteer things. When you're in this country, you don't seek out new groups, or even old ones. I haven't been to a college reunion since I left. When you do meet people, you learn to turn their questions around and get them to talk about themselves. People are selfish. They love to talk about themselves. They rarely notice that they aren't finding out anything about you."

For more than a quarter of a century, Wallace Mills was a clandestine agent for the Central Intelligence Agency. For 10 years in Europe and five years in Latin America, he supposedly served as a low-ranking secretary in one section or another in the American embassy. "I was a lunkhead who never quite arrived," he says, smiling. He also spent a total of 10 years in this country with a cover at the State Department.

Mills, 51, a lean man with a round, pleasant face and fashionably long gray sideburns, retired from the agency last December. At the time, he felt his \$36,000 CIA salary wasn't enough to see four children through college. Today he works as a management consultant in health care for Kappa Systems, Inc., an Arlington, Va., firm, and receives a handsome CIA retirement annuity.

After all those years of silence, he was willing to discuss the strains of leading a secret life as long as he didn't have to name the countries where he was stationed or reveal certain details about his missions. "I was never declared to the host governments and it might prove embarrassing now, even though I am retired," he says.

He wanted to talk, he says, mainly because he is upset about the beleaguered agency's current troubles and feels that the valuable work of a lot of honest, idealistic people has been forgotten in the midst of the unfavorable sentiment. Recently, Mills joined a new organization called the Assn. of Retired Intelligence Officers, whose purpose is to rescue the embattled agency and place its work in the proper public perspective.

Mills, however, says he does not condone the CIA's behavior, if the recent stories prove to be accurate.

"I don't think the CIA should be doing anything illegal by the terms of its charter," he says. "This is my personal opinion: I don't think we should be involved in assassinations. That's a no-win road. It was always my impression—although I have no inside knowledge—that we didn't engage in that kind of thing. I never expected to be subjected to drugs or trickery or any deception like that, although I can understand why, at a time when

brainwashing was so important, an LSD experiment was conducted."

He pauses. "I realize there have been some exceptions where we have been wrong," he says. "I'm pleased these investigations are going on, but I don't think these stories should be coming out in bits and pieces now. Let it all come out when the investigations are over, and let's see where we were right and where we were wrong. I realize there have been exceptions where we have been wrong. I just don't know everything that has been done—only that within my own experience, as far as I know, there has been nothing illegal."

He, personally, has been affected by the publicity.

"To have my children be embarrassed now to tell their friends that their father worked for the CIA really hurts," he says. "I just would like the public to know that spies are human beings, just like everyone else. We are not James Bonds. We do not come out with cloaks and daggers under the cover of darkness. We are an elite group, the best-trained people in the world who were trying to do something we thought would improve the world."

He sits in the enclosed porch of his northwest Washington home early on a warm, damp evening, sipping a gin and tonic. He is surrounded by his wife, his four children, aged 14 to 21, a black cat, and an affectionate poodle that is blind in one eye. His family listens with rapt attention as he speaks. His youngsters are hearing much of this for the first time. A few things even startle his wife, a slender, gray-haired woman of 55, known as Eli, whom he met and married in Europe during his first foreign assignment. She, too, was an employee of the CIA, his Boss' secretary.

"Intra-agency marriages happen with great frequency," Mills says. "When you work for the CIA, you draw in your tendrils. You live among your own people. You're more comfortable that way. It often leads to romance."

He laughs. "I remember in 1950, or 1951, a CIA man was found down at the reflecting pool with a non-CIA girl. Word got around fast that it was OK to have affairs—but have them with someone in the agency."

Eli Mills knew her husband was a spy. But she knew little else.

"He would tell me almost nothing, and I really didn't want to know," she says. "The less I knew, the less I had to lie about. Once, a friend of mine—having seen a lot of CIA people at a party in my house—took me aside and said 'Isn't Wally really with the CIA?' 'Oh no—no, he's with the State Department, I said. It was a canned speech. It came out automatically.'"

Such discipline is, in fact, difficult to lose, even when it is no longer necessary. "I could not have talked to anyone like this six months ago," Mills says. "I almost stuttered at the first cocktail party I went to after my retirement, when I told someone I used to work for the CIA."

"I swung my head around when I heard you say it," Eli Mills tells him.

"For 26 years, you're on your guard," he says. "Then, all of a sudden, you're not. The change comes slowly."

It was a classic life of deception. During the day, Mills would perform routine duties at the embassy. Each ambassador, he says, had been told the real nature of his job. In the early evening, he would attend diplomatic social functions, essential for making contacts. Then, often late at night, he would go off to meet a source or another agent. Or he might use that time to cable information back to Washington.

"It is a double life," he says. "Part of it is the same as for any foreign service officer abroad. The difference is that you've got to do the CIA work at night, after you've done your cover job during the day. It's a 16-hour day."

Information collecting, he says, can be painstaking, methodical and pure drudgery. It can also be hair-raising. "Everyone is always in a little bit of a dangerous situa-

tion," he says. "One time, when we were living in a South American country, I was sure we were being followed by four men in a station wagon. Whenever we took a turn, they took the same one. The turns were not very logical either. The weather was bad and I speeded up a slick hill and almost killed myself doing it. Finally, they turned off. But the point is, you're always looking over your shoulder, all the time."

He laughs. "One time, in Europe, we moved into a house that had a bug in it. I found the wires in the basement."

A sharp sound erupts from across the room. "Great Scott, Wally, you never told me that!" his wife says.

He glances at her and smiles. "As it turned out, the husband of the woman from whom we rented the house had cooperated with the CIA years before he died. He had been recording the dinner conversations of his guests. The implantation was one that we had made."

Getting to Know Them

Although attending parties in this country can threaten an agent's identity, his presence at functions overseas is a must. It is one effective way to solidify relationships, a technique essential to securing information.

"You've got to get to know the people who are the best informed on political, economic and military matters," he says. "You have to get to know them well enough to find out whether they believe in us, or need money badly, or have a mutual friend or enemy. Something that will encourage them to give information. But you have to be discreet, and keep your circle of friends wide enough that no one else will become suspicious. There's actually nothing magic about recruiting—salesmen do it every day."

As a result, the family made few close American friends. The people they knew best were foreigners. Yet, each time they left a country, they had to give up these associations. Mills would simply introduce them to their new contact before leaving.

Mills never allowed himself to get too close to his embassy colleagues for fear they would discover what he was really doing. And for years, he remained silent as his children went to class with the offspring of ambassadors and came home asking when their father was going to be promoted. "It was ego bruising," he says, "but in a way, it brought us closer together. I relied on my family more."

There are some cases, however, where domestic life can suffer irreversible damage.

"You're on call all the time, like a doctor," Mills says. "You can always say in the middle of the night you have to go out—and a wife has to accept it. There have been cases where wives have gotten suspicious, and where men have abused those night meetings."

Tea and Toast

Eli Mills, however, according to her husband, accepted the mystery of his job and more. "We had an operation going on in the garage once, and she sustained all the agents with tea and toast," he says.

She is, however, horrified by the events surrounding the 1953 death of Dr. Frank R. Olson, which was associated with a dose of LSD he was given by the CIA.

"I was shocked," she says. "Something certainly should have been said to that family."

For Eli and Wally Mills, one of the most crucial decisions that had to be made during his career was when to tell their children the truth. "It becomes dangerous after a while if they don't know," he says. "I don't want them in-

nocently telling their friends that Daddy is seeing Mr. So-and-So. At some point, you have to take them into your confidence."

David, the oldest, now 21 and a junior at Yale University, was 15 when he found out. The family was living abroad, and he was asking questions.

"We had gone to see the movie 'Topaz,'" David says. "Afterward, I asked my father about espionage, and somewhere in that conversation he told me he was involved in that kind of work. I guess I was a little surprised. I didn't feel betrayed or anything then, but I must admit that I'm less inclined today to tell casual acquaintances what my father did for a living than I would have been a year ago."

The three daughters, Tish, 19, Ann, 17, and Katherine, 14, were all told after his retirement, when the family had returned to this country.

"I knew before you told me," says Ann, who wears an "Uppity Women Unite" button on her yellow T-shirt. "You used to tell us you were going to the State Department but I'd watch you through the window when you left—and you'd drive off in a different direction. I was a sneaky child, Daddy. I knew. I had connections."

Mills laughs. "It runs in the family."

This is the kind of inconvenience a spy must endure. His wife and kids can't drive him to work or pick him up. Car pools are definitely out. He can't always select his own doctor, and he is advised never to go under anesthesia unless he is in an agency medical installation. And his income tax return can never list the CIA as an employer.

Careful With the IRS

"You have to be honest with the IRS regarding your income, but you cannot file a return that says you work for the agency," he says. "Mine all said the State Department."

But what happens, he is asked, if his CIA salary is greater than that of an embassy second secretary?

"I would file two W-2 forms, both from the State Department. The IRS just assumes you changed jobs over the year. Anyway, they never questioned it."

Mills, a native of Ohio, came east to attend Harvard University on a full scholarship. While in school, he enrolled in a Navy program that placed him in midshipmen school while working for his degree. Eventually, the Navy sent him to Boulder, Colo., to study Japanese so he could become a language officer. "But the war ended before I could get to Japan," he says.

Instead, he was dispatched to the Washington Document Center. There, his job was to scan Japanese books for sensitive information. His first taste of intelligence gathering was a disappointment. For months, he sifted through baskets of Japanese books and reports, finding nothing.

"But then, one day, I opened up a book and found a military map of Russia that showed Russian forces and Japanese forces in Siberia," he says. "My God! I thought, this is it!"

He winces. "It was the Battle of 1905, the Russo-Japanese War."

This, however did not discourage him. He returned to college for a graduate degree at Yale's school of international relations. A seminar in intelligence he took there had a profound effect upon him, and he applied for a CIA job in June of 1948, the year after the agency came into existence.

"It's been a fine life," he says. "I wouldn't hesitate a second to do it all over again."

GAZETTE, Charleston, W.Va.

7 July 1975

Ludicrous And Sinister

One hundred and ninety-nine years after the American Revolution was launched in an effort to establish a republic in which personal liberty would be protected by the state, Victoria Wilson wrote a letter to the Central Intelligence Agency.

Miss Wilson, an employee of the Alfred A. Knopf publishing company, asked the CIA to supply her with copies of any material pertaining to her which might be in CIA files.

She was acting under law only recently enacted. In previous years, such a request

wouldn't merely be unanswered, it would insure that Miss Wilson would be regarded as subversive. After the Watergate-related scandals, including the massive misuse of CIA facilities to stifle domestic dissent, a tiny bit of the founding fathers' idealism impinged upon the congressional mind. Access to CIA and Federal Bureau of Investigation files, in some cases, is now possible.

Miss Wilson received from the CIA copies of 13 personal letters, correspondence between Miss Wilson and her father over a five-year period when he was traveling in the Soviet Union.

The first letter was written by Miss Wilson when she was 10 years old.

childish handwriting. It conveyed a happy birthday message. The last letter was written when she was 15 years old.

Richard Dudman, chief Washington correspondent of the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, reported on the case of Miss Wilson's letters. He quoted her as saying the CIA surveillance was more ludicrous than sinister.

Because CIA agents sometimes appear to be slightly cuckoo in their zeal to protect America from Americans, however, the case of Miss Wilson cannot simply be laughed off. A government serving the people, not a government spying on the people, was the government envisioned by

WASHINGTON POST

7 August 1975

Mitchell CIA, Rogovin: Looking Inside Out The

By Jacqueline Trescott

Early this summer Mitchell Rogovin, a partner with the prominent, liberal-laced law firm of Arnold & Porter, was having lunch at the Palm, a preferred retreat of Washington's legal elite.

With him was John S. Warner, the Central Intelligence Agency's general counsel, who was inviting Rogovin to represent the CIA during its congressional hearings.

Rogovin was intrigued. Warner says sympathetic. In the midst of this discussion, New York Times reporter Seymour Hersh, who unearthed many of the CIA's secret activities, a good friend of Rogovin's, walked up to the table. Rogovin spoke but didn't introduce him to Warner.

Rogovin had come to his fork in the road. He chose the path of the CIA, and ever since, there's been talk.

Essentially, people are wondering what prompted a lawyer known for ferreting out government secrets to defend an agency in the supersecret business.

Rogovin is, after all, the lawyer who helped Common Cause successfully sue the Committee for the Re-Election of the President, forcing the disclosure of Richard Nixon's campaign financing.

Until he accepted the CIA job, he was representing the Institute for Policy Studies (IPS) suit against former Nixon administration officials for wiretapping.

Back in the '60s, Rogovin was the crack-jack assistant U.S. attorney general who blew the whistle on the government bugging of the hotel suite of Fred Black, a Washington lobbyist and associate of Robert G. (Bobby) Baker. "Mitch threw the government into a tizzy. He was incensed," says an associate. Others were upset, like one J. Edgar Hoover.

At the Palm that day, Rogovin seemed to sense some impending ostracism. He told a close friend he was nervous.

Washington, it turns out, can be an objective town with double vision. He still has some friends.

"It's his chance to do what Mitch does best—de-mythologize the tribal aspects of government," lauds friend David Cohen, president of Common Cause.

"He has an important role to play. In the past he has challenged government inefficiencies and he's tough, with a strong sense of libertarian values.

"Just sometimes we have to have some of our favorite advocates on the inside. We should not ostracize them."

afraid he will fight just as effectively for the establishment."

Rogovin was more than bothered by the suggestions that he sold out. But his anguish didn't show.

"Why do they think you've pledged your political views when you take a job? I wasn't hired to be a political consultant," Rogovin says, describing the negative reactions as "distressing."

"At stake here is the future of the agency. I wanted to have some input because I believe we need an intelligence agency," Rogovin continues.

"And the CIA understood the wisdom and expediency an outside attorney could bring to the case. 'The CIA doesn't necessarily have the monopoly on brains or a fresh outlook,' says its general counsel, Warner. 'We needed a fresh outlook. And Rogovin's got brains and he's knowledgeable of the Washington scene.'"

At the current congressional hearings on CIA activities, Rogovin has been quiet, smoking his pipe and sitting by William Colby's side. Already admired by people inside the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence is his behind-the-scenes effectiveness.

Some say that Colby has been loosening up and maybe, just maybe, Rogovin is part of the reason. Once, after an angry exchange with Rep. Otis G. Pike (D-N.Y.), over Colby's use of a "top secret" stamp on documents he gave the Committee, Colby handed Pike a rubber stamp. Yesterday Pike complimented Colby on his candidness.

"In one meeting Rogovin was especially instrumental in mediating a disagreement between Colby and the Committee staff," said one insider. "What resulted was that the Committee got to review some documents it wanted and the CIA maintained its confidence."

At the moment, Rogovin, a short, squarish man of 44, tanned and relaxed is sitting in an anteroom outside the CIA director's dining room.

A thoughtful, professional air surrounds him, as he settles into a corner of the beige tapestried couch, lighting up his pipe. He keeps his right elbow flexed in an L. He relights the pipe, revealing the Lord and Taylor label of his modily-cut beige summer suit. His round face stares unsmilingly, from the plastic CIA identification tag hung around his neck.

Why is he working for the CIA? "It sounded like a challenge," Rogovin

anticipating a possible conflict of interest, Rogovin resigned as Common Cause counsel right after the IPS dropped him as their general counsel because of his new CIA association.

"Frankly, I feel he's being used," suggests Peter Weiss, IPS president and an attorney. "He has a good reputation. He has done good things for people fighting the establishment. We sort of assumed he was sympathetic. Now, in retrospective, maybe he wasn't. Now I'm

answers softly. He goes on to describe the long hours of "catching up on 27 years of reading," the days that start at 6 a.m. and end at midnight.

It's tiring but also exhilarating. It has perked his reformer's drive. Last year when he testified before the Senate Watergate Committee, he presented a laundry list of suggestions for reorganizing the Justice Department. William Colby, the CIA director, has talked with him about "constructive changes coming from the hearings."

"I don't want to downplay the past," says Rogovin. "But the most significant part (of the hearings) is shaping the future. Do we need an intelligence agency? Yes. I still believe gentlemen don't open other gentlemen's mail."

On his politics, firmly and rather whimsically, Rogovin offers a favorite quote, one from Louis Brandeis, as his ethic. "He once said, 'A guy has to have a lot of clients but he doesn't have to be anybody's man.' That's how I feel."

When the interview ends, it is discovered that the door to the anteroom is locked.

Everyone laughs. Rogovin apologizes for his absent-mindedness—"because this always happens"—reaching into his pocket for a slew of keys, but he's chuckling and vastly amused.

When Rogovin was wrestling with the CIA decision, he told a friend, attorney Gerald Stern, that it reminded him of the time at the Justice Department when a young lawyer had asked his advice on working in the South during the Civil Rights protests.

Rogovin, the assistant attorney general of the tax division under Nicholas Katzenbach and Ramsey Clark, asked the guy how he felt. The lawyer said "Very nervous." Rogovin replied "Good," and told Stern that's how he felt, apprehensive but nonetheless compelled.

Very few people speak of Rogovin as a nervous man. More often they describe his patience, doggedness, innovation, savvy, and searchlight approach to law.

"He rarely loses his cool," says Sandy Jaffe, an attorney with the Ford Foundation who has admired Rogovin since they were together at Justice.

"He sits there and he plays with his matches. He's a person more likely to take the edge off difficult ties."

A journalist who follows the legal

scene says, "I'm not saying that a lot of Washington lawyers are dishonest. But Rogovin is unusually respected for his integrity. Honesty is his biggest asset."

Kenneth Guido, the Common Cause attorney who originated the CREEP suit and shared the work with Rogovin, blew up in court one critical day. Rogovin, Guido remembers, "was the coolest guy I had ever seen."

Remembers Guido, "We had subpoenaed Kenneth Parkinson for some very important papers, absolutely crucial to our case. This day Parkinson walked into court, handed the judge and Mitch letters stating he had given the documents to another attorney."

"I told Parkinson it was a despicable thing in pretty strong language. Mitch nudged me and said 'Calm down, this has happened to me many times.' Sometimes Mitch would bel- low but he would not get irritated and this was a case where the emotions were high because the stakes were high."

Rogovin, Guido and Parkinson, the attorney for the Nixon re-election committee who was indicted as a Watergate coverup co-defendant but later acquitted, flew back together on the same plane after Rogovin obtained Bebe Rebozo's deposition. The plane was detoured to Philadelphia where all boarded a bus back to Washington.

They were all physically drained, Guido recalls, "and the bus was an aching inconvenience but Mitch didn't complain." All three shared a cab and Parkinson and Rogovin's briefcases got mixed up. In court the next morning, Parkinson discovered the error and Rogovin says, "that's a very sensitive situation when the opposing attorneys end up with each other's cases. But we all honored one another."

In the '60s, when the principal legal upsets were outside the tax field, Rogovin's expertise, he managed to snag some limelight with two crucial incidents.

The first was the exchange of Cuban prisoners following the Bay of Pigs invasion in 1962. Working mainly behind the scenes, Rogovin, then counsel with the Internal Revenue Service, wrote the charter for the non-profit organization established to trade tractors for the 1,100 prisoners captured. The first group failed.

Between Thanksgiving and Christmas of 1962, a second group, with Rogovin one of the principals, raised \$50,000 and the prisoners were exchanged for food, drugs and other non-military materials.

The second was the Fred Black case, where for the first time the government confessed before the Supreme Court that the FBI had bugged a citizen.

Afterwards Rogovin was not the favorite of J. Edgar Hoover. So Ramsey Clark arranged a lunch with Hoover to mend feelings. One of Rogovin's favorite stories comes from that lunch and repeating it shows Ro-

govin's recognition that power can be stretched to ridiculousness.

Hoover started off the lunch by discussing one of Rogovin's predecessors who had gone to jail. Then he told about the time Harry Truman called him to the White House and said, "I want you to investigate the Justice Department and the IRS."

Hoover said to Truman, "Mr. President wouldn't it be better to have a congressional inquiry rather than an executive branch inquiry of the executive branch? For as you will recall, our Lord had a disciple who was unfaithful." Truman told Hoover, "I think you'll find that three of Jesus' disciples were unfaithful." At the lunch Hoover turned to Clark and Rogovin and said, "I asked the research people to check it out. You know the President was right, there were three unfaithful to Jesus." Rogovin laughs as he repeats the story, explaining, "We sat there biting our lips because we didn't know whether it was funny that Hoover didn't know or funny for the FBI to be investigating in the Bible."

In 1969, at the dawn of the Nixon administration, Rogovin resigned from Justice. He had worked for the government since 1958. In recent years, he's become a respected voice in the field of public interest law. He chairs the Council for Public Interest Law, with William Ruckelshaus, and is associated with the Center for Law and Social Policy.

Other clients have included newspaper reporters, United Serviceman Fund, Lawyers Military Defense Committee and Pre-Term Abortion Clinic. "Mitch sort of made himself available to the better liberal organizations," says an Arnold and Porter colleague. "The radicals were unprepared for his CIA decision but Mitch is excitement-oriented. He likes battle."

One of those radical clients talks about Rogovin's balanced, low-key style. "He's not the kind of liberal lawyer who would say tone down your radicalism and we'll win. He never tried to influence your politics or enforce his own."

A Democrat, Rogovin has assiduously avoided public politics. "The only time I made a political decision was when my old Syracuse University roommate, Lee Alexander (now mayor of Syracuse, N.Y.) ran against Ramsey Clark for the Democratic nomination for U.S. Senate in New York. I contributed to both campaigns."

A New Yorker by birth, Rogovin studied at Syracuse University Law School where he worked his way through. His parents, Max, a salesman for a bridal goods manufacturer, and Sayde, both had died.

At Virginia he was a solid, strong student, remembers Mortimer Caplin, a faculty member during the '50s. On campus, Rogovin lived in the Jefferson Pavilion-style home of law school dean Frederick Ribble. Part of his campus work involved organizing a play center for the faculty offspring.

There, listening and working closely with Ribble, a revered authority on constitutional law and outspoken civil rights advocate, Rogovin formed many of his ideas about government.

Especially, he says, ideas about government limitations. "One summer I started working in a Wall Street firm, writing memos, running for coffee and I left. It was during the McCarthy period and the dean, a magnificent man, was sought after by many Washingtonians for advice that summer."

In his last semester of law school Rogovin met Sheila Ender, a teacher.

For the first four years of their marriage, the Rogovins were a military family. He was a captain in the Marine Corps, stationed at Quantico, Newport, R.I., and Camp Pendleton, Calif. They returned here in 1958 when he joined the IRS as a trial lawyer.

A counseling psychologist for the Montgomery County Health Department, Mrs. Rogovin is also studying for her Ph.D. at American University. The family plays tennis together at the American University Tennis Club, four blocks from their home.

"You will mention my kids wouldn't you," asks Rogovin, fitting a friend's description as the "ultimate father." Lisa, 19, a student at Goucher College, is working for Sen. James Abourezk, (D-S.D.) this summer; Wendy, 16, a National Cathedral student, works for Common Cause and is a courier for her father between the Rogovin home and his Arnold and Porter office, and John, 14, a student at St. Albans, is earning money cutting grass this summer.

The family makes group decisions. "He was very interested in knowing how we felt about the CIA. He wanted to know if we would be comfortable with his decision," says his wife.

The evening of his first day at the CIA, Rogovin told his family he had talked with Colby most of the day. "How do you know it was Colby?" one girl asked. He told them he was alone in the room with Colby and the other daughter asked, "How do you know you were alone?"

Recalling that scene, Mrs. Rogovin says, "Our children are interested in politics and we're a serious family. But there's a lot of humor. Mitch is a flexible person. He knows all things aren't life and death and he doesn't always take himself so seriously."

She describes her husband as a private person, a man who listens to soft music and entertains his friends with stories.

One of his favorites is about Maurice Stans. The night before Rogovin and Guido took his deposition, the only money they could find was the poker money of some Common Cause guys. All quarters and dimes. They gave it to Stans and the next day, after the deposition was taken, Stans returned it, all quarters, dimes and smiles.

Clergy Wary of CIA

Approaches

By Marjorie Hyer

Washington Post Staff Writer

"Come back in three days," the nun, supervisor of the little Chilean school, told the American priest.

The priest, a missionary of the Maryknoll order, was seeking answers to usually inoffensive school census-type questions for Chilean Roman Catholic bishops.

When he returned three days later, the nun was apologetic. "I am sorry, but the teachers and the parents of the children have told me not to answer your questions," she said.

"They think you are from the CIA."

That was in 1971, two years before the Chilean government of the late Salvador Allende—Latin America's first popularly elected Marxist president—was toppled from power and three years before President Ford denied any U.S. role in the coup but acknowledged and defended covert activities by the Central Intelligence Agency in Chile.

"The climate of suspicion is very real in Latin America," said the priest, Charles Curry, now based in Washington, D.C., as he recalled the 1971 encounter.

Far from being a CIA operative, Father Curry now spends much of his time trying to deal with problems of the CIA's relationship to churches. He is a leader of an ad hoc coalition of Protestant and Catholic mission groups.

The CIA's relations with church groups is one of the areas that Sen. Frank Church's (D-Idaho) committee on intelligence expects to look into "in due course," committee spokesman Spencer Davis said recently.

The churches' problems with the CIA fall into several categories: use of mission programs as a conduit for CIA funds; use of missionaries, with or without their knowledge, as intelligence sources, and what Father Curry calls "harassment" of missionaries in the field.

The last category usually involves social reform projects undertaken by progressive missionaries in countries controlled by political regimes that church leaders view as repressive but which are friendly to the United States.

A current complaint—one Father Curry referred to—Sen. Church's committee—involves a situation in Bolivia.

In May, Ambassador William P. Stedman Jr. canceled a scheduled discussion

with about 50 Maryknoll missionaries in Cochabamba when the missionaries objected to the presence of another U.S. embassy official who accompanied the ambassador.

The missionaries were convinced that the second man, John LaMazza, listed on the embassy roster a labor official, was a CIA agent.

LaMazza had been named as a CIA collaborator in a document circulated earlier in Bolivian church circles. The document, which allegedly originated within the Bolivian government, outlined a suggested plan of attack against progressive forces in the Roman Catholic Church.

The document stated that the CIA was involved in the plan to arrest and discredit progressive clergy by promising to "provide full information on certain priests, especially those from the U.S.A." The document called LaMazza "very helpful" in this operation.

"The CIA's collaboration with foreign governments in repressing their own people is highly questionable in itself," Father Curry told Sen. Church in requesting the Senate committee to investigate.

"But because our government's mission in foreign countries is charged with protecting the security and interests of American citizens there, the CIA's action directed against those very American citizens is doubly questionable," he said.

Church sources estimate there are more than 42,000 Americans, Protestant and Catholic, serving as missionaries in other countries.

John Marks, former State Department intelligence officer who coauthored "The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence," has charged that since its beginning in 1947, the CIA has used religious leaders as information sources.

"A lot of people are willing to cooperate," said the Rev. William Wipfler of New York, who heads the Latin American working group of the National Council of Churches. "You can't damn the CIA for talking to anybody who's willing."

As early as 1967, the National Council of Churches, whose membership includes most of the main Protestant and orthodox denominations, formally frowned on such conversations.

The Rev. Dr. David M. overseas mission boss, recently took from his files a copy of a policy statement

that said, in part, that "as a matter of policy," NCC disapproved of staff members "reporting to CIA agents or entering into any other involvement with the CIA."

Dr. Stowe, mission executive for the United Church of Christ, said the statement was "circulated to member denominations" of the NCC but as far as he knows, none adopted it.

Early last month, representatives of nearly a score of Protestant and Catholic groups came together at Father Curry's invitation to explore a possible "code of ethics" for missionaries in dealing with the CIA.

Church mission leaders queried recently about encounters with the CIA were reluctant to talk. But conversations confirmed that CIA approaches were not uncommon.

The experience of Missionary A., appears to be typical:

Mr. A. had been back in a U.S. city about a week when he received a phone call and was asked to come downtown to "discuss something."

The caller, who said he was with "the government," said it had something to do with Country X, the Latin American nation where Mr. and Mrs. A. had served for a number of years.

At the designated address downtown, behind an unmarked door, Mr. A. was ushered into the office of a man who said he was from the CIA.

"As you know, there's an American corporation in your community (in Country X) and we're very concerned about what's happening down there," the CIA agent began.

The CIA agent, Mr. A. recalled, "had a folder in front of him with my name on it, and it was quite full. He also assured me he was a member of my denomination and casually mentioned the names of former associates of mine—ministers here in the States."

Mr. A. said he refused to inform on the people in Country X who had been his parishioners.

A few weeks later, the family moved to another city. One evening, a woman who said she was a CIA agent called on Mr. and Mrs. A. seeking information about Country X. She, too, was rebuffed.

John Marks believes that

such CIA practices could be "stopped in a week" if U.S. church leaders strongly spoke out against it.

Rev. Dr. Eugene Stockwell, overseas mission head of the National Council of Churches, disagrees.

"I don't think the CIA will be that responsive to any statement we make," he said.

Father Curry has raised the question of "legislation to prohibit the CIA from operating in a covert way ... so that any contact they make must be made public."

In the long run, however, he believes that the "education" of missionaries might be more effective.

"It's important to know what the CIA is doing, to be more knowledgeable about what they are up to" so missionaries can be more discreet, he said.

In the past, the CIA has funded church programs and individuals viewed as furthering U.S. policy.

One example is the Rev. Roger Vekemans, a Belgian sociologist sent by the Jesuit General, worldwide head of the order, to Chile in 1957 to help stop the advancing Marxist tide of Allende.

Father Vekemans developed a network of cultural and social agencies aimed at strengthening the Christian Democratic Party and destroying the effectiveness of the Marxists.

By 1963, Vekemans' Center for the Economic and Social Development of Latin America controlled allocations of \$25 million a year, he told an interviewer.

Of that amount, \$5 million came from the International Development Foundation, an agency revealed in 1967 to be wholly subsidized by the CIA.

Father Vekemans' operation is detailed in a David E. Mutchler's "The Church as a Political Factor in Latin America."

Although the book was published in 1971, an account of the CIA funding of the Jesuit was largely ignored until the recent flurry of interest in the CIA.

Thomas Quigley, Latin America expert for the U.S. Catholic Conference, believes that the days of such practices are over.

"I don't think that kind of large funding is around anymore," he said.

Despite their reluctance to talk about their encoun-

POST-DISPATCH, St. Louis
24 July 1975

ters with the CIA, religious leaders are keeping a careful watch on probes into the agency.

In October, after President Ford defended covert CIA activities in Chile, angry representatives of 16 Catholic and Protestant mission agencies sent him an open letter.

Calling his defense of the CIA "immoral," they charged that "CIA covert actions in the Third World frequently support undemocratic governments which trample on the rights of their own people . . ."

"Gangster methods undermine world order and promote widespread hatred of the United States," they said.

Though the ad hoc coalition of Protestant and Catholic mission groups, Father Curry said he expected to "keep a collective eye" on the situation and to remain alert for abuses "now that we have a new consciousness of the problem, now that we know what the CIA is up to."

TRIBUNE, Albuquerque
12 July 1975

Exposing the CIA

When the current wave of probes into the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) started, a few sober people worried about the unwitting damage that might be done.

Unfortunately, the worriers turned out to be prophetic. Washington's new game of leak and tell about the CIA is harming the nation's intelligence-gathering ability and foreign policy.

A good example of this was the premature disclosure that a CIA salvage vessel had recovered part of a Soviet missile-firing submarine that had sunk to the bottom of the Pacific Ocean.

The story made titillating reading. But, more important, it greatly complicated the CIA's plan to go back and fish up the rest of the submarine, which held valuable military secrets.

Now comes the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to deal a hard blow to the CIA, an odd thing for a fellow government agency to do.

The SEC got and let become public an admission by Ashland Oil Inc. that it had accepted nearly \$100,000 from the CIA and acted as a cover for secret CIA activities for about five years.

As a result, the CIA has had to confirm that it uses American cor-

Another example of how the Central Intelligence Agency operated as a law unto itself has come to light with the disclosure that the Justice Department and the agency had an agreement, dating from 1954, under which the CIA could decide for itself when to prosecute its employees for wrongdoing. Representative Bella Abzug, New York Democrat, has made public a letter from the CIA in which the agency said that since 1954 it had found 30 cases of alleged illegal activity by its employees, had referred 21 of them for prosecution and had dropped nine for fear that prosecution would compromise its intelligence sources. The CIA has also been allowed to intervene against testimony by its agents in civil cases for the same reason.

What this indulgence toward the CIA suggests is that, when the requirements of intelligence are made supreme over the requirements of law, the way is cleared for corruption of the legal system itself. The

Above The Law

exemption of the CIA from the accepted rubric that all institutions and individuals are subject to the law was a significant step toward undermining the democratic system. If one agency can operate outside the law, why not others—all in the name of some supposedly valid purpose?

Although the Justice Department-CIA agreement covered only illegal activities by employees for their own personal benefit (such as embezzlement), the secret status and generally sacrosanct aura enjoyed by the intelligence agency obviously tempted it to set aside the law in other ways. Its domestic surveillance, mail-opening and other acts in violation of its charter indicate that the agency considered itself above the law. If effective legal checks are not imposed on the CIA as a result of the current investigations, the organization will be left with the potential for destroying all faith in the institutions of freedom which its intelligence operations are supposed to be serving.

atmosphere, they run the risk of having their activities exposed and facing trouble with the SEC, stockholders and angry foreign countries. So this country's inability to keep its big mouth shut about legitimate and necessary foreign activities is likely to result in a drying up of intelligence opportunities and sources.

Of course none of this is meant to defend the CIA's illegal domestic spying, which touched off the investigations. And nothing but revulsion is due such CIA "capers" as slipping the drug LSD to unsuspecting persons to learn its effects, an ugly practice that preceded the suicide of a civilian research official in 1953.

The persons responsible for the agency's violations of its charter and the law must be brought to account. Steps must be taken to prevent any recurrence.

But this country should be mature enough to reform the CIA without ruining it — by blowing its secrets, exposing its techniques and endangering its agents. So far our performance has not been encouraging.

porations as conduits for funds that finance certain intelligence work abroad.

If all this sounds wicked, one should keep in mind that the CIA's main purpose abroad is, to put it bluntly, spying.

Its agents cannot, of course, walk around with signs saying "I am a CIA spy." They need covers, and not all of them can be fobbed off as, say, cultural attaches at the nearest U.S. embassy.

So Ashland and other American corporations have — patriotically, we think — hired CIA agents to provide them with covers and have been reimbursed by the agency for the salaries paid to the operatives.

Whether corporations will continue to cooperate with the CIA is in some doubt. In Washington's leaky

WASHINGTONIAN
AUGUST 1975

• Major publishers backed away from the temptation to publish "instant paperbacks" based on the Rockefeller Commission's report on the CIA. A spokeswoman for Bantam Books said the decision not to publish was "arduous. We wanted to make sure there was public interest, but with the Senate investigation going on we felt it was still a running story." William Dickinson, head of the Washington Post Writers' Group, said he consulted Dell Books, which has first re-

backs, but the publisher decided "there wasn't enough there." "The CIA report was incomplete since it lacked the assassination stuff," Dickinson added, "It didn't seem strong enough to be marketable." That judgment has been borne out by sales records of the Government Printing Office's edition: GPO has sold or distributed only 16,000 copies of the report at \$2.85, compared to 70,000 copies of the Presidential transcripts and 128,000 copies of certain volumes of the Warren Commission report.

VILLAGE VOICE
16 JUNE 1975

CIA As White-Collar Mafia

Marchetti
UngaggedBY DOUG PORTER AND
MARGARET VAN HOUTEN

WASHINGTON, D.C.—Formerly a high ranking official in the Central Intelligence Agency, Victor Marchetti has emerged as one of its leading critics. Since leaving the agency in 1969, he has written "The Rope Dancer," a fictionalized account of life within the CIA, and co-authored, with former State Department official John Marks, "CIA and the Cult of Intelligence," a comprehensive overview of that agency's activities.

Through a long series of court battles, the CIA managed to have portions of his second book censored prior to publication. Victor Marchetti now lives under a permanent injunction prohibiting him from writing or saying anything "fact, fiction, or otherwise" about intelligence without prior approval of the Central Intelligence Agency. Despite these restrictions, which the Supreme Court upheld last week, he has maintained an active role as a critic of intelligence operations, appearing on campuses throughout the United States during the last year.

In September of last year, Marchetti traveled to Great Britain and met with former CIA case officer Philip Agee, yet another spy who has chosen to lift the veil of secrecy surrounding intelligence operations. Agee's forthcoming book, "Inside The Company: CIA Diary" (which may soon be released in the United States by Stonehill Publishers) is already a best-seller in Canada and Europe. Director of Central Intelligence William Colby has threatened to bring criminal charges against Agee, apparently because of the content and accuracy of the book's descriptions of covert activities in Latin America.

Although these men have different approaches to the problem, both agree that the CIA's secret intervention into the affairs of other nations must end. Marchetti, through his writing and speaking, hopes to win public support for a comprehensive review of CIA in the congressional arena. Agee, on the other hand, feels that abolition of the CIA is the only viable solution.

Currently Victor Marchetti is writing what he calls a "fictionalized history of the CIA," cognizant that his next book may be the first work of fiction ever to be censored for National Security reasons.

In the following interview, Victor Marchetti expounds (within the limits of his court order) on recent happenings concerning the CIA, Philip Agee, and what the future may hold for himself and his former colleagues.

What do you know or suspect has happened to you since you started to speak out about the CIA's activities?

Well, they went through the usual routine

of character assassination; you know—all kinds of reflection on my character. All of these attempts backfired for one reason or another.

In one instance they sent General Cushman (who was then deputy director of the CIA) to my publisher, Knopf, to say that the reason I was writing "CIA and the Cult of Intelligence" was that I was bitter about not having gotten a position that I was after. They sent a marine to do an intelligence officer's job and got exactly what they deserved. The dummy got the story all mixed up and told them instead that I had quit the CIA because I had not gotten his job. That made the book even more attractive to the publisher.

They also spread all kinds of personal rumors about me to the press. Once reporters had a chance to meet me they found out that these rumors were not true.

Then they went through a period where they tried to discredit me by entrapment. They tried putting various odd people in touch with me. If I would have had anything to do with them, it would have been indicative of a willingness to deal with a foreign power. I had offers from people to go to France, Germany, and other places. I had offers from people for other assistance, but I simply turned these over to the director of security at the CIA.

I always found it rather interesting (because I thought these were put up jobs) that he was more concerned with calming me down than finding out the details of these offers. This made me think that he knew all about the offers.

Is this Angleton you're talking about?

No, the director of security was Howard Osborne. Finally after a number of these approaches, I got annoyed and turned them over to the FBI. That's when they stopped.

What else has happened?

They were following me around; they've admitted to that. They've also admitted to other forms of spying, the full extent of which I'm unsure. I think my phone was tapped. I'm quite sure that I had a mail cover, and I may have been burglarized.

I was playing it straight, and naturally they were left with no other choice but to play it straight themselves, because they couldn't discredit me.

I live in the same house, I go to the same church, my kids go to the same school, everything's the same as when I worked for the CIA. When you do it that way, after a while the spooks have no choice but to deal with you legally and deal with the issues.

Lately, they seem to be playing little games designed to draw me back in. For example, in September I went to England and visited with Philip Agee. I got a passport in 15 minutes—which raised some questions in my mind as to how influential I had suddenly become in the State Department. Then that night along comes a guy from the agency who asks me to pick up—i.e., steal—a

copy of Agee's manuscript while I'm over there.

Well, I knew that they had to have Agee's manuscript. I told him that I couldn't understand why they didn't have Agee's manuscript, since, according to the affidavits the CIA submitted in court on my case, they had a copy of my book outline the day before I wrote it. I told him that if you can steal a copy of my outline the day before I write it, you certainly must be able to get a copy of a manuscript that's been floating around New York, Washington and London. I have since learned that they were trying to make it appear that they were drawing me back in, trying to discredit me.

Let's talk about the disclosures in the Post and the Times about Angleton. What are the implications of his being fired?

I think that Angleton got canned basically because he was a Helms man. He's really the last of the old breed in the agency, the last of the blue bloods. He was not a blue blood in the truest sense of the word—his mother was Mexican and his middle name is Jesus—but he was a blue blood in every other way. He's a different breed of cat than the Colbys who are less aristocratic, less at home at the Rive Gauche and the Georgetown cocktail circuit.

Also, Angleton was in that job for so long that he knows where all the bodies are buried. It's like Stalin getting rid of his KGB chiefs periodically.

What you've been seeing is a reflection of internal bureaucratic gutter fighting, as well as the fact that they knew that the domestic thing was breaking and somebody had to be made a scapegoat for it. It's backfired because Angleton can't take the rap for it all. Security can take some of it, but the real finger points to Seymore Russell's old Domestic Operations Division (now known as the Foreign Resources Division). That's where the action was.

They can't take the risk of just throwing Angleton to the wolves because he knows too much, so they pulled the old trick of bouncing him and then hiring him back as a consultant. Apparently he's going to be there for a couple of years writing his memoirs as part of the secret history of the CIA. This way he'll be able to get it all out of his system—say everything he thinks happened and why. And it's all classified information.

16 Do you think that the domestic

spying scandal was exaggerated by the media?

No. I think that there's more to come. I think that there's lots more, in several different areas. Some of it is the already disclaimed illegal domestic internal security type operations which they were forbidden to carry out. A lot of it is going to be internal operations that related to other activities, some of it embarrassing, maybe too much of it. Some of it is probably going to turn out to be corruption. Playing games in the stock market, buying and selling proprietaries in dirty deals and sweetheart deals. If somebody really takes a look at some of those proprietaries like Air America, Southern Air Transport, Intermountain Aviation . . . and really goes over the money that has been poured in, the money that was made, and the benefits that were accrued by CIA, the agency will have one hell of a time convincing some senators that these were really necessary and legitimate cover activities. And they can get into things like people buying wheat futures because they are able to anticipate good and bad crops via the use of satellite coverage.

Corruption can take many forms. For example, looking the other way in dope dealings, being a party to dope dealings because there was a political goal that transcended the illegal goal. No doubt, there's been dealings with Mafia types, and more. One thing that the CIA can't alibi is corruption.

There's going to be something else that going to come out, that the CIA has been infiltrated by the KGB.

Really? Wasn't it Angleton's job to stop that?

Yes. And if Angleton was as good as everybody says he was, then it does not follow that the agency was never penetrated. If the agency was never penetrated, you did not need a James Angleton.

Angleton, if he were willing to talk, would have some very interesting stories to tell. The same thing goes for the Director of Security, Howard Osborne, and for the inspector generals of the past. I think that this is what the agency is really afraid of. They're not afraid of being exposed for having run operations in Chile—that's the kind of thing the agency can live with. They can say that they had directions from on high and that these are the risks of the game. But when you get to the point that the CIA was probably penetrated, this removes their last defense, which is: "Don't question us, we know what we're doing. Trust us. We are honorable men." This means that they haven't come clean.

Do you think that they were penetrated to the point where there was an adverse effect on their work?

Yes. You see, it's going to turn out that certain defectors for example, who were palmed off on the American people as a great coup, were in effect a deception.

I think it may turn out that there were senior or high-ranking officers in the agency who showed very bad judgment at a minimum, or perhaps had more sinister motives for some of the actions they took.

Your first book, "The Rope Dancer," was about KGB penetration of the CIA. How did the agency react to it?

A couple of agency people told reporters that they knew why I wrote "The Rope Dancer" and that they knew the case I'm really talking about. If you could read the secret depositions (from the CIA's efforts to censor "CIA And The Cult Of Intelligence"), one of the surprises that you'd get is that they seem more angry with the fact that I wrote "The Rope Dancer" than they were with the fact that I was planning to write "CIA and the Cult of Intelligence." To use the agency's own words on them: "If you have nothing to hide, then there's no reason why you should be angry if we're checking in on you."

Getting back to the Soviets, what do you think about the submarine the agency tried to recover last summer?

Project Jennifer was a put up job. I think the CIA leaked that story. They've been getting so much bad publicity, and if you'll notice—Colby's a very clever man—all of the bad publicity that the agency has been getting is really focused on Richard Helms. The finger always points to Helms, which makes me very uncomfortable, because you know Colby has such a shady background. He spent practically all his time in the Far East and as head of the Far East Division, which was one of the dirtiest divisions in the whole agency. The whole Indochina thing, Indonesia, Korea, the Philippines, and Burma, came out of that division.

Yet everybody keeps saying what a nice straight guy Colby is. Finally things get too bad, and the CIA's got themselves an investigation on top of everything else. Helms's friends around town are mighty pissed off at Colby, and Helms has some mighty powerful friends. The word comes from the administration that they're getting fed up with Colby because he didn't handle things too well.

Then, all of a sudden, along comes Project Jennifer. If it turns out to be a setup, it can be blamed on Helms. But, if it turns out,

to be a great coup (which is the way most people are interpreting it), regardless of how much they got out of it, Colby can take credit for it, even though Helms probably started it.

The Soviets knew about Jennifer, didn't they?

I agree with Mel Laird when he says that within days, if not hours, of when we were snooping around out there, that they knew what was going on. I think that it will turn out that the CIA didn't get very much out of Jennifer—10 bodies probably. They might have been lucky enough to have gotten a nuclear warhead from a torpedo, and maybe a soggy old code-book, but they didn't get what they were really after: missile warheads and code machines.

I think this is why there is static from the Pentagon. The navy guys are saying that the op was a flop.

What do you think the impact of Philip Agee's "Inside The Company: CIA Diary" will be?

Well, I think that the most important impact his book is going to have is if it isn't published here. That will prove beyond any doubt why fanatics like Bill Colby want to prevent publication of information on the agency in this country. Now that book has already been published in several hundred thousand copies in English—it's available in Canada, England, and various other places. Anyone who wants to read it has already read it. If Brezhnev wants to read it, he can. If Mao Tse-tung wants to read it, he can, too. Who in hell is Colby trying to keep the information from? The American people! Proving absolutely the charge that I and others have made over and over again: the basic reason for secrecy is not to keep the enemy, or opposition, from knowing what you're doing—but to keep the American people from knowing what you're doing, so that they can neither pass judgment nor interfere with your actions. In other words, to avoid accountability. Also an ignorant and misinformed public is a gullible and easily manipulated public.

What about the charge that Phil Agee is a traitor?

I don't consider him a traitor at all. I think he's basically a loyal, patriotic American. But his loyalty and patriotism runs to the American nation, to the American people, not to the powerful interests that control government—big labor, big business, and so on. He is in essence doing nothing more than what an I. F. Stone, or a Carey McWilliams, and a lot of other critics of the system do. But they work within the system. Agee has made what I feel

outside of the country.

The facts in Agee's book really aren't that sensitive. They're only sensitive in our own minds. And that's because the CIA and the U.S. government have done such a great job of propagandizing us over the years. They've kept the people ignorant through excessive secrecy on one hand, and a lot of disinformation, on the other. This combination has made for a gullible U.S. public.

I do not believe any of the CIA's allegations that Agee's a Cuban agent or a KGB agent. I think these are simple, crude attempts to discredit him. I read it in Newsweek magazine, which I think the American public should know is a CIA groupie magazine. Mel Elfin, the Washington bureau chief, makes no bones about the fact that he's a fan of the CIA. He used to consider himself a confidant of Richard Helms. I'm sure he feels the same way about Bill Colby. You'll notice that Newsweek is always the first of the leading news magazines to write something good about the CIA. They have at least one reporter on their staff in Washington who's an ex-CIA man. This man claims to have left the agency back in the mid-'50s. One time I confronted him and told him I thought I'd met him in Ethiopia after he was supposed to have left the agency. He then said that he'd had nothing to do with the agency since the mid-'60s.

Did you learn anything from reading Philip Agee's book?

I found it to be an enlightened and very accurate description of life in the field. I went through some of the same training he went through and I got kind of a nostalgic feeling as I read about the fun and games at "Camp Nowhere," i.e., Camp Peary near Williamsburg, Virginia.

However, I think that there is something missing in the book that perhaps only a professional would notice or appreciate. I think there is a sequel to be written, his own story. It might not be as salable, but I think it would be more interesting from a point of view of: What kind of people join CIA? Why do they do it? Stick with it? Why in some cases do they get turned off, and ultimately, why in a very few instances decide they have to do something about it?

I'm a Catholic. I understand what Phil was trying to do in his book. This was his sincere act of contrition and complete confession that every Catholic has to make before he dies so that he at least has a chance to go to heaven without a mortal sin on his soul.

Is there anything in Phil's book that was censored from your book?

There may have been a few minor things, but nothing I can think of

offhand. One of the reasons I think his book is sincere (and that he is straight) is that he gives the CIA credit for certain successes that are based solely on what he heard in training: clandestine services, internal propaganda.

Did the publication of Phil's book cause the CIA any real damage?

Oh, I think that some people under State Department cover had to be moved around, but they're easily identifiable anyhow. As for certain powerful ones who have risen to high positions like (Mexican President) Echeverria, well, he's a powerful politician and will be able to find a way to squirm off the hook.

Have you read anything by the CIA arguing with the issues or the facts in Agee's book? No, you have not. You've heard them call him a Communist agent, an unwitting agent, a traitor, a fool, a drunk, a womanizer, a man who's bringing harm to innocent individuals, but at no time have they challenged any of the facts that he has raised. I think Agee can sleep with a clear conscience at night, which is more than I can say for Bill Colby.

What about the future of the CIA?

One thing that I am very concerned about is that the CIA is going underground and has been going underground for quite some time. I think the agency crossed over that line which most intelligence agencies eventually come to, and began to take on a life of its own years ago. They began reaching the conclusion during the '60s that the service is more important than anything else. That is, the service will survive—presidents, administrations, and Congresses come and go—but the service goes on.

I think they are moving into all kinds of things—drugs, crime, terror. And with the help of big business, big labor, and their other friends. It gets very complex; strange bedfellows are being made.

It is going to be more and more difficult to determine over the years. When you get these guys playing around with booby traps and unmarked ammunition and stuff like that, there's just no solution to it except revolution.

Do you think that "CIA and the Cult of Intelligence" and "CIA Dairy" will encourage others to speak out?

I would hope so, but I don't think so. My hope when I started out was that I would be the first olive out of the bottle, and that's always the hardest one. Phil came out a couple of years after me, but he did it under much different circumstances. I'm quite disappointed that other people haven't come forward.

What has happened instead is that we have seen a bevy of pro-CIA

books of various sorts. We've seen people like Miles Copeland, Harry Rositzke, Howard Roman, Ray Cline, and John Barron writing books that are big defenses of the CIA. "KGB," by Barron, is garbage.

He has a lot of bullshit in there that was fed to him by Ray Cline and other CIA people. If I had written that stuff in my book, the CIA would have cut it out.

The amazing thing about these books though, is that they haven't taken with the American public. The public instinctively recognizes them for what they are.

What is your reaction to the Supreme Court decision?

I was initially disappointed and angry that they are still using controls over me. I'm just an ordinary guy with no big secrets to reveal and I feel like I'm the victim of some very selective prosecution. I really believed that the Supreme Court would hear the case and see that the CIA's injunction against me was a violation of my First Amendment rights. But after I cooled off awhile I began to feel that maybe the Court's refusal to hear my case was a good thing. Hearing the case would have given the conservatives on the Court a chance to concretize the law and nail me to the cross as well as stopping others from speaking out. On the other hand, I don't know if the liberals on the Court were smart enough to realize that their position was weak and that it was the wrong time to hear a case like this.

How is the decision affecting you personally?

I'm not discouraged. I see changes in people's attitudes. Senators who wouldn't talk to me four years ago are now seeking me out; Tom Braden, who has violently criticized and disagreed with me is now writing articles that agree with what I've been saying all along. While the CIA has won this battle, they're losing the war.

What is your next legal step?

First we appeal the Supreme Court's decision not to hear the case. We're not too optimistic on that score. Then we'll go back to district court in Virginia and take it item by item to show that the information (suppressed in my book) is either not classified, incorrectly classified, or already in the public domain. I'm also thinking of initiating a separate legal proceeding against the agency for the spying that was done against me. In the final analysis, no matter how frustrated I get, the fact that the CIA still has a gag on me, still wants to review everything I write, and has me followed around to my lectures and wherever else I go, lends more credence to my allegations and gives me a sense of satisfaction. □

LOS ANGELES TIMES
24 July 1975

Colby Says Reds Often Opened Mail Before CIA

BY ROBERT L. JACKSON
Times Staff Writer

WASHINGTON—The head of the Central Intelligence Agency has told Congressmen that many letters opened by the CIA actually had been opened surreptitiously already—by Communist agents in their own countries.

In secret testimony providing new details on the CIA's 20-year mail-opening project, Director William E. Colby also said that the agency's mail surveillance was not limited to the Soviet Union and China, the two countries he had previously mentioned.

He said mail from North Vietnam and Cuba and other Latin American countries also was opened.

His disclosures were contained in a 66-page transcript of closed-door testimony given last week to a House postal affairs subcommittee headed by Rep. Charles H. Wilson (D-Calif.). Transcripts were distributed to subcommittee members Wednesday and a copy was obtained by The Times.

Colby said agents applied chemicals to many foreign letters to determine if the writers had sent secret, hard-to-detect messages. In the process, the CIA discovered that other chemicals had been used—signs that the letters had been studied before.

"Many of the letters opened by CIA had been opened before, presumably in the Communist countries of origin," he testified.

Colby added Miami to the list of cities where the CIA once had intercepted mail. He also provided figures for the first time on mail between the United States and mainland China that was examined in San Francisco. The agency photographed 13,000 envelopes during 1970 and 1971 and opened a smaller number of letters there, he said.

The mail intercept program, which the CIA abandoned in 1973, principally took place in a restricted building at New York's Kennedy International Airport.

Colby testified that a veteran postal worker who carried mail sacks into a room where CIA agents worked was paid a \$500 Christmas bonus by the CIA for six successive years.

"This was an improper act by the agency," Colby testified. He added, however, that the postal employee—identified as Peter McAuley, now retired—"was never told that CIA actually opened the mail."

"Because of his diligent service and support to the project, the agency since 1967 gave him a \$500 Christmas bonus totaling \$3,000," Colby said.

The Rockefeller commission, in its report on CIA activities last month, listed four cities where the CIA had once intercepted mail for intelligence

purposes without legal authority. They were New York, San Francisco, New Orleans and Honolulu.

But Colby told Wilson's subcommittee that the CIA also examined mail between the United States and Cuba that was delayed in Miami from April 24 to 28, 1961. That was shortly after the CIA-sponsored Bay of Pigs invasion had ended in disaster.

"The mail was made available by the Miami postal inspector who transported the mail sacks from the airport to the downtown Miami post office annex," Colby said.

He said 140 items were photographed, including envelopes and letters opened by a CIA officer.

Colby said that in some respects the vast mail surveillance program, which he termed "improper," expanded beyond the supervision of CIA officials.

Discussing the San Francisco program, which focused on mail arriving from mainland China, Colby noted that a bag of outgoing U.S. mail also had been opened. Wilson asked him why.

"I suspect it was just that it was there and they decided to look at it," Colby replied. "There is a bureaucratic momentum that grows on these things, and I think that is where some of our trouble comes from."

As part of the New York-based operation, Colby said, the CIA "exa-

mined some mail between North Vietnam and the U.S. and other mail which flowed through the Soviet Union to the U.S."

Aside from Cuba, he said, the agency had opened mail "dealing with Latin America and various countries there." But he did not elaborate on this aspect, saying that mail surveillance had mainly involved the Soviet Union and China.

Colby said there was no record that any President knew about the mail openings, although three postmasters general were briefed on it over a 20-year period.

Pledging that illegal mail-openings would never occur again, Colby told the congressmen: "We are resolved that we are going to run an American intelligence service, which means one pursuant to American laws."

At the same time he sought to explain why such a program had developed in 1954.

"I think again you have to look at the difference in the times, quite frankly," he said.

"The times of challenge, the times of 'Go out and do the job and meet the threat' and so forth were very intense at that time. And with that kind of pressure there were things (that) happened that now quite apparently were improper."

Parts of the transcript had been deleted by the CIA to protect sensitive material. But Rep. William M. Brodhead (D-Mich.) said at one point:

"Certainly I must confess, Mr. Colby, I haven't heard anything today (that) would be harmful to anyone if the world knew of it."

LONDON TIMES
29 July 1975

Exiled Chile general to sue 'The New York Times'

From Florencia Varas
Santiago, July 28

General Roberto Viaux, of the Chilean Army, now living in exile in Paraguay, is to sue *The New York Times* for "false accusations." The newspaper had alleged that General Viaux and others implicated in the 1970 Schneider case were under contract with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to prevent Dr. Allende becoming President of Chile.

The plan was organized after Dr. Allende was elected by a minority vote in 1970. At that time, General Viaux, and a group of civilians arranged to kidnap General René Schneider, Commander-in-Chief of the Army, thinking that the armed forces would then take over power and

prevent Dr. Allende's accession to the presidency. The plot failed and General Schneider was shot dead.

Confirming that he will sue *The New York Times*, General Viaux declared: "The truth must be told about this problem, which only affected Chileans, and where there was no foreign aid whatsoever."

"If I had any contacts, it was with the leaders of the armed forces in active service at that time. I do not accept foreign intervention in my country's politics. I am not for sale. If one has an ideal one does not need money."

General Viaux originally was given 20 years in jail, but this was reduced later to a term of three years and five years' exile.

Postal Inspector Named in Cover-Up

By Jack Anderson
and Les Whitten

The man who stopped the CIA from tampering with the mails; it is now alleged, actually helped the CIA cover up the illegal operation and misled Congress in the bargain.

He is William Cotter, the chief postal inspector, who first began dealing with the Post Office in the 1950s as a CIA agent opening other people's mail.

After he was put in charge of enforcing the postal laws in 1969, he allegedly promised a CIA officer that he wouldn't interfere with the illegal mail openings without first consulting the CIA.

True to his promise, he never told his postal superiors about

the mail-opening project. But when the heat was on, Cotter asked the CIA to clear the operation with his postal bosses. The CIA refused, so Cotter belatedly stopped the mail openings to save his own skin.

These charges have been made by Rep. Charles H. Wilson (D-Calif.) in a private letter to Postmaster General Benjamin F. Bailar. Wilson, whose subcommittee has been investigating the mail-opening scandal, asked Bailar to fire Cotter.

In calling for Cotter's removal, Wilson charged that "his dedication is first and foremost to the CIA, not the Postal Service."

Cotter also misinformed Congress, according to Wilson, about his knowledge of the mail

openings. The chief inspector swore he had "no official awareness" of the mail surveillance since he left the CIA project in December, 1955. "The Rockefeller report reveals that this assertion is false," Wilson wrote.

He told the Postmaster General bluntly that "the contradictions in Mr. Cotter's testimony should be of some concern to you."

Wilson noted that Cotter continued to conceal the mail openings even after he had received inquiries "from American scientists." Not until 1973, nearly four years after he became the chief inspector, did he halt the illegal operation.

Cotter is on vacation and could not be reached for comment.

ment.

Footnote: Cotter is now pursuing a marginal mail-opening case with uncharacteristic zeal. This involves a reporter, however, rather than the CIA.

Brian Kanzaki recently wrote in the Queens College, N.Y., newspaper that a student leader allegedly had used student funds to make personal, long-distance phone calls. The student leader charged that the story was based on phone records illegally obtained from her mail.

She called in the postal inspectors, who threatened Kanzaki with prosecution if he didn't tell them where he got the phone records. These are the same inspectors who ignored the opening of millions of letters by the CIA.

NEW YORK TIMES
4 August 1975

PANEL SAID TO FIND C.I.A. ACTS ILLEGAL

Justice Department Aides
View Reported on Opening
and Photographing Mail

By JOHN M. CREWDSON

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Aug. 3—Justice Department lawyers looking into possible wrongdoing by the Central Intelligence Agency have concluded that agency employees acted illegally in opening and photographing mail in transit between the United States and Communist countries, according to well-placed department officials.

The officials' assertion is the first report that the department panel set up to examine the range of the C.I.A.'s domestic activities, as well as its alleged involvement in foreign assassination plots, has reached a determination of illegality of any of the agency's operations that have been questioned.

One of the officials, all of whom asked not to be identified, said a principal problem faced by the panel, which is composed of about a dozen Justice Department lawyers, is that the Federal statute of limitations, normally five years in most felony cases, had nullified prosecution against many of the agency's activities in the nineteen fifties and nineteen sixties.

He said, however, that such was not the case with the C.I.A.'s mail-opening opera-

tions, which are said to have continued in the San Francisco area until 1971 and at Kennedy International Airport in New York until 1973.

The Justice Department, the officials said, is investigating all domestic C.I.A. activities of which it has knowledge, ranging from wiretapping and break-ins to the infiltration of political organizations and the administering of mind-altering drugs to unsuspecting victims.

An important consideration underlying all of the cases, they have said, is whether such activities, while taking place within the United States, were nonetheless consonant with the agency's mission of gathering and evaluating foreign intelligence or with the responsibility of the executive branch to protect the national security.

The reported conclusion of the Justice lawyers—that the seas mail was illegal—may therefore hold significance for the eventual prosecution of other domestic activities by the agency that, like the mail openings, possessed an element of foreign involvement.

One high Justice official has said privately that some prosecutions were almost certain to grow out of the department's investigation.

Matter of Evidence

Other officials have cautioned, however, that it was still unclear whether the department would be able to assemble in the mail-opening cases evidence that was solid enough to sustain a criminal indictment of the agency employees who were directly involved.

One official said that the agents "were very astute" in concealing from post office employees their surreptitious opening and copying of letters bound for the Soviet Union and China.

The department's investigation, he said, might well dis-

solve into a matter of "Who struck John?"—a metaphor for the confusion that results from a welter of conflicting testimony and accusations unaccompanied by independent evidence.

One official pointed out, as an example of an incident that he said was clearly prohibited by Federal statute, the recent disclosure by the C.I.A. that it had detained for three years more than 100 pieces of mail from the Soviet Union to recipients in the United States.

Benjamin F. Bailar, the Postmaster General, said last month, in announcing the belated discovery, that the mail—85 postcards and 25 letters—had been given to the Justice Department "pending possible legal action against those responsible for opening and detaining it."

Without a Warrant

The Federal statute governing the Justice Department's investigation of the mail-tampering cases makes it a felony punishable by up to five years in prison to remove from a postal facility or to open and examine any piece of mail in the absence of a judicial search warrant, which the C.I.A. did not have.

William E. Colby, the Director of Central Intelligence, said last February that he did not expect criminal charges to be brought against any C.I.A. employees over their involvement in domestic activities.

Lawyers in the Justice Department's Criminal and Civil Rights Division which are coordinating the C.I.A. investigation, said later, however, that they had given Mr. Colby no such assurances and were waiting to see additional material, including that produced by the Rockefeller commission looking into domestic C.I.A. activities, before reaching any conclusions.

The commission reported in June that, from 1953 to 1973, the intelligence agency ran in-

termittent mail-opening programs at different times in New York, San Francisco, New Orleans and Hawaii.

The New Orleans and Hawaiian mail interception programs, the commission said, took place in the nineteen-fifties, but it termed both of them, like the New York and San Francisco operations, "unlawful."

In 1970 and 1971

The commission reported that the San Francisco project, which was concerned with mail to and from Far Eastern countries, took place in 1970 and 1971 and involved removing and later returning selected pieces of mail from the West Coast postal facility for photographing and analysis.

The commission said the New York project, which continued uninterrupted between 1953 and 1973, was finally halted by William J. Cotter, who learned of the project while an official of the C.I.A., which he left in 1969 to become chief postal inspector.

Mr. Cotter's predecessor, like most other postal officials, had believed that the agency's operations at postal facilities involved simply photographing the outsides of envelopes destined for the Communist target countries, which is legal.

In its last year of operation, the interception project at Kennedy Airport examined 2 million pieces of mail destined for overseas delivery and opened nearly 9,000 of them; the commission reported.

Among the letters that were opened, photographed and retained were two mailed to the Soviet Union in 1958 and 1960 by Bella S. Abzug, now a Manhattan Democratic Representative, while she was a practicing lawyer in New York.

The two letters had been sent in behalf of clients of Russian ancestry to an arm of the Soviet Government asking for assistance in finding other potential heirs in estate cases.

NEW YORK
23 JUNE 1975

The Politics Of Assassination

By Tad Szulc

The politics of assassination is a relatively new phenomenon in American politics. But it is a political weapon with two cutting edges. One is the simple act of assassination for political purposes at home and abroad. The Warren commission decided, for example, that Lee Harvey Oswald acted alone when he killed John Kennedy in Dallas, but it could not rule out the possibility that Oswald was politically motivated. Similarly, it is assumed that Sirhan Sirhan had some political motivation in shooting Bobby Kennedy in Los Angeles in 1968. And to plot the death of foreign leaders—Premier Castro of Cuba, say—is to make a political decision, whether the plotting is done by elected officials of the U.S. government or at the Central Intelligence Agency.

The other cutting edge of the politics of assassination is the use of *knowledge* of assassinations, or assassination plots, to damage past and present governments. Who gains depends on who is playing this game. One thinks of the attempt by E. Howard Hunt, the convicted Watergate "plumber," to falsify, while working in the Nixon White House, a series of telegrams to show that President Kennedy had ordered the assassination of South Vietnam's President Diem in November, 1963.

The politics of assassination is clearly the legacy of murders and attempted murders of national leaders reaching back to the cold war era of the 1950's. The plots against Castro, the deaths of John and Robert Kennedy—we have become accustomed to mysteries, accustomed to conclusions with loose ends untied.

In the past five months, the politics of assassination has been on view in the handling of charges that the CIA plotted political murder in pursuit of presumed American foreign-policy objectives. In these months, the conduct of the Rockefeller commission, whose duty it became to look into these charges, had at least one decidedly political aspect. While the commission finally chose not to get to the bottom of the assassination charges, it appeared to have tolerated enough leaks to the media to suggest that if there were any CIA murder plots, they were hatched at the direction of John and Bobby Kennedy.

The politics of assassination, as played in Washington today, is especially obvious in the running controversy between the Rockefeller commission, chaired by Vice President Nelson Rockefeller, who has not ceased to run

for president in seventeen years, and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities, headed by Frank Church of Idaho, a potential Democratic presidential candidate in 1976.

Rockefeller's commission refused, finally, to report on the subject despite an extra two months' time allotted to it by President Ford for this purpose. Church, whose painstaking investigation is very much centered on assassinations, says that he has "hard evidence" of CIA murder plots.

The Rockefeller commission's handling of foreign assassinations is, in fact, a kind of classical case study in the politics of assassination. Its decision to skirt the whole subject because "time did not permit a full investigation" immediately became a burning political issue, with both the White House and the Rockefeller panel being charged with a cover-up.

Ford, to be sure, promised to give the materials on assassinations gathered by the commission to appropriate congressional committees and to the attorney general, for further investigation. But the real outcome of this maneuvering was that the presidential commission was spared the necessity of addressing itself to the hottest, and the most politically dangerous, aspects of the CIA inquiry. When the Church committee presents its conclusions, probably early in 1976, the White House might well accuse the Democratic majority of playing politics with assassination in an election year. This, the White House might well hope, could defuse the danger posed by Church's investigation. The politics of assassination is also a vicious circle.

The whole CIA affair to date probably did nothing to enhance the stature of Nelson Rockefeller in terms of his vice-presidential (if not presidential) ambitions in 1976. As a congressional observer remarked last weekend, "The CIA investigation may turn out to be Rockefeller's political Bay of Pigs."

Why Ford should have saddled Rockefeller with the investigation in the first place is a reasonably interesting political question in its own right. But it is only one element in the surrealistic—and often almost unbelievable—picture of the politics of assassination in Washington today. The following is an attempt to reconstruct as much of this complex story as possible from information from sources in and around the intelligence investigative bodies and from those familiar with circumstances surrounding the assassination plots. The eight-man Rockefeller commis-

sion was appointed by Ford last January 4 following published reports that the CIA engaged in illegal domestic spying against antiwar militants and other radicals. But inasmuch as the CIA had been accused in the past of every conceivable misdeed, the first question to ask might well be why

Ford was stampeded into naming a blue-ribbon commission chaired by the vice-president of the United States. At first sight, it looked like overkill, the setting of a stage for a high-level whitewash. White House sources said at the time that Ford would have felt vulnerable in the post-Watergate climate (and the CIA's role in Watergate remains unclear) if he hadn't launched an investigation at once. Thus it was serious politics from the outset.

Washington, however, is full of skeptics. It soon occurred to many observers that Ford may have moved in order to fend off accusations of a more serious kind against the CIA—even more serious than domestic snooping in contravention of the agency's charter. Ford's hope, by this logic, was that the investigating would be confined to the Rockefeller commission, which, presumably, could keep things from getting out of hand. After all, its mandate was only domestic spying.

Two unplanned events then took place to upset the White House strategy. One was the Senate's decision, soon after, to appoint its own investigative body—the Church committee—to look into every aspect of United States intelligence activities at home and abroad. This was an open-ended mandate. Church, fresh from investigating the CIA's involvement in the 1973 coup in Chile, rushed into it with gusto.

The second event, in March, was the public surfacing (through a news leak) of the fact that CIA Director William E. Colby had given Ford a supplementary "oral" report dealing with the question of possible foreign assassination plots. Ford's reaction was to add "domestic aspects" of plots of assassinations of foreign leaders to the Rockefeller commission's mandate—and to extend the life of the panel by two months. It is at this point that the political mystery deepens.

Because the Rockefeller commission was working in utter secrecy (members were even advised not to leave their shoes for shining outside their hotel rooms' doors, to prevent the planting of transmitting devices inside heels), it is impossible to tell how Rockefeller initially planned to approach the investigation of murder charges. It is known, however, that the committee took depositions and testimony from a number of past and present senior CIA officials—though only to a very limited extent from CIA field operatives, including the retired ones, who could reasonably have been expected to shed considerable light.

That the principal intended victim of CIA plots was Fidel Castro was common gossip. There were grounds to think the agency had knowledge of the Congo's leftist lead-

er, Patrice Lumumba (killed in 1961), and the Dominican Republic's right-wing dictator, Rafael Leonidas Trujillo (also killed in 1961). The Rockefeller commission received information concerning such plots, including the fact that the CIA contracted with underworld figures to assassinate Castro in 1961, and that a memorandum concerning a "contingency" to murder the premier was drafted in 1962 by a counterinsurgency expert claiming to have been working on Kennedy's orders.

The Rockefeller commission was told by former CIA Director John A. McCone—who repeated his story before the much more diligent Church committee—that there was a plot afoot to kill Castro in 1961, but that it was aborted. McCone, however, added another bizarre element to this history of assassinations by admitting that he had not known of the conspiracy at the time (he was director of the CIA between 1961 and 1965), learning about it only later. But Richard M. Helms, who became CIA boss in 1966 after running the agency's clandestine services for years, vociferously denied in public that there had been any plots to kill distinguished foreigners. Thus, the McCone and Helms statements raised doubts about the veracity of the CIA when it spoke to "outsiders" and even more disturbing doubts about whether CIA directors were always privy to what their underlings were up to.

Faced not only with contradictions but also with the risk of unraveling the most secret CIA operations, the Rockefeller commission decided early in May that assassinations were too hot a potato to handle. The commission knew, for example, that planning for Castro's assassination began in 1960, during the last year of the Eisenhower administration, when Nixon, as vice-president, was the executive officer in the White House for the Bay of Pigs invasion. It may have also found out—as the Church committee did—that the CIA had planned to murder China's Premier Chou En-lai and Indonesia's President Sukarno in the 1950's, and that it was aware of plans by local police dissidents to murder the president of the Malagasy Republic last February—a successful plan, as it turned out.

In any event, the Rockefeller commission made the political decision to ignore assassinations altogether. It decided to drop the initial plan to devote an 86-page section of the report on murder allegations and to replace it with only a lengthy paragraph to the effect that the commission simply had no time to look into all the ramifications of the assassination problem and, consequently, could offer no conclusion on this matter. Ford says that he cleared the decision. There is no explanation of how astute politicians like Rockefeller and Ford could have thought that the commission would get away with what amounts to a "no comment" reaction to the charges.

Meanwhile, as the report was being drafted, unidentified sources close to the commission leaked the story that the Federal Bureau of Investigation had documents providing evidence that

the CIA had contacted Sam Giancana and John Roselli, two men identified with the Mafia, to get Castro killed. The point was made that it happened in 1961—during the Kennedy presidency. Simultaneously, another story leaked out concerning the role of retired Major General Edward G. Landsdale, the counterinsurgency expert with CIA ties, in developing plans in 1962 to kill Castro as one of the contingencies for handling the Cuban problem. In press interviews, Landsdale confirmed that he had been working on Kennedy's instructions, delivered through an intermediary, but he left it fuzzy as to whether there was any follow-up.

In both cases, however, available evidence suggests that both the Kennedy brothers had acted to block the Castro assassination plots. President Kennedy discussed the pressures on him to authorize Castro's murder when he received this reporter in the Oval Office in November, 1961, for an off-the-record meeting. Speaking in the presence of Richard N. Goodwin, a special assistant to the president, Kennedy went out of his way to emphasize that it would be morally wrong for the United States to become involved in political assassinations. This was two years before he was murdered in Dallas. Adam Walinsky, who served as aide to Robert Kennedy, said in an interview that the attorney general told him at about the same time of stopping the CIA-inspired Mafia plot against Castro. Walinsky said that Bobby Kennedy first learned of CIA-Mafia ties when he was counsel to a Senate committee investigating rackets in the late 1950's. Meeting in Lima, Peru, in October, 1965, with angry students denouncing the United States for plots to kill Castro, Robert Kennedy shouted, "But I'm the one who saved his life...."

Anti-Castro plots did not stop with John Kennedy's death. In 1964, during the Johnson administration, the CIA engineered a conspiracy against Castro, who was to be shot by a Cuban army major, Rolando Cubela, with a special rifle provided by the agency. There may have been as many as thirteen plots to kill Castro between 1960 and 1965. None of this material, of course, appears in the Rockefeller report.

The final draft of the report, containing a more detailed explanation of why the panel failed to reach any conclusions on any plots for political murder, was approved by the full body on June 2, a Monday. Plans were made to deliver the report to Ford on Friday, June 6, and to distribute 3,000 copies to the media for release on Sunday, June 8.

According to sources within the Rockefeller commission and the White House, this plan was still in effect as of close of business on Wednesday, June 4. The confusion began on Thursday, June 5. This is when advance copies of the report were delivered to the White House. They were read by several top officials, including Donald Rumsfeld, the number-two man in the Ford White House, and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger.

It is unknown whether Ford himself

had a chance to read it on Thursday. But, according to reliable sources, the men who read the 299-page report were shocked when they came to the section on assassination. With the public's interest all but completely centered on assassinations—the CIA's domestic spying seemed forgotten—the section announcing that the commission had not gone into the murder charges could have discredited the entire investigation.

Thursday night, accordingly, the White House decided to hold back from the news media the text of the report. Ford was consulted, and he approved of the decision. The choice was made between the risk in releasing the report as written, with the inevitable consequences, and the risk in delaying it in order to "sanitize" the text, with its own political dangers. On Friday, June 6, the White House said that the report would be kept secret indefinitely—and in so doing lit the biggest political fuse in Washington since Watergate.

As Ron Nessen battled the infuriated reporters, the suspicions of a White House cover-up developed. Only then did it dawn on the White House that it had set in motion a political scandal.

Nixon-like, the White House sought to recoup with the announcement that the report would be released after Ford read it over the weekend. Last Monday, at a news conference largely devoted to the CIA controversy, the president promised that the report would be released the next day—minus the material on assassinations. The compromise was to write in the two-paragraph explanation that the commission had had no time to deal with it.

Will the politics of assassination run its course when the Church committee presents its findings? In both a narrow and a broad sense the answer has to be "no." There is little doubt that the U.S. government had been involved in murder conspiracies. President Ford virtually confirmed it at his news conference on June 9 when he said, "I don't want to sit in 1975, passing judgments on decisions made by honorable people under unusual circumstances." But, inevitably, others will make political judgments on them.

On another level, the politics of assassination will play a key role in the 1976 election year—with both its cutting edges at work. One of the factors in Teddy Kennedy's decision not to run for the Democratic nomination is his fear of being murdered as his brothers were. George Wallace is himself a product of the politics of assassination. It is possible that his partial paralysis, the result of the 1972 assassination attempt against him, will work against him. But it is just as possible that his physical condition will win him sympathy—and votes.

The death of Lincoln, the death of Garfield, the death of McKinley, the wounding of Teddy Roosevelt—these were sudden shocks in our history, and they were over not long after they began. But today we seem to be in a different temper.

Despite the Rockefeller commission's conclusion that the CIA was not involved in the Dallas assassination—

and its reconfirmation of the findings of the Warren commission in 1964 that Oswald acted alone—pressures will continue for a formal reopening of the John Kennedy murder investigation.

In the last twelve years we have seen assassinations breed assassinations, either in imitation or in reprisal. We must be prepared to live for a long time with the politics of assassination.

WASHINGTON STAR
4 August 1975

Mary McGrory

CIA's Old School Ties Tangle Probers in Ivy

The House Select Committee on Intelligence got very little direct information out of James Lynn, director of the Office of Management and Budget, the agency which decides on the agency's allowance.

But Lynn told a few things about OMB, which told a great deal about the CIA and explained why it lives so high on the hog while other departments whine and scrape for their share.

Of the six-man OMB staff in charge of national security funds, three are alumni of CIA. A former OMB budget official is now performing as comptroller general of the CIA.

Chairman Otis Pike suggested that concentration of ex-agents with Ivy League diplomas like his own (Princeton) might benefit from an infusion of fresh blood that would be more representative of America, and dilute "The Old School Tie effect."

Rep. Ron Dellums, D-Calif., the

splendidly scornful black from Oakland, called it "a quasi-closed society" and said he spied a pattern, probably government-wide, of a network that was an inbred protective league of the CIA.

LYNN WAS a veritable "Sunny Jim" before the committee, cheerful as a tap dancer, handing out light banter about his old days at HUD, his tilt towards domestic spending, his alertness towards "big ticket items" — which he had to admit in the case of the CIA he did not always see. Thanks to Congress, CIA Director William E. Colby can go around to the National Security Council, which is said to have a thriving CIA alumni chapter of its own, and get approval for the more sensitive projects.

What Lynn was principally peddling was the line that the CIA is just another agency, just another mouth at the trough. It plainly irritated the members.

Chairman Pike pointed out that, for starters, the CIA does not require congressional approval for specific expenditures. It does not so much as appear in the federal budget. And, although Lynn promised to tell the members what they really wanted to know in closed session, it was pretty clear that he would need more than a week to recall any time his sharp-eyed ex-CIAs managed to overrule any CIA request.

IT IS VERY common, Lynn said several times, to recruit OMB personnel to examine the budgets of agencies they once served. It happens all the time. Why, the VA section is full of former VA men.

The reason the parallel failed to reassure, of course, is that so far as

Point of View

anyone knows, the VA is not buying

WASHINGTON POST
25 July 1975

Bishop Said Paid by CIA

Associated Press

The CIA regularly infiltrated church groups and missionaries working abroad and once had a South Vietnamese Catholic bishop on its payroll, a former State Department intelligence specialist says.

The bishop, who headed a diocese outside of Saigon, was on the agency's payroll as recently as 1971, and a CIA "case officer" would fly in from Saigon for secret meetings with him, according to John Marks, the former State Department specialist.

Marks is director of a research project for the Center for National Security Studies, a private group frequently critical of the CIA.

In a study of the agency's relationships with church groups, Marks says: "Congressional and executive pres-

Corps volunteers and Fulbright scholars, but religious organizations have never been treated by the agency with such deference."

A spokesman for the Senate panel probing the CIA said the committee is looking into the CIA's relationships with missionaries.

Marks' study says an unidentified Protestant missionary in Bolivia made regular intelligence reports to the CIA "as a patriotic duty and not for pay." The missionary was said to be "knowledgeable about the Communist Party and had all sorts of information about unions and farmers' cooperatives."

Marks said another Protestant missionary in Bolivia periodically passed on names of Bolivians he thought were Communists to U.S. embassy officials, who he assumed were with the CIA.

selves against communism is in and of itself repulsive.

Sir: Mary McGrory is so transparent in her pro-Communist leaning and writing that the double standard she and her press-establishment colleagues propound should be clear to all.

Consider the implications of the phrase "broke the law" when columnists of Ms. McGrory's convoluted turn of mind apply it to draft evaders and deserters as compared to the way it is used in the current CIA witch hunt. Put very simply, what they tell us is that it is proper to break the law if the law requires one to fight communism. On the other hand, to break the law to defend our-

Note also, that individual cases are selected when universal amnesty is the subject, but when the CIA, the most successful agency ever to serve the country against communism stands accused of breaking the law, these champions of Marxist-Leninism, Castro's Cuba and the simple freedom-loving Khmer-Rouge will only deal in generalities.

If Ms. McGrory would only carry one of her recent, typically illogical parallels one step further she could cease her attempts at journalism and spare us; "we have suffered enough."

Milton L. Honemann.

Towson.

LOS ANGELES TIMES
30 July 1975

BELIEVES DULLES RECEIVED REPORTS

OK'd Mafia Plan, Ex-CIA Aide Says

BY ROBERT L. JACKSON
Times Staff Writer

WASHINGTON—A former chief of clandestine services for the Central Intelligence Agency said Tuesday that he personally had approved CIA cooperation with Mafia figures who wanted to assassinate Cuban Premier Fidel Castro in 1960.

Richard M. Bissell said also in an interview that he believed the late Allen Dulles, then director of the CIA, had received regular reports on the Mafia connection.

Bissell's statements marked the first time a former member of the CIA hierarchy had acknowledged responsibility for the unusual cooperation in the early 1960s between the underworld and intelligence planners.

Lawrence R. Houston, former general counsel of the CIA, told reporters last week that he had first learned about the CIA-Mafia links in April, 1962, from the late Col. Sheffield Edwards, then the agency's director of security.

Houston said he had never authorized these arrangements and insisted that he and Edwards had immediately briefed Atty. Gen. Robert F. Kennedy about them. Houston said he doubted that Edwards had acted alone in arranging the contacts.

Bissell, who was reached by telephone at his office in Farmington, Conn., said arrangements with the Mafia had been handled by Edwards' office through Robert A. Maheu.

Maheu, a former top aide to industrialist Howard Hughes, gave his first closed testimony to Senate CIA investigators Tuesday after being granted immunity from prosecution

earlier this month. Maheu said that he would meet with reporters today if he completed his testimony.

Bissell said Edwards had arranged the highly secret cooperation with underworld figures Sam Giancana and Johnny Rosselli, but that he (Bissell)—who outranked Edwards—also approved it.

"Sheff Edwards talked to me about it," he said. "I approved of what he was doing."

Bissell said the Mafia work had not been under his personal direction, however. "In everything related to this matter, I believe Edwards reported directly to Dulles—with my knowledge and concurrence," Bissell said.

Bissell said these arrangements had begun "in the last half of 1960." They started in the waning months of the Eisenhower administration as plans were being made for Cuban expatriates to invade their homeland. These plans ended in the abortive Bay of Pigs invasion in April, 1961, in the early days of the Kennedy administration.

Rosselli reportedly has told Senate investigators that he helped plan or direct about six attempts on Castro's life in the early 1960s.

When asked how cooperation with the Mafia had arisen Bissell said: "I think the history is very uncertain, as to whose original idea it was."

Giancana or other Mafia figures might have suggested it themselves, he said, because "they did have very large interests in Cuba that were totally eclipsed or destroyed by Castro."

"I believe the record shows that they worked (for the CIA) without pay for the most part," he said.

Other government sources have said that the Mafia wanted to remove Castro from power to reopen the lucrative gambling operations in Havana that Castro had closed.

Bissell speculated that underworld figures were also seeking to build up credit with the U.S. government against possible federal prosecutions in the future.

Bissell, a top planner of the Bay of Pigs invasion, left the CIA in February, 1962, during a Kennedy administration shakeup of the agency. He said he did not know how long work with the Mafia had continued, although others have said that Rosselli's anti-Castro plans continued until 1963.

It was learned that Bissell had told Senate investigators he had known assassination plans would be made when he approved the Mafia cooperation but doubted that the Mafia could ever execute such plans. He told The Times he had "no clear recollection or hard evidence" that the White House or Atty. Gen. Kennedy knew about any such plans.

In a related development, Sen. John G. Tower (R-Tex.), vice chairman of the Senate's special CIA committee, said he had sounded out former President Richard M. Nixon Saturday about the possibility of Mr. Nixon providing testimony on several issues.

Toner said he had spoken with Mr. Nixon by telephone for 20 minutes but refused to disclose the response. Committee sources said the matter was unresolved.

WASHINGTON STAR
7 August 1975

Spy Agency Hit on Monitoring

By Norman Kempster
Washington Star Staff Writer

A member of the House CIA committee wants the Justice Department to consider criminal charges against the National Security Agency for listening in on the international telephone calls of Americans.

Rep. Les Aspin, D-Wis., said electronic eavesdropping without a warrant is "clearly illegal" because it violates several statutes and ignores recent Supreme Court rulings.

Aspin compared the telephone intercepts with the CIA's 20-year program of opening mail between the United States and several other countries, including

the Soviet Union. Both, he said, are illegal but the mail program ended in 1973 while the telephone eavesdropping is still going on.

THE LAWMAKER suggested that the committee send its file on NSA monitoring of telephone and cable traffic to the Justice Department for possible prosecution.

CIA Director William E. Colby confirmed yesterday that the NSA monitors international telephone calls including those involving American citizens. But he refused to provide additional details of the program during the committee's public hearings.

Sources outside of the CIA and NSA but familiar with their methods have said the NSA intercepts virtually all telephone and cable traffic between the United States and foreign countries. Although Colby stopped far short of confirming those accounts, he provided the first official word that the NSA is currently engaged in monitoring "foreign communications."

HIS TESTIMONY showed that the program has not been stopped in spite of recent court decisions adding new restrictions to warrantless wiretaps.

In answer to a series of

questions from Aspin, Colby said the NSA monitors "communications that go abroad or are abroad."

Later Colby told Aspin he had not said the monitoring takes place in this country. He refused to say where it does take place.

Aspin said the committee has information that the NSA intercepts calls between the United States and foreign countries. He said he did not know where the listening post was located.

The NSA is one of the most secret of the nation's intelligence agencies. Its primary function is making and breaking codes but it also has access to advanced technology for intercepting communications.

WASHINGTON POST
7 August 1975

CIA Asked 500 Troops For Guards

By Timothy S. Robinson
Washington Post Staff Writer

The Central Intelligence Agency asked for 500 federal troops to be stationed at its Langley headquarters to protect the building during a 1971 antiwar demonstration, according to documents filed yesterday in U.S. District Court.

The request came after a CIA employee "observed one of (protest leader) Rennie Davis' men taking notes near the CIA headquarters building," according to the documents.

The request was made at a meeting with Justice Department officials on April 8, 1971. The document reflects only the request and does not state whether the troops were supplied. However, lawyers familiar with the case said troops were never stationed at the CIA during the antiwar protests.

The document was among summaries of planning sessions held by various government officials between the time period of April and May, 1971, when hundreds of thousands of protesters came here to demonstrate against the Vietnam war.

Filed in one of the pending lawsuits that grew out of protests during the first week of May, the material reflects the wide range of government agencies involved in planning the government's response to the protests.

The Justice Department compiled a list of the agencies at the request of Sen. Edward M. Kennedy (D-Mass.) in 1973; which also was among the materials filed yesterday. It does not include the CIA among the government agencies involved in the planning sessions despite the CIA participation in at least one session.

Justice Department officials were unable to explain the omission last night.

The Central Intelligence Agency assigned at least one agent to infiltrate May Day demonstrations according to the report on CIA's domestic activities requested by the President earlier this year. The CIA also has disclosed that it supplied drivers and technical equipment to D.C. police for the protests.

The document filed yesterday is the first public disclosure that the CIA feared for the safety of its massive Virginia headquarters and other CIA buildings in the Washington area.

The meeting occurred in the offices of Justice Department

BALTIMORE NEWS AMERICAN
18 JUNE 1975



JOHN P. ROCHE

The CIA Is OK

Maybe you want President Ford to declare a week of national humiliation, fasting and prayer as collective penance for the misdeeds of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) but frankly I think we have a better intelligence agency than we deserve.

When you realize that since 1947 the CIA has operated without any effective legislative or executive regulation, has been provided with almost unlimited funds and done its work virtually hidden from public or press scrutiny, the miracle is that we don't have a monster, that 15 foreign heads of state were not disposed of, and that all mail entering the United States was not read.

What has been uncovered demonstrates beyond a shadow of a doubt that the CIA went well beyond its mandate in a number of areas, but there is no evidence of a malignant conspiracy to turn the United States into a police state.

On the contrary, there is no pattern: as problems arose, solutions were improvised—some illegal. And, of course, once a "solution" gets established in the bureaucracy, particularly one protected from observation, it remains like a fly in amber. If someone asks, "Is it legal?" the answer is, "Sure, we've been doing it since 1952." In short, a body of common law grows up around the original charter.

In retrospect, for example, I am convinced that unknowingly I was a witness to the beginnings of the CIA operation "Chaos," which involved infiltrating antiwar and other militant groups and domestic surveillance.

In 1967, as the anti-war movement became noisier and noisier, President Johnson became madder and madder. His fury was fed by the late FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover, who could find a conspiracy in a nursery school. In the White House, special counsel Harry McPherson and I became the backboards. We were both profoundly skeptical of the conspiracy theory, and LBJ set out to convince us we were a couple of barefoot innocents.

His technique was to call either of us in and triumphantly hand over some documents that, he felt, were proof positive of his pet thesis—that the militants were led and financed by the Communists abroad, and that they were tightly coordinated. One

that I recall vividly was a memo from J. Edgar carefully documenting how anti-war militants in 15 cities across the United States had employed the same protest techniques within the space of three or four days.

Following my addiction to the simplest possible answer, I suggested that in each of these cities there were television sets, which could explain the chain reaction. A group in New York would see a new wrinkle playing in San Francisco and employ it the next day. The president was unimpressed and called on the government for a full-court press.

Now when a president, particularly a volcano like LBJ, calls for a full-court press, the troops really hop. In fact, they are very likely to become more catholic than the Pope—that is, engage in marginal and illegal acts to impress the Man.

When army counterintelligence got the word, for instance, it launched an absolutely outrageous campaign of surveillance, bugging trees at anti-war meetings and setting up dossiers on roughly a quarter of the population of the United States. The president knew nothing of this, nor did the Secretary of Defense: Down in the depths of the Pentagon, however, some colonel was bucking for a star.

Let us shift to CIA director Richard Helms and his possible reaction to President Johnson's booming orders. Like other human beings, he did not want to disappoint his boss. I hypothesize the following scenario:

Helms held a council of war and somebody suggested infiltrating radical groups. Someone else perhaps asked, "Can we do it legally?" and the common law was invoked, "We did it for Kennedy (or Eisenhower). That settled, "Operation Chaos" went into business. And when Director Helms proudly handed the president a letter from one militant in Havana to one in Detroit, one doubts if the president's first question was, "Did you obtain it legally?"

In any case, our reaction to the exposures should skip flagellation in favor of effective external control. No agency, particularly a secret one, can be trusted in police itself.

official Harlington Wood on April 8, 1971, at 10 a.m. Participating were two U.S. marshals, two CIA representatives, and four Justice Department representatives, according to the summary.

A CIA official told the group the agency "anticipates problems at CIA headquarters between April 24 and May 26," according to the summary. "On April 26, intelligence is that a group intends to enter the building. In May, demonstrators plan to disrupt traffic near CIA building."

The CIA felt its "various buildings" in the District of Columbia were well-protected, but that it was concerned

the summary.

A CIA representative asked that U.S. marshals be stationed at CIA buildings in Rosslyn. Justice Department official Wood then said "marshals will start to study the CIA buildings in order to plan for protection."

The CIA then asked whether troops could be used at the headquarters building, the document shows.

In response to questions about how many troops might be needed to protect the headquarters building a CIA representative said "about 500" would do the job.

No major protest ever materialized at CIA headquarters during the 1971 period.

WASHINGTON POST
29 July 1975

Chilean Plot

SANTIAGO—The leaders of a kidnap plot that ended with the death of Chilean Gen. Schneider in 1970 have denied that they received money from the Central Intelligence Agency.

Businessman Luis Adolfo Gallardo, who lives in Chile, and former Gen. Roberto Viaux, exiled to Paraguay, both told the newspaper La Tercera that they received no money from any foreign agency.

U.S. SPY SPENDING IS STILL UNKNOWN

By JOHN M. CREWDSON

WASHINGTON, July 31—Elmer B. Staats, the Controller General, told a House committee today that the General Accounting Office had no idea how much money was spent each year by the dozen or so agencies that make up the Federal intelligence community.

In an appearance before the House Select Committee on Intelligence as that panel began its first round of open hearings, Mr. Staats referred to estimates of a \$6-billion annual budget for the Federal intelligence agencies as only a "guess." He said that, with the exception of a few specific requests from Congress for information about the Central Intelligence Agency, the G.A.O., which he heads, gave up trying to audit the C.I.A. about 15 years ago because of difficulty in obtaining access to classified information.

Representative Otis G. Pike, the Suffolk Democrat who took over as head of the House select committee after it was reorganized earlier this month, said in an opening statement that the committee's mandate was to "investigate the intelligence-gathering activities of the United States Government." "It is a huge order," Mr. Pike conceded, "and the only way we can get there is by starting. We start by looking at the cost."

The chairman also expressed hope that the committee's investigation, which he said "could not have taken place in most nations of this globe," would be undertaken for that reason in a spirit of "pride and not embarrassment."

Mr. Pike previously announced his intention to concentrate the investigation at first on attempting to learn more about the ways in which Federal funds were appropriated to the C.I.A., the National Security Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency, and how they were in turn expended.

In an interview yesterday, he said that, by the end of next week, he hoped to know "the total amount we spend for foreign intelligence-gathering."

"I would like to know the total amount we spend for domestic intelligence-gathering, how high up you have to go to spend a million dollars, and what oversight is performed by either the G.A.O. or the Bureau of Budget on the expenditure of these funds," he added.

Today, however, Mr. Staats was unable to shed much light on the questions that Mr. Pike posed, although he did say that the G.A.O., which is the investigative arm of Congress, was eager and able to perform useful oversight of the intelligence agencies if the necessary cooperation was secured.

As an example of the stumbling blocks he said his agency had encountered, Mr. Staats

By William Greider
Washington Post Staff Writer

Director William E. Colby of the Central Intelligence Agency pleaded with congressional investigators yesterday not to force public exposure of any CIA budget figures, lest that information help the Russians.

In return, one congressman accused Colby of "playing God" with classified information and another suggested that the CIA wants to keep its budget secret from the American taxpayers rather than the Soviets.

Colby appeared before the House intelligence committee, which is reviewing the secret fiscal affairs of the federal government's various intelligence agencies, programs said to cost billions of dollars though the official budget total has never been disclosed.

The CIA director, who has overall responsibility for coordinating intelligence budgets and programs with other agencies, warned that "the agency's budget must be kept secret and . . . revealing it would inevitably weaken our intelligence."

Even if an overall total figure was the only information made public, that would still be helpful to U.S. adversaries, Colby said, because they could chart trends over a period of years and derive valuable conclusions about the secret directions of American spying.

"Moreover," Colby said, "once the budget total was revealed, the demand for details probably would grow. What does it include? What does it exclude? Why did it go up?"

Why did it go down? Is it worth it? How does it work?

ST. LOUIS GLOBE-DEMOCRAT
26-27 July 1975

Clark Clifford's Arrogance

It is one thing for a former high-ranking official of government to criticize the conduct of a federal agency. That is not only his prerogative but that of every citizen of the United States.

But Clark M. Clifford goes entirely too far when he charges that former FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover "obviously did not believe in our form of government." This is imperiousness beyond the tolerance of the vast majority of Americans who believe that Hoover put service to his country above himself and that he was dedicated to safeguarding and sustaining the American form of government.

Clifford has extensive experience in government. The former St. Louisan served as an adviser to Democratic Presidents Truman, Kennedy and Johnson and was at one

noted that the heads of most of the intelligence agencies had the authority to spend unvouchered funds "on certi-

cate" at their own discretion and without a subsequent accounting outside their agency.

"There would be revelations, even revelations of facts not in themselves particularly sensitive but which would gradually reduce the unknown to a smaller and smaller part of the total, permitting foreign intelligence services to concentrate their efforts in the areas where we would least like to attract their attention."

Rep. Otis Pike (D-N.Y.), among others, was not impressed by Colby's defense of total secrecy. The committee chairman noted that the Soviet Union already knows a lot about American intelligence programs because the United States is an open society, Colby agreed.

"So in the final analysis," Pike said, "the people who really don't know it are the taxpayers who pay for it."

Colby argued that Americans will tolerate secrecy if secrecy is required for an effective governmental action such as secret voting or secret grand jury sessions. "Intelligence is such a process," he said. "It is important to our country and it will not work if it is exposed."

Pike noted that only 38 senators and representatives among the 535 members of Congress are told about the secret budgets. Thus, 93 per cent of the Congress is in the dark. The money is hidden in 20 categories of Defense Department spending and one State Department account.

Pike suggested to Colby that "you fear that the secret you have would become known to the public if all members of Congress knew them."

"I do so fear," Colby replied.

That prompted an angry blast from Rep. Ronald V. Dellums (D-Calif.) who asked: "What makes you the person who decided he can play God?"

"Mr. Dellums, I am not playing God," Colby said. "I am only enforcing the laws which the Congress passed to protect those secrets needed to preserve that free society which you and I both want."

Dellums said the CIA director is putting himself above elected representatives and is using "National security" as a shield just as the Nixon White House did in the Watergate scandal.

On the subject of assassinations, Colby reiterated his position that he is opposed to government-sponsored assassination of foreign leaders though he said he would have supported such an effort aimed at Hitler in World War II.

Some committee members were reluctant to go into executive session with Colby because they said their closed meeting last Friday with James T. Lynn, White House director of management and budget, produced evasive answers and no information.

Lynn repeatedly told the committee in public that he would be happy to answer many questions in private, but Pike said Lynn reneged once the committee met privately with him.

"The result could only be described as acutely disappointing," Pike said. The committee then voted 6 to 5, to go into closed hearings with Colby, though the chairman was among those who voted against it.

time Secretary of Defense. But this does not give him license to assume airs of omnipotence when it comes to sensitive functions of government. Clifford's views appear inflated beyond his own importance.

The Central Intelligence Agency, the main target of Clifford's broadside at governmental activities, is not beyond reproach. But Clifford's sweeping indictment of the CIA and the FBI is pure arrogance. He apparently would like to mould the two agencies into moulds of Jell-O — and without much flavoring at that.

The nation's domestic surveillance and foreign intelligence operations need improvement, as has been shown by recent revelations. But Clifford's proposed remedies are not the answer. They could prove terminal.

PEOPLE

23 JUNE 1975

EX-SPY DAVID PHILLIPS PREACHES THE C.I.A. STORY, BUT CAN'T CONVINCE HIS OWN DAUGHTER

Another CIA spy has come in from the cold, but this time to take some of the heat off the agency. After a quarter century of undercover work in such countries as Chile, Lebanon, Brazil, Cuba and Mexico, 52-year-old David Phillips has retired from the CIA. His new self-assigned mission is "to explain why our country needs an intelligence service and to help clear up erroneous impressions."

Phillips says the investigations by the House, Senate and Rockefeller Commission will largely exonerate the CIA—with only three or four instances of illegal activity. But on domestic spying, Phillips agrees with CIA critics: "I'd be mad as hell if it happened to me. I'd scream if I thought anyone was opening my mail or tapping my phone."

Phillips' decision to quit has been deeply felt at home—a split-level in Bethesda, Md. where he lives with his wife, Gina, 32, and five of their seven children (three by his previous marriage). His \$38,000 salary has shrunk to an \$18,000 pension—forcing Gina to find a job. "I still have five kids to educate," says Phillips. "We've gone from steak to stew."

Another blow has been his failure to win over his 15-year-old daughter, Debbie, who told him his undercover job was "dirty." He patiently explained why he thought it was in the national interest. "I still think it's dirty business," she

said, unconvinced. "Her reaction really got to me," admits Phillips. "It's just another part of the misconceptions about the CIA."

Phillips is coldly quiet about his own exploits as a spy. "I made a secrecy agreement, and I'm not going to violate that." He is less reticent about CIA detractors. "I got madder and madder every time Charles Colson tried to pin Watergate on the CIA," Phillips snaps. "Most of the public have accepted as true all of the charges about the CIA. Philip Agee [an ex-agent who has written a searing exposé of the agency] is now a folk hero." Phillips recently debated Agee on British TV. "He is such a convinced socialist-Marxist, it is difficult to talk to him. Agee is the first-ever CIA defector."

Agee, who lives in London, suggested that Phillips might still be on the CIA payroll. Phillips swears he is not and does not receive any CIA financial support. He says \$3,000 has been contributed toward his mission by former intelligence agents.

Phillips was a World War II bombardier who was shot down and escaped from a German POW camp. After the war he bought a small English-language newspaper in Chile and was promptly hired by the CIA. "It was a 'dangle operation,'" Phillips recalls. "Other secret agents were supposed to think I was the chief of U.S. intel-

ligence. They paid me \$50 a month, and the first time a Soviet KGB agent approached me it occurred to me that I should be making \$60."

By 1954 Phillips was a "full-time contract man," and had moved on to Guatemala, posing as a businessman. (Later he masqueraded as a Foreign Service officer.) American foreign policy distressed him only once during his career. That was in 1965 when President Lyndon Johnson ordered Marines into the Dominican Republic. "I thought he was wrong," says Phillips. "I was ready to hang up my hat, but I finally decided to accept assignment there as station chief. I felt that if enough people like me left, the agency would be run by gumshoes just doing the President's bidding."

Before he retired last month, Phillips set up the Association of Retired Intelligence Officers—whose members, Phillips says, will spread the CIA gospel "to anyone who wants to listen." So far, he says, he has enlisted 340 of 400 former agents approached. Ex-spy Howard Hunt was not invited to join. "The CIA was wrong to outfit him for the Watergate caper," says Phillips. "That will always be a black mark against us."

Phillips is planning a book, *25 Years of Peculiar Service*, and may even team up with nemesis Agee on the lecture circuit. "My agent said I could make \$5,000 to \$10,000 a year defending the CIA, but if I were anti-CIA I could make between \$50,000 and \$100,000. That," Phillips says, "is when I knew I was doing the right thing."

GARRY CLIFFORD

THE NEW YORK TIMES, MONDAY, AUGUST 4, 1975.

Ford Says Soviet Aids Portuguese Reds

WASHINGTON, Aug. 3 (Reuters)—In an interview published today, President Ford accused the Soviet Union of quietly helping the Communists in Portugal and called it tragic that the United States was unable to help the situation there. "Western European countries are helping 'democratic friends' in Portugal," he said in the interview with the magazine *U.S. News & World Report*, but because of Congressional investigations of the Central Intelligence Agency, the United States is unable to participate. [The interview was conducted before he left last weekend on his current visit to Europe.]

'Portugal in Turmoil'

"We don't like the fact that Portugal is in turmoil now," he said. "I think it is undoubtedly recognized that the Soviet Union is quietly helping the Communist elements in Portugal." "On the other hand, we do know that West European countries are helping their social democratic friends in Portugal," he said. "I think it is

very tragic that because of the C.I.A. investigation and all the limitations imposed on us in the area of covert operations, we aren't able to participate with other West European countries."

"I am not saying our participation would automatically solve the problem," the President added, "but détente shouldn't prevent us—and it doesn't prevent us—from going in and meeting the challenges where we know the Soviet Union is involved."

Schlesinger: C.I.A. Undercut

WASHINGTON, Aug. 3 (UPI)—Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger has said that the Central Intelligence Agency's sources of information abroad "have been dramatically reduced" as a result of leaks from Congressional investigating committees.

Mr. Schlesinger, who once headed the C.I.A., was questioned by Senator James L. Buckley, Conservative Republican, on a recorded television interview.

[Parts of the interview were reported in The New York Times Sunday.]

The Senator asked whether "we have reason to fear that the willingness of foreign governments to work with us is being undercut" because of C.I.A. secrets that had been made public.

"I think we have more than reason to fear," Mr. Schlesinger replied.

"I think," he went on, "that we recognize that the sources of information coming into the C.I.A. have been dramatically reduced in both liaison relationships and in relation to the willingness of foreigners to work with our intelligence people, and that is an inevitable effect on these kinds of revelations."

Mr. Schlesinger dismissed as "a dramatic oversimplification"

the notion that the only kind of intelligence the United States needed was what was provided by spy satellites.

"Photographs, of course, can provide you with indications with respect to the growth of certain types of capabilities," he said, "but one must recognize that nobody has ever been able to photograph intentions."

"The only way we are ever able to get at intentions is through normal human intelligence and, in addition to that, there are various technical parameters that one can never learn through photographs," he continued.

"So all of the elements of the intelligence community must be effective if the U.S. is to have eyes and ears in what continues to be a relatively dangerous world," the Secretary said.

Norrskensflamman
Lulea, 17 June 1975

What Is Happening In Angola?

Yesterday the three leaders of the organizations that have been prominent in the liberation war in Angola, Agostinho Neto of the MPLA, Holden Roberto of the FNLA, and Jonas Savimbo of Unita, began talks on the current situation in the republic of Angola, which will soon be independent.

The three men have not met very often and not at all since 25 April last year, when a new era began in Portugal's relationship with Angola and the other former colonies. Significantly the talks that have now started are not taking place in Angola but in the Kenyan city of Nakuru with Kenya's president Kenyatta as host and "mediator".

There has been unrest in Angola for a long time. Bloody conflicts have occurred and there has been no lack of rumors of an imminent "major civil war". But it must be said that the unrest in Angola is not the result of any division among the Angolan people but it has been caused entirely by the imperialist forces that are behind the FNLA and Unita.

The FNLA's Roberto and Unita's Savimbo have used most of their time and energy trying to crush the MPLA, which has had to wage the liberation struggle against fascist Portugal almost alone.

For a long time it has also been entirely clear that the leadership of both the FNLA and Unita have been directed and supported mainly by the USA (read CIA) and Zaire. There are confidential sources that also say that China has its finger in this game.

When the schemes of CIA and organizations directed by Zaire against the MPLA did not succeed, they resorted to brutal violence and murder. Even direct coup attempts -- lead and organized by CIA -- have occurred, but these have been defeated by the MPLA. However, murder, kidnapping and mass executions of MPLA sympathizers are still carried out by the so-called FNLA forces and the armed forces of Unita.

There are ever fewer Angolans in the FNLA forces, but the number of Congolese is increasing. Mobutu in Zaire (former Belgian Congo) has backed Holden Roberto's FNLA, following U.S. advice.

Why are the United States and other imperialist powers so interested in getting their puppets installed in Angola. It is perhaps sufficient to cite Henry Kissinger from 1970: "...The largest American interests in southern Africa are in Angola."

The self-evident reason is the discovery of large oil reserves off Angola's coast and also the huge mineral deposits in the country, and not in the least, diamonds.

Above all for the United States but also for Mobutu, the MPLA and Agostinho Neto are a hindrance to their desire to manipulate as they will in Angola. With Holden Roberto and Jonas Savimbo in key positions, the United States and the multinational companies can ravage at will and extract huge profits.

To believe that under these conditions any real progress can be achieved in Namibia is to be overly optimistic. The CIA will not allow Roberto and Savimbo to give up trying to gain control over Angola.

Angola's freedom, independence, and peace are entirely dependent on the power of the MPLA.

NDIRINK FNN FILA MIMIAN

17 juni 1975

Vad sker i Angola?

I går började de tre ledarna för de organisationer som framträtt i samband med befrielsekriget i Angola, MPLA:s Agostinho Neto, samt FNLA:s Holden Roberto och Unitas Jonas Savimbo samtal om den nuvarande situationen i den snart självständiga republiken Angola.

De tre har inte mötts alltför många gånger, inte ens efter den 25 april i fjol då en ny era inleddes i Portugals förhållande till Angola och andra f.d. kolonier.

De samtal som nu inletts sker betecknande nog inte i Angola, utan i den kenyanska staden Nakuru, med Kenyas president Kenyatta som värd och »medlare».

Det har varit oroligt i Angola en längre tid. Blodiga strider har förekommit och rykten om ett förestående »stort inbördeskrig» har sammanligger inte saknats.

Men det måste säjas att oron i Angola inte är något resultat av någon splittring av Angolas folk, utan helt orsakat av de imperialistiska krafter som står bakom FNLA och Unita.

I motsats till MPLA — som nära nog ensamma fick föra befrielsekampen mot det fascistiska Portugal — så har FNLA:s Roberto och Unitas Savimbo använt huvuddelen av sin tid och kraft till att söka krossa MPLA.

NEW YORK TIMES
5 August 1975

Illegal Intelligence

Viewed separately as isolated incidents, each violation of the laws and every incursion into a citizen's privacy by this country's foreign and domestic intelligence agencies may seem of limited importance and perhaps even excusable. As a long-developing pattern, these actions are highly disconcerting. The cumulative impact, and the difficulty of stopping them and preventing their recurrence, threatens to distort the relationship between ordinary Americans and their government.

Each revelation of illegal activities by the intelligence agencies has been followed by explanations and even some expressions of regret, intended to allay public concern. The underlying theme, however, continues to be that some such lapses may well be unavoidable in shoring up the nation's security in a dangerous world.

The over-all effect of these confessions, accompanied by suggestions that matters really are not all that serious, has been to numb the public's perception of the extent of the damage.

• Foreign security break-ins by the F.B.I. have been executed against diplomatic offices of allies as well as potential adversaries.

• Domestic dissenters' ranks were infiltrated by the C.I.A., even though the agency is categorically prohibited from engaging in any domestic surveillance.

• The Internal Revenue Service, whose nonpartisanship is so crucial to the functioning of the entire system of taxation, strayed into the dark alleys of political intelligence.

• The privacy of mail and telephone was repeatedly penetrated without benefit of warrants clearly required

Sedan lång tid tillbaka har det också stått helt klart att både FNLA:s och Unitas ledning dirigerats och stötts av framför allt USA (läs CIA) och Zaire. Det finns tillförlitliga uppgifter som också säger att Kina har sitt finger med i detta spel.

När inte de CIA- och Zaire-dirigerade organisationernas intriger mot MPLA lyckades, så tog de till brutalt våld och mord. Även direkta kuppförsök — ledda och organiserade av toppmän från CIA — har förekommit, men dessa har slagits ner av MPLA. Men mord, kidnappning och massavrättningar av MPLA-sympatisörer förekommer fortfarande företagna av de s.k. FNLA-styrkorna samt Unitas beväpnade band.

Det blir dock allt färre angoleser i FNLA:s styrkor och allt fler kongoleser. Mobutu i Zaire (f.d. Belgiska Kongo) har hela tiden hårt satsat på Holden Robertos FNLA, på amerikansk inrådan.

Varför är då USA och andra imperialistiska makter så intresserade av att få sina marionetter installerade i Angola. Det kanske räcker med att citera Henry Kissinger från 1970:

— . . . de största amerikanska intressena i södra Afrika finns i Angola.

Den självklara anledningen är upptäckten av de stora oljetillgångarna utanför Angolas kust samt de jättelika mineraltillgångarna som finns i landet, inte minst diamanter.

För främst USA, men också Mobutu, är MPLA och Agostinho Neto ett hinder för att manipulera som man vill i Angola. Med Holden Roberto och Jonas Savimbo på avgörande poster skulle USA och de multinationella storbolagen få härja som de vill och föra ut jätteprofiter.

Att under dessa premisser tro att några reella framsteg kan nås i Naruku är att vara överoptimistisk. CIA kommer inte tillåta att Roberto och Savimbo

under the constitution.

• Dangerous, and, at least in one known instance, deadly experimentation with mind-altering drugs were carried out by the C.I.A. and the military.

Those who rationalize or condone these actions insist that they were taken with the nation's interests in mind — specifically to counter foreign dangers. Yet, to invoke foreign dangers as an excuse for the violations of basic liberties at home ignores the fact that democracy has always carried with it some inherent risks, particularly in competition or confrontation with totalitarian systems. To try to eliminate these risks by adopting some of the "safety" measures routinely taken by its foreign opponents is tantamount to draining democracy of its inner strength.

To say that the American intelligence services cannot be allowed to circumvent the laws and ignore the Constitution is not to deny the need for effective military and diplomatic intelligence operations. These operations can, in the modern context, be best carried out through diligent research and sophisticated use of technological detection devices to monitor foreign military moves, without diminishing the rights and invading the privacy of American citizens, least of all the ultimate privacy of their minds through the illicit use of drugs.

Proper limitations imposed on intelligence and police agencies may well create some risks that greater license to interfere with basic liberties might eliminate. Yet such risks are insignificant when compared to the certainty of the menace inherent in a government that stands above the law. The alternative to forcing the intelligence agencies to function within the limits of democratic rule is the security of democracy's graveyard.

GENERAL

THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, Friday, July 25, 1975

Is Detente Smothering Radio Free Europe?

"The question is whether a nice little CIA-funded company that never used to worry about where its next dollar is coming from can make it on its own."
—an employee.

By FELIX KESSLER

MUNICH—Michael Nebolieff considers himself far luckier than most fellow Bulgarians.

After escaping from Sofia toward the end of World War II, he was granted asylum in West Germany, completing his law studies at the University of Wurzburg. Then, in 1952, Mr. Nebolieff received the chance to tell his former countrymen what life was really like in the West—and to give them uncensored news of Bulgaria.

He joined Radio Free Europe, a fledgling American-sponsored station that broadcast news, music and other programs to millions of listeners in five East European countries: Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and Romania. For the past 23 years, he's stayed faithfully on the job. "At this time, I haven't missed more than one week because of sickness," he says.

But Mr. Nebolieff and hundreds of other anti-Communist emigres have now threatened to do something that years of Communist jamming couldn't accomplish—silence Radio Free Europe. The station was merged, for economic and other reasons, with Radio Liberty, which beams similar broadcasts to the Soviet Union. Hundreds of jobs have been pruned from both organizations. The employees subsequently voted to strike to dramatize what many perceive as a threat to the group's future existence.

Iain MacDonald, a senior editor and vice-chairman of Radio Free Europe's Munich chapter of the Newspaper Guild, says that a 24-hour strike was scheduled and "put on ice" to give the new management a fair chance. But the situation is still critical. The cuts pose "by far the worst threat in RFE's 25-year history," he says.

Some say that the broadcasting stations, which flourished during the Cold War years, now appear to be victims of the new era of detente. News bureaus in Vienna, Berlin, Stockholm, Geneva and Athens have been closed already. Others in Rome, London, Bonn, Paris and Brussels were pared drastically from large news organizations which rivaled the biggest American newspaper and TV network bureaus.

The Munich RFE headquarters staff was reduced from about 1,200 editors, researchers, broadcasters, engineers and technicians to 939 and, after further cuts, will number 800 by year's end.

One reason for the radio stations' problems, though sub-surface, is undoubtedly political. From the beginning, both broadcasting outfits were clandestinely funded by the Central Intelligence Agency. Rumors to this effect were heard over the years but it wasn't until a disgruntled RFE employee spilled the beans to Senator Clifford P. Case, of New Jersey that RFE's cover was blown in 1971.

After the subsequent furor, a presidential commission headed by Dr. Milton Eisenhower recommended that Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty be continued as a joint body, funded by Congress and under the auspices of a Board for International Broadcasting. The consolidation became effective July 1.

Sig Mickelson, a former president of CBS News, was named president of the merged station. He categorically denies there are any plans to close down or that any cuts were made on political, rather than economic, grounds. "The motivation was simply to put the radios on a sound financial base," he said here recently, noting that there are plans to buy new broadcasting transmitters.

Some employees, however, suspect that the political climate no longer is favorable, even for non-ideological news broadcasts to what formerly were called Iron Curtain countries. The Soviet Union has long campaigned against both stations for what it termed their propaganda broadcasts. "There hasn't been any overt political pressure" from the U.S. on the stations, says one newsroom veteran, but money-saving cuts may signify a political trend. "It may well be within the context of detente," he says, noting that these days the Voice of America has "a softer tone and is treading more lightly."

To Mr. MacDonald and other RFE union officials, there's little difference "whether these cuts are economically or politically inspired, if the programming is reduced both in quantity and quality." Evdokim Evdokimov, a veteran researcher in RFE's Bulgarian department and the Guild chairman, says the union decided "to go to the barricades" when the 100 most recent staff cuts were announced.

Because of the cutbacks, there are now greater gaps in Radio Free Europe's own broadcasts and in its monitoring of East European radio, he says. Radio Free Europe broke the news of Poland's Gdansk shipyard riots in 1970, he observes, by monitoring an early-morning broadcast of a local Polish radio station. Only after the RFE broadcast did Radio Warsaw acknowledge the events, which culminated in new leadership and a revision of Polish planning.

NEW YORK DAILY NEWS
26 JULY 1975

DON'T STILL THIS VOICE

Radio-Free Europe, now merged with Radio Liberty, is freedom's penetrating voice to peoples behind the Iron Curtain. It is in danger of being gagged.

What Communist jamming could not do, detente seems to be accomplishing—the silencing of the only effective link that captive peoples have with the free world.

Congress has not yet fully funded the radio programs. Deep slashes in programming and staff have been made all over Europe. It almost seems as though Congress and the administration want to fold up the whole operation.

We hope it doesn't happen. The hopes of people yearning for news from the free world should not be dashed.

In addition to broadcasting up to 21 hours a day and monitoring 30 East European radio stations and news services, the stations also analyze some 700 newspapers, magazines and other Communist publications. Many analyses are sold to Western universities, libraries, news organizations, governments and research institutions. The 85-person research staff will soon be cut to 60. One member of the new broadcasting board, in congressional testimony, sounded an ominous note for RFE employees when he questioned whether the organization was in the "publishing business or radio business."

Staffers here say research is an integral part of broadcasting. "I see our job as a free press for Eastern Europe," says one 11-year staff member. "While the Voice of America gives the American point of view, we concentrate on news that happens in their countries and present news about the rest of the world, and how it affects them."

The exposed—and severed—CIA affiliation has for some time proved a major embarrassment within the organizations. At lunch recently, one Western RFE newsman turned to a slightly senior colleague and admitted that he always thought the older man had been planted by the CIA, similar to some who've since vanished from their offices. "God, if that were only true," said the American, "I wouldn't worry about losing my job."

Some think that the newly streamlined organization would benefit from a new name, unassociated either with Cold War echoes or the CIA specter. "Whenever I cover something now and am asked where I'm from," says a newsman, "I always mumble something about Radio Three Europe."

For all the past rumors, Mr. Nebolieff says he was "astonished" when it was finally admitted that Radio Free Europe wasn't privately sponsored, as had been stated, but mainly CIA-funded. "I can assure you that in my case I didn't know," he says. "Who would be interested in listening to a journalist who's a CIA agent?"

Though shame-faced at the revelation, Mr. Nebolieff puts in even longer hours than in the past. Often he arrives at RFE's headquarters at 3 a.m. to prepare a 5 a.m.-to-8 a.m. broadcast, goes home and returns again at 6 p.m., broadcasting until 11 p.m. He declined when management offered to cut the Bulgarian broadcast schedule.

"I am personally of the opinion that the RFE operation is very, very important to my Bulgarian people," he says. "I do it not only as an employee of RFE but as a Bulgarian."

READER'S DIGEST
August 1975

The Challenge America Must Meet

In the aftermath of defeat in Southeast Asia, our allies grow skeptical, our enemies bold. Thus, says this distinguished observer of foreign affairs, we have come to a moment of truth

By JOSEPH ALSOP

DURING his unsuccessful trip in the Middle East last March, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger had his most instructive experience in Syria. The Syrian president, Hafez Assad, is an exceedingly intelligent man, with whom the Secretary is on terms of friendly frankness. At their meeting in Damascus—before the negotiations broke down—Assad told Kissinger that he could not understand why President Anwar el-Sadat of Egypt was still loyally going along with the U.S. effort to secure a compromise peace with the Israelis. If Sadat were only patient enough, Assad predicted, the time would come when the Arabs could name their terms to Israel without worrying about American interference.

After all, the Syrian president remarked, the United States was already abandoning Vietnam and Cambodia. It had cast onto the discard heap, in the Cyprus troubles, those very old and faithful allies, the Turks. And it was clearly preparing to abandon South Korea, which had been under American protection since 1950. *Against this background, the Syrian president concluded, how could any man of sense fail to foresee that the United States would also abandon Israel before long?*

These were hard words for an American Secretary of State to hear. Yet Kissinger had no answer, except to protest that the American commitments to Israel and South Korea would never be forgotten. To which, inevitably, the reply came back: *but there had also been American commitments to Turkey, to Cambodia, to South Vietnam.*

"We Can Do Nothing." The Assad-Kissinger meeting occurred some weeks before the fall of Phnom Penh and Saigon to the communists. With it, you need to weigh the text of a letter received by the former U.S. ambassador to Cambodia, John Gunther Dean, in response to a last-minute offer of air-evacuation from Phnom Penh. The writer was Sirik

Matak, a member of the Cambodian royal family and the ablest leader of the anti-communist Cambodian government. Here is what he wrote Dean:

"I thank you very sincerely for your letter and your offer to transport me toward freedom. I cannot, alas, leave in such cowardly fashion. As for you, and in particular your great country, I never believed for a moment that you would have this sentiment of abandoning a people which has chosen liberty. You have refused us your protection, and we can do nothing about it. . . ."

Finally, careful thought also needs to be given to Secretary Kissinger's reply when an old friend recently asked him: "Where do you think we are today as compared with the experience of the 1930s?" The 1930s, of course, were the years when Adolf Hitler and the Second World War rushed down upon the world while the British and French, physically and morally disarmed, simply looked the other way. For Americans under the age of 50, it may also be well to explain that Hitler's re-occupation of the Rhineland in 1936 was the last easy opportunity to prevent the Hitler war. Before making his move into the Rhineland, Hitler had to promise the German General Staff that he would instantly resign if he met the slightest resistance from France or Britain. But he met none at all.

"Where are we on the scale of the 1930s?" Dr. Kissinger repeated. "Certainly we're long past the re-occupation of the Rhineland. I only hope we haven't passed the point of no return."

Shaken Allies. The foregoing are not texts for a sermon. They are instead the best capsule guides I can offer to the changed standing of the United States in the world today. I have spent many days discussing our country's new situation with members of the inner group of American policy-makers, and with foreign diplomats and leaders whose wisdom I

have learned to trust. Their consensus, I regret to say, is very grim.

Consider, first, the effect of our changed situation on our allies. Thailand, that unfailing weather vane of Asia, is now pointing disdainfully away from Washington toward Peking. There is a serious chance that American naval and air bases in the Philippines will be denied to us after the "reassessment" of national policy announced last April by President Ferdinand Marcos. In South Korea, President Park Chung Hee has ordered a top-level reassessment of South Korea's American alliance, with all leaders of his government joining in. Their first conclusion was that, despite the presence of 40,000 U.S. troops in South Korea, "no real confidence" could any longer be placed in America.

But if the faith of our allies has been profoundly shaken, so the boldness of our enemies and potential enemies has been strongly reinforced. And *that* is the real problem that confronts us today.

Tempting the Bully. In this new situation, so full of danger, the most basic factor is the military one. At the time of the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, our strategic-weapons margin over the Soviets was crushing, being variously rated at from seven-to-one up to ten-to-one. In recent years, however, our strategic-weapons programs have stayed almost stock-still, while the Soviets have forged ahead with fearful rapidity. Thus American superiority has been transformed into a slight edge for the Soviets; and if we continue to stay stock-still, while the Soviets go on forging ahead—as is now the realistic prospect—the Soviet edge will turn into a significant Soviet strategic superiority.

Nor has this American fecklessness in the area of strategic weaponry been compensated for by improved conventional forces. On the contrary, our conventional forces have actually shrunk since 1962, while once again the Soviets have forged ahead with ruthless determination. Only two decades ago, for example, the Soviets had no navy worth considering. Today the Soviet navy is both more modern and more powerful than our own. The Soviets' recent worldwide naval war game, OKEAN '75, took the startling form of a mock-assault on the United States with seaborne nuclear weapons.

As the outcome of the Cuban missile crisis so happily proved, a strong military posture is the best insurance policy for peace: if you are strong enough to fight, and seem willing to

fight, you almost never have to do so. It has to be admitted, however, that American policy-makers are wise to be more concerned today by an apparent weakening in our country's national will, than by our military position. For a loss of will devalues the most powerful weaponry.

The symptoms of American loss of will are now painfully plain. In

recent weeks, half a dozen leaders of both great parties have confided to me unhappily that they feared the United States, short of responding to a direct attack like that at Pearl Harbor, would never fight again after Vietnam. If this had been our posture in 1962, Cuba would still be bristling with Soviet missiles. In sum, we are perilously close to the kind of physical and moral disarmament that prevented the British and French from nipping the Hitler-danger in the bud.

Burg'ars at the Door. So we come to the two most fundamental questions raised by Secretary Kissinger's comparison of the present period with the 1930s. They are as follows:

Can you have a Hitler-time without a Hitler?

Since America's strategic nuclear weapons cannot be totally destroyed by Soviet strategic superiority, are we really likely to end where the British and French ended in 1939—cornered like a rat?

As to the first question, the answer must be given in steps. The first step is to make a rational judgment of the methods and purposes of the Soviet Union. On the one hand, it is mistaken to imagine the Soviets with a grandiose Hitler-style program, as it is wrong to see anything Hitler-like in General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev. On the other hand, it is fatally mistaken to assume that the Soviets will refrain from exploiting any rich target of opportunity that presents itself, either because of "détente," or because they are too comfortable already, or for some other delusive reason. The record shows the very opposite. Consider the events in just one area, the Middle East, in just one short, recent period, the last decade.

In 1967, the Soviets actually helped start the Six-Day War, by planting grossly false intelligence in Cairo and Damascus, and thereby purposefully driving Egypt's Gamal Abdel Nasser to take the aggressive steps that led to war. After the smashing Israeli victory, the Soviets began again from Square One, so to say, by promptly pouring huge quantities of new arms into Egypt, Syria and Iraq. In the midst of the arms flow, Egypt's President Anwar el-Sadat outraged the Kremlin by expelling thousands of Soviet military advisers

from Egypt.

Yet even in the subsequent period of cool Egyptian-Soviet relations, the Soviets provided the very advanced anti-tank and other weapons that later gave such trouble to the Israelis. Thus one can now describe the Soviets, at a minimum, as the *sponsors* of the war that broke out in 1973. Finally, when the Yom Kippur War's tide turned against the Arabs, the Soviets promptly threatened to intervene with airborne divisions which they had ready on south Russian airfields. The toughest kind of answering message from President Nixon was needed to abort the Soviet intervention.

The foregoing is not a record, I submit, that justifies the view that the Soviets will refrain from adventures that strike them as potentially profitable. As someone said long ago, they are like hotel burglars who try every door in a long corridor until they find one that is not properly locked.

Time to Pray. Even so, one could not speak about the present becoming a Hitler-time without a Hitler were the world scene not littered with targets of opportunity to tempt the Soviets. Among these targets, the Middle East clearly retains pride of place. As a measure of risk, consider an experience of my own last December. In honor of my approaching retirement as a full-time newspaper columnist, President Ford asked me to luncheon. In the course of the meal, I remarked to the President that most of his advisers seemed to be putting the risk of a soon-renewed Middle East war at "somewhere between 60 and 70 percent." The President answered, bleakly but quietly: "It's above 70 percent."

To hear the risk of war given at "above 70 percent" by the President of the United States was a mite chilling. Yet it made perfectly good sense last December, when everyone still expected General Secretary Brezhnev to pay a state visit to Egypt in January. If Brezhnev had gone to Cairo (as had been formally announced), the visit would surely have been followed by enormous new deliveries of Soviet arms for the Egyptian forces. If another huge flow of Soviet arms to Egypt had begun, moreover, the Israeli leadership had already made a conditional decision to launch a preventive war.

As it turned out, there was one weak link in this expected chain of cause and effect. At the last minute, Egypt's Sadat balked at the price Brezhnev was asking, which included no more Egyptian hobnobbing with the United States, the return to Egypt of the banished Soviet military advisers, and other

steps seriously impairing Egyptian national independence. Consequently, Sadat gambled that Secretary Kissinger would succeed with the negotiations that finally broke down in Jerusalem in March 1975.

The breakdown, one must also note, was another, particularly heavy installment of the price of our new situation in the world. As Israel's war minister, Shimon Peres, pointed out in a public speech: the example of "collapsing guarantees" elsewhere—namely the U.S. guarantees in Southeast Asia—made it only right for the Israeli Cabinet to dig its heels in against Secretary Kissinger's persuasions. And Secretary Kissinger, while maintaining a discreet public silence, is known to have told the President sadly that the breakdown would have been "unthinkable" if the United States still retained its former standing in the world.

In consequence of this severe setback, President Ford decided to try his hand himself. His search for a Middle East compromise began at a meeting with Sadat of Egypt early last June—a meeting which both men characterized as "an important step" toward peace. We must all pray that this is so. And I mean *pray*. For if the President's efforts fail, or if the negotiating process begins again and then breaks down, the risk of early war in the Middle East will be back at 70 percent or above.

Ducking the Challenge. There are, alas, other places besides the Middle East in need of prayer. Laos, Thailand and Pakistan come quickly to mind. But most important on the danger list is South Korea, whose abandonment by the United States was so flatly predicted by Syria's Assad.

An immediate sequel to the fall of South Vietnam was a trip to Peking by the North Korean communist dictator, Kim Il Sung. In the intelligence community, there is no doubt that Kim's aim was to secure Chinese Communist support for another drive into South Korea. It seems likely that the Chinese discouraged Kim, since they want no further trouble in Asia at this time. But the North Korean dictator is so dead set on his new enterprise that he is reportedly planning to seek help in Moscow, where he has not gone for 14 years. By grace of the aid-stinginess of the U.S. Congress, moreover, South Korea has only one third of the airpower and rather less seapower than North Korea; and although the Southern army is large and excellent, it is also American trained—which means heavily dependent on air superiority.

If South Korea is attacked, and we

limply stand aside, the effect will be no mere further impairment of U.S. standing in the world. The effect will be the equivalent of international bankruptcy for the United States. Duck the challenge in Korea—if it comes—and we shall be a country that no longer really counts as a world power. More to the point, our enemies will believe, with good reason, that our next challenge will probably be ducked, too—and they will be that much more likely to launch it. And this is what now makes it possible to have a Hitler-time without a Hitler.

Tragic Terminus: So we come at long last to the proof that even a major nuclear power can find itself by weakness with the same choice as a cornered rat. The proof is simple enough. The jugular of the United States and the West now runs, by geological misfortune, through the far-off, ill-defended waters of the Persian Gulf. The Soviets have been methodically moving to gain control of the Indian Ocean, into which the Persian Gulf opens.

Imagine a future time when the

United States has firmly established its unwillingness to defend friends and interests overseas by ducking challenge after challenge of the kind already listed. Suppose, therefore, that the world power balance has been rapidly tilting in the Soviets' favor. Suppose that the unfavorable tilt of the strategic-weapons balance has also been complacently ignored by the U.S. Congress—as has happened to date. Suppose—as would only be natural—that the Soviets therefore think it safe to seize direct control of the Persian Gulf, thereby fixing an iron grip on this country's and the West's jugular.

In these quite possible circumstances, the American President who had to make the next move might well regard a cornered rat with envy! Yet such circumstances as these are the obvious terminus of the road we are now traveling.

If this report seems gloomy, even despairing, I would not have it so. The need now is to be clear-sighted about the realities of the new American situation. Ponder these words

from the always-wise French analyst, Raymond Aron: "A great power is not characterized by millions of tons of steel or millions of megatons, but, primarily and above all, by will. The American will has not always been so clear-sighted during the past 25 years, but it has never been doubted. It is now doubted for the first time, and no one can assess with certainty the consequences of a weakening which is less material than moral..."

The great requirement now, in short, is nothing more nor less than a regeneration of the American national will that held the line for freedom in the world from 1941 until just the other day. It may cost us heavily—for genuine regenerations of national will are expressed by refusing to duck hard challenges rather than through Fourth of July orations. Yet the costs of such a regeneration will be trifling compared to the long-run costs of imitating the French and British in the 1930s in this infinitely more perilous world of the 1970s.

LONDON TIMES
23 July 1975

WHY DÉTENTE IS NOT BETRAYAL

Mr. Solzhenitsyn has now accused President Ford of betraying eastern Europe by planning to attend the East-West summit conference in Helsinki next week. It is easy to sympathize with his moral concern for the peoples and nations under Soviet domination. It is less easy to see how they could be helped by the political attitudes which he appears to recommend. Short of embarking on a war of liberation, which would merely liberate a lot of people from life itself, there is no obvious alternative to the sort of patient diplomatic bridge-building of which the Helsinki conference is a part.

Mr. Solzhenitsyn's objection to the conference is that it allegedly endorses the present boundaries of the Soviet empire. It does not. The documents to be signed are not treaties and have no juridical force whatever. They are declarations of principle and intent which are supposed to guide the conduct of the signatories. Even as principles they do not endorse spheres of influence or types of government. They endorse national sovereignty. They say, for instance, that frontiers should not be changed by force. This probably leaves the Baltic states within the Soviet Union (had anybody plans for rescuing

them?), but it does not exclude changes of government or even peaceful changes of frontiers among the states of Europe.

The documents are far from perfect. They are full of loopholes and compromises after two years of negotiation. But they do, on the whole, demand greater changes of conduct from the Soviet Union than from the Western countries. Apart from endorsing sovereignty (Czechoslovakia?) and the non-use of force (Hungary and Czechoslovakia?) they contain a series of pledges relating to human contacts, and the freer flow of information. If these principles are observed the situation in Europe will improve. If they are not observed they can scarcely contribute to making the situation worse except, perhaps, by becoming bones of contention, and even then there is no reason why the West should lose all the arguments.

Solzhenitsyn stands for an absolute view of the world; totalitarian communism is evil, and should be totally opposed at all times. International statesmanship is concerned with consequences—how can communism best be contained and if possible humanized? The danger is that statesmen should lose sight of the moral reality. Dr. Kissinger appears to have done

so when he foolishly advised President Ford not to see Mr. Solzhenitsyn. Apparently Dr. Kissinger was worried about annoying the Russians. But could there be a more demeaning situation than the President of the United States being persuaded that he must not receive a famous writer, with whose political views he happens to disagree, merely because those over-sensitive men in the Kremlin would be irritated?

This is not détente but surrender. Détente does not demand that the American President creep around on tiptoe trying not to annoy the Russians. It demands that he seek rational ways of accommodating conflicting interests and seeking areas of practical adjustment. The right thing to have done would have been to invite Mr. Solzhenitsyn to the White House and say openly that he respected him as a writer and fighter for human rights but could not take his advice on the conduct of politics. This would have earned him the respect of many people, including possibly even Mr. Solzhenitsyn himself. As it was he initially accepted restrictions on his freedom of action which made him less convincing as a champion of freedom for others. By the time he woke up it was too late to repair the damage.

NEW YORK TIMES
6 August 1975

Ice Water After the Sauna

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

By C. L. Sulzberger

STOCKHOLM—The pleasant Finnish custom of a hot sauna followed by a freezing dip serves as a healthy stimulus and dousing the head in ice water after the radiant smiles of Helsinki's European security summit is an exercise much to be commended.

It requires many years for Soviet diplomacy to bring about the enterprise which achieved for Moscow consensus ratification of its sphere of influence in Eastern Europe and its borders elsewhere, principally with China. American officials, who like to think they are Yankee traders, claim Brezhnev had to pay heavily for this privilege in months of advance negotiations by making a new Berlin deal (which retains the partition wall) and pledging facilitated visas for journalists and geographically divided families.

In 1954, when the Kremlin first began to work for the arrangements that were signaled in Helsinki, the U.S.A. was still the only superpower, with a consequently respected voice. This position was backed by the fact of its strategic invulnerability. Because the U.S.S.R. had no intercontinental weapons systems, Washington enjoyed

the luxury of speaking loud while carrying a big stick. That brief moment vanished with the missile that threw up Sputnik in 1957. It is no fault of later administrations that our bargaining power has dwindled since.

For 21 years the Kremlin pursued a series of related policy objectives: a denuclearized zone in Europe; suppression of foreign bases; withdrawal of troops to their homelands; atomic non-proliferation; reduction of forces in both halves of Germany; European arms limitation and dissolution of military coalitions. In the wake of the Helsinki euphoria it may be anticipated that one by one these goals will be revived.

Meanwhile various nations of the West, led by the United States, are rivaling each other in attempts to invest billions in the U.S.S.R. to gain access to its markets and resources and to make available their own techniques and advanced technology in exchange.

Crumbling NATO has no cogent new strategy. Its conventional strength is no match for Russia's. Its European members believe U.S. strategic nuclear missiles would only be used against Russia if American territory or installations were first hit. And, despite the Helsinki congress, the superpowers deal with each other independently of their allies who receive courteous ex post facto reports.

Last week's European summit bent a principle Henry Kissinger enunciated Dec. 27, 1973: that the United States would not permit "selective détente." As far as Portugal goes, that's just what has been produced.

In retrospect, the United States has manufactured much of its own weakness by actions in the realm of foreign policy on the part of both the executive and legislative branches. To find back-door access to Moscow and compose bilateral accords which the Kremlin was actively seeking, we tilted toward Pakistan to get to Peking, then moved from there to the Soviet Union supermarket.

Favoring Pakistan sacrificed what shreds of influence we had left in India. Courting China (the abrupt way we did) offended Japan. Now the Chinese have cooled off, and with Russia we've got what the Russians were themselves angling for.

Congressional pressures helped us lose prestige in Southeast Asia and may produce a dangerous mirage of peace in the Middle East.

From our viewpoint, the Mediterranean is a mess. What began as negligence by the Executive on the Greece-Turkey-Cyprus issue has been compounded by gross legislative interference; Congress is getting a busy-body complex. And now the U.S.A.—which foreigners will consider one government, not two or three—is reviled in Athens, Ankara and Nicosia all at once.

The Executive in Washington has been so pilloried—above all with respect to the C.I.A.—that nobody seems prepared to help our friends in Portugal (who once both liked us and respected us) or even to formulate a policy that could save that little land from a brutal take-over given under-the-table encouragement by Moscow.

In this "The Heritage of Henry Adams," Brooks Adams wrote: "Democracy is an infinite mass of conflicting minds and of conflicting interests, which by the persistent action of such a solvent as the modern competitive industrial system, becomes resolved into what is, in substance, a vapor, which loses in collective energy in proportion to the perfection of its expansion."

Since that book, published during the 1919 treaty negotiations, democracy has clearly been perfected because, judging by the "vapor" issuing from Helsinki's sauna, its collective intellectual energy has evaporated.

LONDON TIMES
18 July 1975

East-West détente

From Mr Brian Crozier and others
Sir, A "summit conference" is to be held at the end of this month at Helsinki, following the lengthy Conference on European Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). It is more urgent than ever, in the opinion of the signatories, to give serious thought to the much-abused terms "détente" and "cold war".

The signatories are strongly in favour of ending the cold war (which has never ended on the Soviet side) and of détente—so long as the détente is true, not illusory.

Relations between France and Germany exemplify a true détente, after three wars in a lifetime. Even in the years between those wars, there was freedom of communication between the two countries. Nowadays, this freedom is taken for granted and there is no censorship of any kind of the attitudes of the one nation to the other.

This is not at all the situation prevailing between the Soviet Union and the non-communist world. Soviet citizens may travel abroad only in groups supervised by the KGB, not as individuals. A West European citizen cannot count on getting a visa to the Soviet Union. The only British newspaper freely available in Moscow is the *Morning Star*, and censorship excludes the great majority of Western publications, and even many non-political books. Yet the Soviet Union was our ally in the war against Hitler.

In the CSCE, and in particular in Committee III dealing with human contacts, travel, education culture

and information, the Soviet negotiators have systematically resisted Western proposals designed to give substance to "détente". In this situation, the summit conference can do no more than produce empty declarations of intent, meaningless and unenforceable. Their only practical effect would be to make it easier for the Soviet authorities to resist all future attempts on the Western side to improve real human relations with the Soviet people.

We believe that Western leaders should defer any summit plans until the Soviet government ends arbitrary travel restrictions in the USSR; discrimination against individual visitors; ends restrictive laws making citizens liable to arrest for talking to foreigners; interference with mails and with telephone conversations; the jamming of radio and television; opens its territory to the free circulation of publications from Western Europe and elsewhere; and eliminates minefields, trip-wire machine-guns and other cold war devices between neighbouring European states.

If it is necessary to make an agreement with the Soviet Union in a framework of unremitting unilateral Soviet hostility, so be it. But it is not détente and must not be so called. Let Western leaders, if they go to a summit, publicly speak the truth about what they are doing and not deceive their own peoples.

Yours very truly,
BRIAN CROZIER,
L. B. SCHAPIRO,
G. H. N. SETON-WATSON.

NEW YORK TIMES
5 August 1975

The Khrushchev/Brezhnev Doctrine at Helsinki

By Harry Schwartz

No less a politician and statesman than British Prime Minister Harold Wilson seemed to take seriously Leonid I. Brezhnev's talk about non-interference in other country's affairs at last week's Helsinki conference.

Apparently an invincible optimist, Mr. Wilson even went so far as to hint that Mr. Brezhnev might be abandoning the Brezhnev Doctrine and to suggest that if he had said eight years ago what he said last week there might have been no Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August, 1968.

Actually the whole idea ought to be called the Khrushchev Doctrine, because the essence of this policy is the assertion that the Soviet Union has the right to invade any "socialist" country whenever the rulers in Moscow decide that capitalism threatens to replace socialism.

The clearest practical application of this doctrine first took place under Mr. Khrushchev in October-November 1956, when the Soviet Army invaded Hungary and drowned the Hungarian Revolution in blood. Twelve years later, in August, 1968, under Mr. Brezhnev, Soviet and satellite troops invaded Czechoslovakia and occupied her. Soviet troops still remain in Hungary and Czechoslovakia to prevent any new "mutiny" in either land.

Mr. Brezhnev has publicly defended the invasion of Czechoslovakia more than once. Speaking in Warsaw on Nov. 12, 1968, for example, he defended it in these terms:

"When external and internal forces hostile to socialism try to turn the development of a given socialist country in the direction of restoration of the capitalist system, when a threat arises to the cause of socialism in that country—a threat to the security of the socialist commonwealth as a

whole—this is no longer merely a problem for that country's people, but a common problem, the concern of all socialist countries."

Some weeks before this Brezhnev speech, Pravda quoted approvingly this even blunter statement of the Soviet position by Wladyslaw Gomulka, then head of Poland's Communists:

"To those friends and comrades of ours from other countries who believe they are defending the just cause of socialism and the sovereignty of peoples by denouncing and protesting the introduction of our troops in Czechoslovakia, we reply: If the enemy plants dynamite under our house, under the commonwealth of socialist states, our patriotic, national and international duty is to prevent this by using any means that are necessary."

The Pravda article, on Sept. 26, 1968, in which this quotation appeared went even further. In the best tradition of George Orwell's "1984" it argued that the invasion of Czechoslovakia was in no way a violation of that country's independence:

"The allied socialist countries' soldiers who are in Czechoslovakia are proving in deeds that they have no task other than to defend the Socialist gains in that country. They are not interfering in the country's internal affairs, and they are waging a struggle not in words but in deeds for the principle of self-determination of Czechoslovakia's peoples, for their inalienable right to decide their destiny themselves after profound and careful consideration, without intimidation by counterrevolutionaries, without revisionist and nationalist demagoguery.

"Those who speak of the 'illegality' of the allied socialist countries' actions in Czechoslovakia forget that in a class society there is and can be no such thing as nonclass law. Laws and the norms of law are subordinated to the laws of the class struggle

and the laws of social development."

These statements contain the essence of the Brezhnev Doctrine. In the flexible Marxism-Leninism of the Kremlin any international commitment such as last week's Helsinki Declaration can be repudiated whenever convenient because "laws and the norms of law are subordinated to the laws of the class struggle and the laws of social development."

The peoples of the Soviet satellite states have no illusions that the chains of the Brezhnev Doctrine have been loosened from them. At the beginning of the 1970's the Polish revolt which toppled Gomulka was contained at that level only because of the Poles' fear that they might invite the fate of Hungary and Czechoslovakia.

It was only after August, 1968, and the explicit enunciation of the Brezhnev Doctrine that Mao Tse-tung, fearing for his nation's existence, began the policy of rapprochement with the

United States as a means of getting political and economic aid that might help counter the threat of Soviet invasion. And Peking today never tires of warning that Russian imperialism is alive and well in Moscow's Kremlin.

In 1968 President Johnson canceled a scheduled trip to Moscow when he heard of the invasion of Czechoslovakia. In 1975 President Ford signed the Helsinki Declaration along with Mr. Brezhnev and the men Soviet troops placed in immediate command of Hungary and Czechoslovakia, Janos Kadar and Gustav Husak.

Since the Soviet belief in the inevitable victory of world Communism and the legality of all means to achieve it has not changed, the only explanation is that United States perception of its own power and possibilities has changed—and not for the better.

Harry Schwartz is a member of the Editorial Board of The Times.

CHRISTIAN SCIENEC MONITOR
29 JULY 1975

Times says Soviets have secret aims

London

The Times newspaper said Monday that the Soviet Union has secret plans to maneuver the United States into a position of isolation from Europe and the developing world and then to intensify the arms race.

In a copyright article, Lord Chalfont, a former government minister, described the contents of a secret Warsaw Pact document smuggled out of Czechoslovakia. The first phase, from 1956 to 1959, concerned the abandonment of military confrontation in favor of economic cooperation. The second, 1960 to 1972, involved trying to promote disunity and accelerate social dislocation in the West.

The current phase, from 1972

JAPAN TIMES
29 July 1975

35% More Heroin Seized in U.S.

WASHINGTON (UPI) — The U.S. Customs Service announced Sunday it seized 35 per cent more heroin in fiscal 1975 than a year earlier, bearing out recent statements by many drug authorities that heroin use is on the rise in the United States.

U.S. Commissioner of Customs Vernon D. Acree said morphine and codeine seizures rose even more dramatically than the heroin confiscations in 1975.

Acree said over 45 kilograms of heroin were hauled

to 1985, involves total demoralization of the West, Lord Chalfont wrote. And the fourth, intensification of the arms race and the West was feeling.

in by custom officials in 1975 compared with 34 kilograms in 1974. Codeine and morphine arrests by customs agents rose 166 per cent from 62 kilograms in 1974 to 166 kilograms in 1975.

Several of the seizures, Acree said, were made possible by customs drug detector dogs who sniffed nearly 4,000 illegal drug "hits," a canine performance improvement of 100 per cent over 1974.

The service made 21,000 seizures in all, valued at \$678 million, in 1975. Among these was a record 19-ton marijuana seizure in Arizona last September, the largest illegal drug haul in U.S. history.

26 July 1975

YOUTH INFLUX

Communists in U.S. Find New Vigor

BY FRANCIS WARD

Times Staff Writer

CHICAGO—The scene was the crowded floor of the International Amphitheater here, draped with huge banners and other colorful convention regalia. As Angela Davis' voice boomed in the background, a longtime member of the Communist Party said animatedly, "I'm really glad to see so many young people here, especially so many young blacks."

The crowd in the cavernous hall last month—the scene of numerous Democratic and Republican national nominating conventions disclosed more than the speeches as the Communist Party USA, held its 21st national convention.

Among the estimated 3,000 members, followers, and supporters were considerable numbers of young people, black and white.

Whatever else the convention showed or failed to show, it destroyed the image of the American Communist Party as a bunch of old, worn out, holdover radicals from the 1930s and '40s.

The charge that the party was irrelevant to current radical struggles was the one most often heard from the New Left in the 1960s—primarily from antiwar activists, the Students for a Democratic Society and the Black Panther Party. Now those organizations are either dormant or underground, as many members of the Communist Party once were.

The leadership of the CP—as it is known to members—is still predominantly over 50, but the party clearly has a new lease on life in the United States and is seeking to regain its old preeminence as unchallenged leader of the radical left.

The infusion of new blood into the 56-year-old party has come mainly through its affiliation with the Young Workers Liberation League, formed in February, 1970, in Chicago as a youth-oriented, pro-Marxist organization with fraternal ties to the party.

Structurally, the Communist Party and the youth organization are independent, with their own officers and central committees. But party members were instrumental in founding the youth league. And the youth organization takes ideological direction from the party and is generally involved in major party activities.

"We regard the Communist Party as the only revolutionary party in

the United States," says John Lumpkin, 23, a Youth Workers Liberation League member and former medical student at the University of Illinois.

The youth league replaced the defunct W.E.B. DuBois Clubs as the major youth organizing affiliate of the party. National chairman of the league is James Steele, ex-student leader at Ohio University in Athens. He is black, as is Jarvis Tyner, his predecessor as chairman. They, along with other key spokesmen and re-

cruiters, such as Angela Davis, are largely responsible for an increase in the number of young blacks joining the league.

Several knowledgeable observers of progressive-left movements say the Communist Party, USA, as well as other organizations of the left, have benefited from an upsurge in the number of radicalized, mostly young, persons from the 1960s.

"The Vietnam war and antiwar

movement, civil rights movement and current economic troubles throughout the country have created a mass base for a radical movement," says Richard L. Criley, 63, Midwest coordinator for the National Committee Against Repressive Legislation, the successor to the old National Committee to Abolish HUAC (House Unamerican Activities Committee).

Criley says that none of the organizations of the left, including the Communist Party, is large or strong enough to effectively organize this mass base. Another source, with long experience in leftist activities, says he believes "at least several million people were radicalized in the 1960s, but only a small portion of them are organized."

Criley and other sources describe the political left as relatively small numerically, greatly divided into warring factions of strident Marxist-Leninists, Maoists, Trotskyites or other Socialist groups.

It is generally believed the Communist Party and the rival Socialist Workers Party have the largest memberships of any organizations on the left, and they are the two most active ones in electoral politics. The Socialist Workers Party was formed in the 1930s by rebel members of the Communist Party who, at the time, supported Leon Trotsky in his fight with Joseph Stalin.

An influential member of the Socialist Workers Party (who asked that his name be withheld) said he believed the two parties were about even in membership, although the Communists, until the 1960s, were considerably larger. The source says he believes the Communists have a larger percentage of blacks and Latinos and a larger following in the labor movement, but added, "Whenever the two run simultaneously in elections we outpoll them every time."

The same source conceded, though, that the Communists had lost thousands of members during the late 1940s and '50s when the party was almost driven underground and destroyed by relentless pressure from government, private citizen groups, business and labor unions.

Criley says, "The Communist Party never recovered from the Joseph McCarthy era of witchhunting and red baiting. It used to be the catalyst and vanguard of the radical left, with considerable influence in the trade union movement among intellectuals and the unemployed. Because of the pressure it was subjected to, the party became isolated from the various mass movements that it once gave leadership to or had an influence within."

Arnold Johnson, a spokesman for the party in New York, said that the party's current card-carrying membership was about 16,000 but contended that an additional 100,000 noncard-carrying persons were sympathizers.

Richard Rubenstein, professor of political science at Chicago's Roosevelt University and an observer of leftist activities for more than a decade, says one frequent criticism of the party made by rival organizations is that it follows a "slavish" adherence to a pro-Soviet, anti-Chinese, anti-Maoist line.

Rubenstein adds, "Communists simply believe the Soviet Union is a socialist state and China is not. The American CP is one of the most slavish followers of a pro-Soviet line, as opposed to, say, the French and Italian Communist parties, which, to this day, heavily criticize the Soviet Union for its invasion of Czechoslovakia. The CP here defended the invasion."

Party spokesmen, while denying "slavish" adherence to a pro-Soviet line, admit a clear preference for the Soviet Union over China. "The Soviet Union is the most advanced segment of mankind and most advanced socialist

country," says Ishmael Flory, a veteran Communist leader in Chicago and member of the party's National Central Committee.

There are also constant arguments on the left about whether the party and other groups, such as the Socialist Workers, are still in fact revolutionary.

It seems apparent that the major Communist Party tactic during the last several years has been to run candidates for office. At times, it's hard to tell the difference between the party's program and that of any standard liberal group.

Lumpkin, of the Young Workers Liberation League, explains that a major goal of that organization is to obtain passage by Congress of a full employment bill jointly sponsored by Democratic Rep. Augustus F. Hawkins of Los Angeles and Sen. George McGovern (D-S.D.). The league wants a Youth Bill of Rights attached to the bill. Although this hardly sounds revolutionary, Lumpkin explains, "We know many of the things we're for aren't radical, but we use them as a way to reach people with our literature and messages."

Some Community Party members such as Angela Davis have been active in a growing prisoners' rights movement and in rallying support for Joan Little, the young black woman now on trial on a charge of murdering her jailer in Beaufort County, N.C.

During the 1960s, CP members never gained a substantial leadership of the antiwar movement nationally, though Communists undoubtedly played a role in organizing some rallies. Student movements, though frequently pro-Marxist, were seldom closely identified with the party.

The fortunes of the party began to turn slowly upward with the controversy surrounding Angela Davis, and particularly her trial on murder, kidnaping and conspiracy charges in connection with the Marin Civic Center courtroom abduction and shooting of Aug. 7, 1970.

For the first time in years, the cause of a known, admitted Communist drew sympathy and support from millions of persons around the country and abroad. Most were not Communists but believed that she, as a black woman activist, was the victim of persecution.

Communists played leading roles in organizing Angela Davis defense committees throughout the country. She became a kind of radical celebrity, following her acquittal in June, 1972, with numerous speaking engagements and media appearances all over the nation. It is believed that her appeal and access to persons and organizations previously denied to Communists have made her the party's

most effective propagandist.

Public attitudes toward the Communist Party, USA, and to communists generally have changed. No longer is the party thought of everywhere as a violent revolutionary group, bent on wholesale overthrow of the U.S. government. Communists still advocate displacement of capitalism with socialism and the ascendancy of the working class to power, but far less stridently than 25 years ago.

The party has not been the object of much government pressure since the Smith Act trials or congressional hearing of the 1950s, or attempts to prosecute members under the McCarran Internal Security Act.

Court fights over the constitutionality of that law continued during the early 1960s. John J. Abt, the party's general counsel in New York, said the party now considered the McCarran Act "completely dead, without any force whatsoever."

Abolition of the old Subversive Activities Board several years ago was the final nail in the act's coffin. Abt said.

Last year, Congress abolished the House Internal Security Committee, successor to the old House Committee on Un-American Activities, which had been a Communist Party nemesis since the late 1930s. Also, Abt said, virtually all of the old state loyalty oaths and anti-Communist affidavits, which required persons to swear they were not party members before getting certain jobs or being allowed to run as candidates for public office, have been invalidated by the courts.

Abt, a courtly New York lawyer, was quick to point out, however, that, despite the changed public mood and gradual acceptance of (or at least accommodation to) Communists, many party faithful are still reluctant to be identified publicly.

"For many old-timers, there's still a hangover from the McCarthy era. The younger ones who didn't go through that period don't care about identifying themselves publicly as Communists," he said.

Many labor unions still have anti-Communist clauses in their constitutions, said Abt, which prevent Communist union members from admitting they are party members.

"They're afraid of being fired by the employer or expelled from the union," Abt said.

These provisions have not been effectively challenged or invalidated, he said, only because the party has not found a test case of a party member who was ousted by union or fired by an employer because of party affiliation.

"If you find such a case, let me know. We're looking for one," Abt said, apparently convinced that these provisions, once challenged in court, also would be invalidated.

NEW YORK TIMES
30 July 1975

What's Yours Is Negotiable

By C. L. Sulzberger

HELSINKI, Finland—I don't know what else the Helsinki summit will be remembered for in history but there is no doubt it serves as a brass monument to patient, careful Soviet diplomacy which, for 21 years, has been seeking an East-West accord formally acknowledging East Europe's de facto frontiers.

Moreover, it signalizes a personal triumph for Leonid Brezhnev. He continued the basic foreign policy gingerly begun by Stalin's successors. With unflamboyant persistence, he has now brought to a legal conclusion the process of gaining recognition for all Russia's World War II territorial conquests.

—as well as the ideological ascendancy Moscow has since reaffirmed in that area.

And Brezhnev, by holding the West adamantly to his own timetable, managed to do this in the immediate wake of the Soviet-American space link-up. That event dramatically reminded the world there are only two genuine superpowers. This in turn exacerbates suspicions all the way from Paris to Peking that these superpowers are imposing their own patterns, thereby weakening the voluntary support on which Washington relies more than Moscow.

It is fitting that leaders from 35 nations should meet in Helsinki. Finland's political position has given its name to a condition conceivably slated to apply elsewhere in Europe, which might henceforth focus on a revised version of Marx's 1848 Communist Manifesto, beginning the new edition: "A spectre is haunting Europe—the spectre of Finlandization."

While Finlandization frightens West Europeans because it implies helpless strategic dependence on Moscow, even though acknowledging considerable ideological independence and a largely pluralistic society, it heartens East

Europeans. They dream of the day when they will be permitted as much freedom as the doughty Finns have been allowed in exchange for their loyalty.

But the rest of East Europe is unlikely to gain much more liberty as a

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

consequence of the Helsinki summit. In 1934 the Russians are not going to be less tough about what they consider their private business than they were in Hungary (1956) or Czechoslovakia (1968). Nor is the deal to be ratified here going to alter Soviet determination.

As the late Charles E. Bohlen discerned years ago, Moscow's approach to these matters, vis-à-vis the West, is: "What's ours is ours, what's yours is negotiable." So while the West tacitly accepts everything in Europe East of the Elbe as permanently Communist, the same West looks on like a paralyzed chicken while an avowedly pro-Soviet minority in NATO Portugal attempts to establish a Marxist dictatorship.

Washington and most Western capi-

WASHINGTON POST
7 August 1975

Joseph Kraft

The Limits of Detente

President Ford made an important new acquaintance on his recent trip to Europe. He was introduced, and in no gentle way, to the limitations of detente.

The President went to Europe under the impress of a domestic opinion aroused against further concessions to Soviet military power. He found there no great disposition on the part of the Communist leaders, including Leonid Brezhnev of Russia, to make accommodation. So on his return the future of detente is in question.

The starting point for what happened was the sudden rise in anti-Communist feeling here in the United States. The exiled Soviet writer Alexander Solzhenitsyn, with his flaming denunciation of the prison state, played a part. So, probably, did the increase in food prices after the latest Soviet grain purchases.

Also the Apollo-Soyuz space spectacular, so visibly a public relations expression of harmony without content. As a final element there was the European Security Treaty due to be signed at Helsinki which formalized borders in Eastern Europe that are anathema to many Americans.

In response to these feelings, the political world of Washington suddenly began pouring scorn on detente and all its works. The Helsinki conference was billed as a kind of Munich. Arms control arrangements made by President Nixon and Secretary of State Kissinger in the name of detente were denounced as sellouts. Dr. Kissinger was attacked for ignoring the moral implications of compromise with the Communists.

President Ford harkened to these complaints and tried to make the European trip a demonstration of moral purpose in foreign policy. In his speech at the Helsinki conference he went on the offensive against "empty words and unfulfilled pledges." He sought to underline American support for independent regimes in Eastern Europe by visits to Poland, Romania and Yugoslavia.

But nobody could make Helsinki anything more than an exercise in hot air. The current regimes in Eastern Europe are conspicuous for a lack of moral quality. They have long since been replaced by the Asian Communist regimes as the chief exponents of dissent in the Communist world. So the general tone of Mr. Ford's trip had a hollow ring.

In his specific dealings with Mr. Brezhnev on arms control, the President also played to American opinion. In a previous meeting with Mr. Brezhnev in Vladivostok, Mr. Ford had won the assent of the Communist leader to the principle that the United States and the Soviet Union should each be limited to 2,400 strategic weapons, including 1,320 multi-headed, or MIRVed, missiles on each side. At Helsinki the question was what weapons systems should be included in these limits as part of a detailed accord to be signed when Mr. Brezhnev visits the United States this fall.

Mr. Ford insisted on one major point—that any weapons which had been tested in a MIRV pattern should fall within the limits of multi-headed missiles. In addition, and clearly in

response to current Pentagon pressure, he moved to include in the limits two weapons systems the Soviets have sought to exclude—Russia's Backfire bomber and the cruise missile which both countries are developing.

Mr. Brezhnev apparently gave on the major point—definition of MIRVed weapons. But he made no commitments on the Backfire bomber or the cruise missile. As a result, less progress was made at Helsinki than expected, and it is uncertain whether there will be a Brezhnev visit this fall and a new arms control accord.

Just why the Soviet leader held back at Helsinki is not clear. He may be playing for time, figuring the American position will soften as election time draws near. He may lack the authority to commit his colleagues in the Politburo. It is even possible that he is sick again (the leukemia reports persist) and will need time to absorb what Mr. Ford had to say.

In any event, however, the Russians are clearly loath to moderate the big arms program presently under way. Further progress toward arms control in the context of an easing of East-West tensions is by no means assured. The detente strategy may have run its course.

So this country needs to be looking about for an alternative to detente diplomacy. That means, at a minimum, working more closely in the economic field with the Europeans and Japanese, and searching for means to engage more deeply the Asian Communists who are an increasingly important offset to Soviet military might.

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als today have an inferiority complex about doing anything that might be construed as hostile to the Russians or their friends. Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn is kept out of the White House and President Ford comes to Helsinki—while Mr. Brezhnev's cobelligerents infiltrate the Portuguese Government, British trade unions, French media, Greek politics, Italian regional administration, and Irish revisionism.

To be sure some Communist activists are at present opposing Muscovite methods and proponents. They proclaim their support for democratic freedoms and party pluralism. Even Lenin can be cited as favoring this as a tactic—but Lenin was not notable for applying it.

And, as Western unity and political dynamism turn to cornmeal mush, it is unlikely that sponsors of an "occidental renaissance" for Marxism will feel their independent backbones becoming stiffer.

All this doesn't mean the summit—if it signifies anything more than symbolism—heralds an ideological end to political and social democracy. But right now too many democratic coun-

tries are run by a collection of unimaginative mediocrities who focus more on tomorrow's elections than the day after tomorrow's problems.

So even if the Soviet dictatorship has become sclerotic and the so-called classless society is dominated by a new class of pampered bureaucrats, it nevertheless remains coherent and clearly knows where it is heading.

The flabbiness of NATO is fated to get worse. China, which has been urging Western togetherness, has every reason to worry; Russia's allies in India and North Vietnam (which worry Peking) are getting respectively more anti-democratic and more strong.

The Russians are extending their broad-gauge railway system deep into Eastern Europe, a matter of some military importance and certainly a sign of confidence in the durability of Moscow's policy—to have and to hold.

Nor are restrictions on Soviet emigration or dissidence relaxing further. Helsinki and the diplomatic trend it punctuates won't change Moscow's society as much as it may change our own.

Eastern Europe

LOS ANGELES TIMES

24 July 1975

Solzhenitsyn: a Hero—and Also a Threat

BY PETER LISAGOR

WASHINGTON—To give him his due, Alexander Solzhenitsyn has whipped up a wondrous storm. A strange hybrid of Hawk and Dove, he has injected a healthy irritant into this environment of apathy and disbelief.

He has thrown a Bunyanesque shadow over the politics of detente, much to the dismay of Secretary of State Kissinger and President Ford, whose treatment of him as a cold-war leper has made into a political issue and brought together, in a ring of solidarity around him, such assorted couples as George Meany and Ronald Reagan, James Buckley and Adlai Stevenson.

The President's reluctance to see Solzhenitsyn, on the advice of Kissinger, makes a mockery of the proclaimed openness of the Ford White House. But Kissinger, whose investment in detente is substantial, puts it plainly: He yields to none in his admiration for the Russian's literary genius, but Solzhenitsyn's message, as Kissinger reads it, is "not only a threat to detente" but also advocates that the United States "should pursue an aggressive policy to overthrow the Soviet system."

From that loose reading, Kissinger leaps to the judgment that Solzhenitsyn invites a

Peter Lisagor writes for the Chicago Daily News.

"considerable threat" of nuclear conflict which "has consequences that will not be acceptable to the American people or to the world."

The fallacy of the false alternative is at work here. So Ford shakes hands and exchanges trivial amenities with Solzhenitsyn in the Oval Office, and the Kremlin wrathfully cancels out another U.S. grain deal, calls off the Helsinki summit conference to sanctify the Communist conquests in Eastern Europe and begins to gird for Armageddon? That is too fatuous to dwell on.

As an avenging apostle of human freedom, Solzhenitsyn has managed to stir passions long thought to be extinct here. As improbable as it may seem, this bearded moralist has seemingly assuaged a hunger among Americans for a hero. He is embraced as a symbol of moral goodness. He generates his own kind of thunder when he declaims against tyranny and oppression, and his credentials as a universal spokesman in behalf of human dignity have been enriched by the 14 years he spent in the Soviet prison camps of the Gulag archipelago.

Yet, for all his courage, his spirited defense

of the human spirit, his soaring words of defiance, there can be found in his writings an attachment to authoritarian forms. "Russia is authoritarian," he wrote in a 15,000-word letter to Soviet rulers in September, 1973. "Let it remain so, and let us no longer try to change that."

He imagines an authoritarian system that would be benevolent and compassionate, based on "genuine concern and love on the part of the rulers, not only for themselves and those around them but also for all their people, and all their neighboring peoples, too."

Solzhenitsyn saw Western democracy as lacking in ethical content, in the throes of "perhaps its last decline." His fervent denunciations of Karl Marx don't make him a disciple of Ayn Rand or Alan Greenspan. He probably can be best described as a Russian nationalist passionately devoted to intellectual freedom and a brotherhood of man. In an authoritarian system?

Kissinger and other critics would seem to doubt that Solzhenitsyn is fully aware of the risk of nuclear war. That isn't true. In his letter to the Kremlin leaders, he spoke of a possible nuclear war with China, and said it would be "the longest and bloodiest in the history of mankind," costing the Russians at least 60 million lives.

Like most of mankind, Solzhenitsyn's view of the ideal organized society is a bit fuzzy. But his heroic survival of Gulag puts him beyond criticism, in the eyes of many Americans. For suggesting recently that not all his words were struck in stone, this writer received a flurry of mail. A typical letter read: "It will be apparent to many Americans that Mr. Solzhenitsyn knows the difference between good and evil, while intellectuals (sic) like yourself, hypnotized by personal cowardice and terrified by personal death, do not." To the barricades!

What this remarkable force in our midst has done is to uncover legacies of the cold war, a deep-seated suspicion of the Kremlin's motives and a lingering hatred of communism and its works. It would be unfortunate if his presence has animated only the yahoos who shrink from the complexities of a dangerous world and resent the subtleties of a policy to deal with them. However, if he has enlivened the debate about detente—and raised questions about foreign policy being the private preserve of a small isolated circle of men, with a mania for secrecy—then he deserves a medal.

It would be ominous if, through Solzhenitsyn, the nation discovered that it needs an enemy as well as a hero.

BY FRED WARNER NEAL

The idea of American-Soviet detente is currently under renewed attack in the United States, led by the visiting expatriate from Russia, Alexander Solzhenitsyn. The onslaught is so powerful, that given the cold-war psychology still present in our society the danger exists that detente may be ripped apart and that we will return to the politics of confrontation. This time, though, a cold war would be far more dangerous than before, with greater peril for us and the world.

Now Solzhenitsyn is undoubtedly a great and prolific writer and a brave and uncompromising man, and a great hoopla has been made on his visit. Whether he would command such a spotlight in the United States were it not for his uncompromising anti-Soviet stand, however, is questionable, even considering his Nobel Prize.

One can readily understand and sympathize with Solzhenitsyn's hatred for a regime which treated him so harshly and unjustly. The trouble is that this doesn't automatically make him a great spokesman for democracy.

Russia has a tradition of turning out great writers who are political screwballs. Fyodor Dostoyevski was one such. And Dostoyevsk

Fred Warner Neal, a professor of international relations at Claremont graduate school, is chairman of the executive committee of the Committee on U.S.-Soviet Relations.

and Solzhenitsyn have a good deal in common. Solzhenitsyn's roots, like Dostoyevski's come from the old Slavophile tradition, which rejects Western ideas including political democracy and social progress, embraces the aspirations of the Russian Orthodox religion with all its inherent nationalism, and sees the essence of goodness in the mystical Russian soul as embodied in *muzhik*, the peasant uncontaminated by education, free press, political debate and other dangerous institutions.

What Solzhenitsyn may lack in the way of democratic credentials, however, he more than compensates for in uncompromising zealotry. Not only does he believe we made a mistake in not pursuing to success our abortive invasion of Russia after the Bolshevik revolution, and not only does he insist we should not have recognized the Soviet Union in 1933, he also comes close to saying that we should have let the Germans win World War II—because he saw in them hope for eliminating the Soviet regime. Beyond that, little matters for Solzhenitsyn.

Now Solzhenitsyn is urging the American people, in effect, to rekindle the cold war and get ready to fight a hot one, no matter how much he denies it. In the meantime, he tells us to make no agreements of any kind with Moscow. If the world destroys itself in a nuclear Armageddon, well, at least the hated Soviet Communists will be destroyed, too. So

SUNDAY TELEGRAPH, London

20 July 1975

Down-to-earth man of truth

By ROBERT CONQUEST

TWO rather different voyages are now in progress. In one of them, out in space, the Soviet rocket Soyuz has parted from Apollo after the spectacular rendezvous. In the other Solzhenitsyn continues his tour of America and, after an initial docking failure, may yet meet President Ford.

I feel rather better qualified than most people to comment on these two events. I am an old rocket buff, a member of the British Interplanetary Society for many years before the first artificial satellites. I lately had a long and most amicable morning with Solzhenitsyn. And I am just back from a tour of the United States where I met political and trade union leaders, academics and responsible journalists (while avoiding the irresponsible, such as some sections of the British Press in Washington).

The rocket display, as is widely recognised, is of fairly marginal technical significance: its main point is as a demonstration, a propaganda exercise, in favour of "détente." Solzhenitsyn, on the other hand, in the tradition of Russia's Holy Fools, has been blurring out truths, has been the child pointing out that the glittering raiment of détente is largely imaginary.

This has produced, in America itself and in our own Press too, an enormous volume of abuse, misrepresentation and denigration from owners of ideological shares in this phantom company. But let us note that even Soyuz contains striking confirmation of all that Solzhenitsyn stands for.

The genius of the Soviet space

apparently, runs the logic of Solzhenitsyn.

Many congressmen still seem ready to do anything in the name of anticommunism, and so they cheered Solzhenitsyn when he addressed them a few days ago. When President Ford declined to receive him at the White House, there was so much criticism the President backed down and issued an invitation.

One can only wonder about Kremlin's reaction to all this. How would we react if the tables were turned? Fortunately, the United States does not have a prominent exile who might publicly call for our downfall. But if there were, imagine what might happen if the Soviet government, while saying it was for détente, invited him to give an address in the Supreme Soviet.

Solzhenitsyn does merit our respect as a great writer and a courageous man. As such, he deserved a hearing. Now that he has had it, I hope the American public will tune him out and consign him to his proper place as a literary giant and a political oddity.

We can then get on with the business of working out ways to live peacefully in a dangerous world—and in the bargain perhaps contribute to a climate which could breed more freedom in the U.S.S.R. and elsewhere.

programme was Sergei Koroiev. This was admitted only after he had died. Before that, the whole thing was attributed to harmless academicians of the second and third rank who were allowed to meet foreigners, go abroad and behave in a manner appropriate to the New Soviet Man.

Koroiev could not be trusted to do this. He had started his contribution in a scientific prison in exactly the circumstances which Solzhenitsyn himself experienced and which formed the theme of the "First Circle."

When released, and given comfortable quarters and fine laboratories, he remained totally cynical about the Soviet order. He used to say that even then (as with Solzhenitsyn's heroes), he remained ready to move with the minimum prison bundle, at the usual moment's notice.

And now, to put it crudely, Koroiev's product is generating fantasy in space, while his colleague is telling the truth on earth. He is pointing out, in fact, and in the bluntest and most tactless way, that, though there may be a peace in the sense of armed truce between the present-day Soviet Union and the countries of the West, the idea that the Kremlin's motivations have basically changed, or are likely to change, as the result of trade, conferences, handshakes and mutual expressions of goodwill, is a false one.

To do the Russian leaders justice they at least have always proclaimed that détente is "a method of struggle."

For them "détente" is different from "cold war" merely in the tactical sense which Aesop developed 2,000 years ago in that famous fable where the Wind and the Sun try in turn to remove a traveller's cloak, the first by cold blasts, which only make the man clutch the garment more tightly about him, the second by increasing warmth. The sun, of course, wins.

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There are two types in America and Europe who do not wish these facts to be made known. First there are those who, for whatever reason, are motivated by an anti-Western automatism. Secondly, there are "men of goodwill" who are so concerned with, or personally committed to, the rosier opinions about pseudo-détente that they cannot believe the truth to be otherwise.

Both types have found Solzhenitsyn a nuisance. On the advice of the détente faction in the American Administration, President Ford was originally unable to fit in a talk with him—being busy with such matters of state as a meeting with a basketball team.

At a lower level (lower in every sense) there has been vicious sniping at Solzhenitsyn. To undermine his vast moral authority is

not, indeed, an easy task. Nor can it be argued very convincingly by those in the trendy bars of the Washington Press corps that he does not understand Russia.

Still, there are ways: he is a difficult customer from a cruder society, he does not understand how such bonds as trade and official visits will gradually erode Soviet hostility (even while freedom of movement of people and ideas remains under total ban and while Soviet-ruled populations are subject to a vast campaign of anti-Western "vigilance," even when it is recalled that the highest points of German-Russian trade were in 1914 and 1940 respectively).

But above all he can be got at—as in a widely condemned and particularly nasty little piece in the *Guardian* the other day—through those in the West who agree with him. These are all "red-necks" or idiot trade union leaders, proponents—of course—of "cold war." One would gather

that none but Neanderthal patriots from the Ozarks hold the view of the Soviet leadership which Solzhenitsyn puts forward, or have qualms about "détente."

In fact, of course, it is common to almost all serious students of the Soviet Union and of foreign affairs in the United States and here too: by everyone who writes and thinks of these affairs, in fact, except for appeasement-minded journalists and some circles in the American Administration.

The phrase "cold war" is of course the litmus paper for the *Guardian* attitude. Cold war, bad; détente, good—these appear to be the furthest limits of political thought such minds can attain. But during the recent prevalence of détente we have seen Russian cannon blasting the way into Saigon, Russian tanks pouring to the edge of the Golan Heights, the Russian-sponsored Cunhal bidding for dictatorship in Lisbon...

For the more serious proponents of the American Administration's current policy, the disadvantage has always been that an atmosphere of the utmost cordiality towards a power that you admittedly do not trust enough to give it supremacy in armaments contributes to the psychological disarmament of the West.

I would suspect that even while Soyuz and Apollo bombinate amicably in the vacuum overhead Dr. Kissinger himself, if not his lesser followers, welcomes the strengthening of the West's resolve which arises from such bluntness as Solzhenitsyn's.

Meanwhile, one could hardly express the issue more clearly than one of the major bugbears of the "liberals," George Meany, did a year or two ago:

WASHINGTON STAR
1 August 1975

William F. Buckley Jr.

The attempt to stigmatize Solzhenitsyn

The gradual rejection of Solzhenitsyn by the American intellectual establishment was predictable. For one thing he is entirely independent, moving through the cosmopolitan scene without tripping over any of the lilliputian nets that ensnare most of us. Now *Newsweek* magazine has come up with the killer designation: "The exile found himself ignored by some influential liberals and embraced — apparently to his discomfort — by the conservative right." If only they can thus taxonomize him — a member of the conservative right — they can pin him up in a showcase along with the rare and grotesque butterflies, let him go on there with his writhings and — forget about him.

The extensive story in *Newsweek* does not tell us just how Solzhenitsyn is embarrassed by the support given to him by the conservative right. When he insisted that Senator James Buckley of New York be invited to hear his speech in Manhattan, he was hardly shrinking from an association with the right. On the other hand, his principal sponsors were the trade unions, the organized voices of the working man — and they gave him a tumultuous reception. Unremarked in *Newsweek*.

"His writings glorify the wisdom of the simple peasant and the righteousness of the most rural communities," wrote the editors. So did Thomas Jefferson's, the founder of the Democratic party.

He speaks of the "decadence of Western society." So does the *New York Review of Books*, Noam Chomsky, and Herbert Mar-

cuse.

"He hates cars and cities." So does Ralph Nader.

"He was shocked to find that interest in Soviet affairs seemed to be limited to the far right." Well, if that is so, I too am shocked. Interest in Soviet affairs was very great among the far left during a period when much of it was servile to the Soviet state. *Newsweek* seems to be suggesting, though I doubt it was intentional, that American liberals have lost interest in the Soviet Union now that they acknowledge it as a slave state bent on maintaining the captive nations in captivity, and manufacturing more and better hydrogen bombs with which to threaten us.

If Solzhenitsyn is a far rightist who appeals to the far right, he goes at it in a most unorthodox way. Having declared that the Russian people are the natural allies of the American workers, he commented in one of his recent speeches about "another alliance — at first glance a strange one, a surprising one — but if you think about it, in fact one which is well-grounded and easy to understand: this is the alliance between our Communist leaders and your capitalists."

"This alliance is not new," Solzhenitsyn reminded his audience. "The very famous Armand Hammer, who is flourishing here today, laid the basis for this when he made the first exploratory trip into Russia, still in Lenin's time, in the

very first years of the Revolution. He was extremely successful in this intelligence mission and since that time for all these 50

years, we observe continuous and steady support by the businessmen of the West of the Soviet Communist leaders." Doesn't sound to me like a typical far right talk.

Solzhenitsyn went on to discuss a recent exhibit of United States anticriminal technology which the Russians bought up with fascination. The difference being that we were selling our scientific paraphernalia not to the law-abiding for use against criminals, but to criminals for use against the law-abiding: rather like inventing a guillotine for the purpose of chopping meat, and then selling it to *Rosespiere* for other uses.

"This is something which is almost incomprehensible to the human mind: that burning greed for profit which goes beyond all reason, all self control, all conscience, only to get money." Far right talk, to

the editors of *Newsweek*. As a veteran of a number of right-wing rallies, I take leave to pronounce this as an unorthodox way to cement relations with the capitalist class.

What Solzhenitsyn is of course proving is that the deep resources of humanity lie for the most part in the conservative community. This is despicable. Because conservatives, by and large, do not believe in the shifting standards of right and wrong which, for instance, can bring a Barbara Tuchman, a James Reston, or a John Kenneth Galbraith to travel to mainland China and report back their boundless enthusiasm for the work of Mao Tse-tung. If his tormentors truly succeeded in identifying Solzhenitsyn as a member of the far right, they will succeed in identifying themselves as the heartless, mindless robots they, in fact, so often are.

NEW YORK TIMES
4 August 1975

Life Without Dreams

By Anthony Lewis

In his speech to the Helsinki Conference, President Ford emphasized its pledges of freer movement for people and ideas. "It is important," he told the leaders of thirty-four other countries there, "that you recognize the deep devotion of the American people and their Government to human rights and fundamental freedom."

How embarrassingly hollow those words must have sounded. For Mr. Ford had just had a chance to demonstrate his devotion to human rights in the simplest way—by meeting a man who symbolizes the struggle for them—and he failed the test.

The decision not to invite Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn to the White House has been deplored by now from all points of the ideological compass. For sheer political ineptitude it was in a special class. But beyond that, the episode teaches us some things about the nature of political life.

"... with regard to Moscow's present line, we are told that we must 'accept the politics of reality.' That means the Berlin Wall, minefields along the frontier, ransom for Soviet Jews, and acceptance of, say, the persecution of Lithuanian Catholics as an 'internal Soviet affair.'

"Well, we don't see it that way. We don't want to start any wars, but we insist on something that seems to disturb a lot of so-called intellectuals—we insist on emphasising the difference between democracy and dictatorship."

And so says Solzhenitsyn. And so say all of us.

tators in the United States seized on Solzhenitsyn's presence here as a way to dramatize their argument that détente is a mistake because the Soviet Union can never be trusted. The only way to deal with Communism, they say, is to oppose it everywhere by military strength—and increase the already enormous burden of the arms budget.

President Ford and Secretary of State Kissinger allowed that view to occupy the field by their foolishness. But the special importance of Solzhenitsyn does not lie in any particular political stance, or in his own Christian-Slav mysticism. It lies in his person, his witness, his words. Solzhenitsyn has shown the world that one human being, through his courage and his art, can inflict moral defeat on the most powerful of tyrannies. He has reminded us of the potentialities of the human spirit. And of course that achievement transcends any narrow politics.

The United States cannot ordinarily help the victims of tyranny by means of bombs or missiles. We do not live in that kind of world. Our recourse has to be to other ways of pressure: political and economic and psycho-

AT HOME ABROAD

logical. One of the most important things we can do is simply to make

JAPAN TIMES

25 July 1975

A Transplanted Hero

By Max Lerner



Watching Alexander Solzhenitsyn on TV, on the Meet the Press program, one saw a transplanted hero, with a Dostoevskian growth of beard and fierceness of eye, coming on with the intensity of a major prophet. Because the setting was the familiar American one of electronic journalism the torrential flow of his talk had to be sliced up into question-and-answer segments. When the Apocalypse comes it will be measured out in two-minute dribbles, with time out for a commercial.

Solzhenitsyn's American tour is not just a case of another visit by another famous foreigner. It is a historic test of what happens to a hero when he gets ripped up from his native soil and transplanted to a foreign one. Does the magic of heroism get muted, the halo tarnished? Does the sense of the extraordinary dissolve when dipped into the everyday?

The Soviet leaders, when they packed Solzhenitsyn off on a plane to Switzerland, may have gambled on this happening. They hoped that with the transplanting to Western Europe and America the bloom would wear off the rose.

Will it? The danger of its happening is clear enough. As long as Solzhenitsyn spoke and wrote from within the belly of the monster itself, putting his life on the line, courting peril, daring the Soviet masters to stop him, the rest of the world—including his critics on the left—watched in awe. They didn't dare speak out against him. But now that he is out of extreme danger, appearing securely before American audiences, visiting with a delegation of American senators, his critics no longer are inhibited.

The whispers get louder. Isn't he a cold warrior, as witness his quoting Melvin Laird on SALT I? Isn't he old hat, hobnobbing with George Meany and the other old men of American conservative labor? Isn't he a fanatical anti-Communist, who

clear that we have a commitment to human rights—a commitment going beyond immediate political considerations.

For those who live under oppression, it can make all the difference to know that somewhere outside others care about them and share their views of humanity. That is why those who suffer discrimination in South Africa give such an emotional welcome to visitors from abroad. And it is exactly the same for dissenters in the Soviet Union. It would have been a restoring symbol of hope, for them, if an American President had shaken the hand of Solzhenitsyn.

A second lesson of the episode, a sad one, is that we suffer these days from political leaders without ideals, without dreams. Their interest is limited to the immediate, their vision to power.

Consider the reason finally given for the decision of state to keep away from Solzhenitsyn. After various pathetic excuses from the White House, Mr. Kissinger gave this explanation: Solzhenitsyn's "views," if they became our "national policy," would threaten "military conflict."

Now I happen to think that that stated reason had nothing to do with the case. I think Henry Kissinger just cares much less about human rights and decency than he does about power and short-term political objectives. He

sustains the right-wing governments of such countries as Chile and South Korea, despite their brutal character, because he thinks them helpful to his policy. And he does not want to let anything get in the way of his doing business with Leonid Brezhnev.

But in a way it would be worse if Mr. Kissinger really meant what he said. For the suggestion is that an American President dare not meet a person with bad ideas, however great a human being, lest the President be infected with his views and make them "national policy." Try to imagine Jefferson or Lincoln or Roosevelt afraid of ideas.

We ask our politicians to do the work of the day, and we should not expect them to show the same concern as artists for eternal truths. But we may begin to wonder, in this age, whether something has happened to make political leaders everywhere—not only in the United States—such narrow, humorless, insensitive creatures.

It is our own fault, as citizens, if we begin to see life in the politicians' limited terms. There is more in the stars than that. Generations thrill to Mozart that do not know the politicians of his age. Men will remember and read Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn when Gerald Ford is a footnote to history: The name of a President who pardoned his criminal predecessor.

will get the United States into trouble with the Soviet Union? Isn't it dangerous to talk of the Russian people being buried by their rulers? Isn't he just a Catholic writer carrying the same old anti-Communist message that other exiles have carried—the Poles, Lithuanians, Latvians and the rest?

Isn't he a stick-in-the-mud conservative, and a mystical one, too, with all his talk about religion and love of the Russian earth and the soul of the people? Isn't he enveloping the American people of the Heartland with the same mystique?

The answer is, of course, that one can disagree with particular views of Solzhenitsyn and still see his continuing heroic quality. He could have made an easy adjustment to his exile. He could now be mouthing all the fancy rhetoric that would go down beautifully with the intellectual elites of New York, Washington, Paris, London, and they would be carrying him on their shoulders—before they dumped him in time. But that isn't his style. He is in dead earnest, he is consumed with an inner fire, and he won't let anyone near him get out of reach of the flames.

On the question of President Ford's failure to see him, Solzhenitsyn's answer—that he didn't come as a guest of the American Government and didn't expect to be received by Mr. Ford—is good enough in its own way. Yet something must be added. As long as the rulers of one great power would deem it an unfriendly act for the head of another great power to talk with a major intellectual figure from either country, there is no common climate between the two, and as yet no world intellectual community.

Solzhenitsyn is especially good on the question of communication between peoples. The experience of one people, he says, is communicated back to another by its great writers. He adds that the burden of experience borne by the Russian people has been tragic. This is true of the American people, too, if our writers and thinkers could only express it.

Asked whether he regards the West as in decline, Solzhenitsyn answers no; that it is only the will of its ruling groups which is weak. He might have added that the perceptions of its intellectual communities are also confused. If Solzhenitsyn can act as a seer, and invoke the experience of the Russian people to make the people of the West see more clearly, he will play a great historic role outside Russia, as he did within Russia.

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